

So long as the United States has vital interests in Arab lands and the United Arab Republic has a role of influence and leadership, the two countries cannot escape doing business with each other. The question is whether they can be sufficiently mature, clear sighted and patient to work out gradually a consistent and mutually profitable relationship.

Let Us Stand in Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 23, 1965

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, as I indicated in earlier remarks on the floor of the House, I am inserting in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD an article by Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin, respected military commentator, which appeared in the Sunday New York Times Magazine for February 21, 1965.

In the article, entitled "We Must Choose—(1) 'Bug Out,' (2) Negotiate, (3) Fight," Mr. Baldwin argues for a greater use of American military power in Vietnam. He believes we must fight a war to prevent an irreparable defeat.

While I do not agree with Mr. Baldwin's observations and recommendations in every instance, it is my belief that he has made a distinct contribution to the dialog on this issue.

Among his suggestions which I believe should be implemented are these:

First, the United States itself must provide maximum possible security for our installations in South Vietnam. Rather than rely on the South Vietnamese as we have in the past, we should use U.S. armed guards to defend against Vietcong attacks on our airplanes, helicopters, barracks, and other facilities.

Second, Mr. Baldwin points out that coordination between the various U.S. agencies working in Vietnam could be further improved. This problem was evident to me during my visits to Vietnam, the last in October 1963. Apparently there has been some improvement, but more could be done to streamline our operations.

Further, he suggests that military troops in Vietnam be made responsible for holding the areas cleared of Vietcong guerrillas, a task at present being done by internal security forces. This recommendation deserves careful attention.

I do not agree, however, with Mr. Baldwin's belief that a commitment of U.S. combat troops under United States-South Vietnamese joint command is necessary at this time.

Rather, I would hope to see greater efforts being made to convince our allies in Southeast Asia—especially the South Koreans, Nationalist Chinese and the Filipinos—to send forces into South Vietnam to assist in defeating Communist aggression there.

WE MUST CHOOSE: (1) "BUG OUT," (2) NEGOTIATE, (3) FIGHT
(By Hanson W. Baldwin)

What should we do—"bug out" or fight? Should we be hawks or doves? Or is there a third choice—negotiations now?

Recent events in Vietnam indicate that "the war that is not a war" has reached a crossroads. Washington's policy of the past 4 years, based on the polite fiction that we were not fighting a war but merely helping the Vietnamese to defeat the Vietcong insurgents within their own territory, has reached a point of no return.

Compromise and consensus—perhaps applicable to some of the Nation's great domestic problems—cannot be guideposts to foreign policy. There must be a clear-cut and courageous decision. And though in Vietnam we face the hard problem of risking much to gain little, the risk must be taken; we must fight a war to prevent an irreparable defeat. We must use what it takes to win.

Our policy should not be "unconditional surrender" or unlimited victory. Our goal of victory should be the defeat of Communist attempts to conquer South Vietnam and extend their control deep into southeast Asia.

The reasons we must fight for Vietnam have little to do with making Saigon safe for democracy or freedom. There has been far too much cant on this point, far too much effort devoted to trying to establish a politically legitimate South Vietnamese Government after our own image. Nor does it do much good to argue the past, debating whether or not we should have become involved in Vietnam in the first place. The facts are that Communist expansionism in Asia has been consistent, related and progressive, that the end of the Korean war, without a simultaneous settlement in Vietnam, gave Peiping and North Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh the opportunity in southeast Asia they have so well exploited.

Belatedly, but nevertheless clearly, the United States became aware of the threat. Our commitments to Saigon began in the Eisenhower administration and were enormously amplified after the Kennedy administration took power 4 years ago. Today, we are committed—fully committed—by the words of Presidents and Cabinet members, by the actions of the Government, by the deep involvement of U.S. military forces.

U.S. global prestige and power is intimately bound up with the outcome of the Vietnamese struggle. In Vietnam, we are attempting to formulate an answer to the Communist strategy of creeping aggression, of subversion and insurgency, of what Khrushchev called "wars of national liberation." If the might and will of the United States cannot evolve a victorious answer to such tactics, we are undone; the map of the world will gradually become red. And if we will not fight in Vietnam, where—after the series of Communist conquests in the past 20 years—will we fight? Where will we draw the line?

The psychological and political consequences of a U.S. defeat in Vietnam, a U.S. withdrawal, or a negotiated peace likely to lead to a Communist takeover, would be disastrous in much of Asia. It would undermine Thailand (already openly threatened by Peiping), Laos (even now half conquered by communism), Malaya, the Philippines (with its growing anti-Americanism), Burma, India, Japan, and even Taiwan, Okinawa, and Australia.

For a long time after the politically stalemated end of the Korean war, Peiping was successfully depicting the United States to the peoples of Asia as a "paper tiger." The defeat of the French—backed heavily by American aid—in Indochina enhanced this image of a windy, weak-willed, feeble Uncle Sam. That image has since been dispelled by U.S. actions in and around the Taiwan Straits, during the Cuban missile crisis and, recently, by President Johnson's retaliatory air attacks upon North Vietnamese objectives. But the portrait of flabby indecision could be easily revived if the United States loses in Vietnam.

Strategically, South Vietnam is too important to be allowed to go by default. North Vietnam badly needs the rice of the

South. More important, the area is the traditional rice bowl of the continent. Geographically, Vietnam is a long appendix pointing toward the rich archipelago of Indonesia and abutting strategic sea passages. Whoever dominates it will eventually control most of the Indonesian archipelago.

The strategic importance of the area is similar to the so-called "rimlands," or maritime nations, of Western Europe which represent a powerful bastion against the "heartland" of Soviet Russia. In Asia, the non-Communist strategic position vis-a-vis Red China is based upon mainland positions—Pakistan, India, southeast Asia, and the island bastions of the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa and Japan. If the "rimlands" of Asia fall to communism, the island positions will be doomed sooner or later. Ultimately the Communists will challenge us upon what is now our unchallenged domain—the oceans.

In a word, we must remain in southeast Asia for our own security needs. South Vietnam is in itself not "vital" in the sense that the United States cannot live without it. But if lost we would be forced to commence the next chapter of the world conflict in retreat, and at a disadvantage.

Despite the admitted importance of South Vietnam to the U.S. global position, the current breed of neoisolationists and the "doves" who believe we must cut our losses and get out advance many arguments against deeper involvement and in favor of withdrawal.

Most of the arguments represent the voices of defeat and despair, caution and fear.

"Why not negotiate now?"

Any negotiations opened now would lead from weakness, not strength. If we want to negotiate—and not to surrender—we shall have to raise our ante considerably. And "meaningful" negotiations are "meaningful" to the Communists only if they are faced with superior power and a position of strength.

We must "arm to parley." Personally, I seriously doubt whether talks can guarantee peace in Vietnam and southeast Asia, as some quarters have suggested, by neutralizing the area politically and militarily; in short, by eliminating the struggle for influence between Communists and non-Communists. Nevertheless, we need not fear negotiations if we speak from strength, by really putting up a fight for Vietnam.

Continuing U.S. air and sea attacks on North Vietnam would serve notice on Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow that the United States will no longer tolerate "sanctuary warfare." They might—hopefully—force Hanoi to the conference table. Indeed, such a policy would appear to be the minimum necessary to open any kind of negotiations. Yet even such a program will not "win" the war in the South.

"If the French couldn't win, how can the United States achieve victory?"

The implication of this argument is twofold: (1) we have donned the colonial mantle of the French, and (2) our power is no greater than that of Paris. Both suggestions are absurd.

As some of our diplomats have found to their discomfort, South Vietnam is distinctly an independent country—not, as in France's day, part of a colonial empire. In fact, the fear of Chinese Communist colonialism is probably greater in all of Vietnam, and in North Vietnam in particular, than the fear of United States "imperialism." As for a comparison between the political, economic, and military power of the United States and France, there is none. Particularly in the air and at sea we can mobilize power completely unavailable to France, backed up by the ultimate force which France did not possess—a nuclear arsenal.

"You can't win a war against guerrillas."

Not true. We have dressed up the fighting in Vietnam with a fancy name—"counterinsurgency," but some of its basic mili-

tary elements resemble the kind of war Americans have fought successfully many times in the past in Nicaragua, Haiti, and behind the main fighting fronts during the Korean war. Other anti-Communist guerrilla wars were won in Greece, the Philippines, and Malaya. The Portuguese seem to have done a pretty good job of stamping out the rebellion in Angola. Guerrillas can be defeated, but it takes careful organization, special training, and security forces that should be from 10 to 30 times larger than the guerrillas. It takes infinite determination and patience.

"Continued fighting or expanded U.S. involvement will mean higher U.S. casualties and greater risks of broadening the war."

Of course. You cannot win a war without spilling blood. We must pay the price of power. Risks are unavoidable in any foreign policy worthy of its name. The question is not whether there will be risks, but the degree of risk. For against the perils of action must be weighed the perils of inaction. Political and military history clearly reveal that compromise, hesitancy or appeasement merely lead to ultimate disaster. In Vietnam, the longer we wait, the greater the price we shall have to pay for even partial victory (as we are now discovering), and the more restricted our choice of options.

"We have no moral right to be in Vietnam, or to attack North Vietnam."

Neither do the Vietcong. Nor does North Vietnam have the right to support the civil war in the South. Our involvement was a response to Communist aggression. Since the beginning, Hanoi has organized, supplied and directed the Vietcong insurgency. We were invited by the South Vietnamese Government to come to its aid. A high moral purpose is an essential element of our foreign policy but we can be left with no purpose—moral or otherwise—if we are conquered by the doctrine that the ends justify the means. If we are inhibited from action by Hamlet-like indecision over legalistic concepts of international law, we shall lose the world.

"What's the use of further military involvement, when the political instability of South Vietnam pulls the rug from under our feet?"

Here is one of the more cogent objections to greater involvement. But in the long history of Vietnam there have always been feuding sects and factions. Moreover, the French left behind them a people still unequipped for self-government. Yet somehow or other the war has gone on, and somewhat better in some respects recently. Greater U.S. involvement—above all, a tangible determination to win—may well do more for Saigon's political stability than any amount of diplomatic pressures.

"Isn't the real danger that escalation might involve us in a larger war? Wouldn't the Chinese come in?"

"This is the \$64 million question. It is quite clear that if the United States becomes more involved we must be prepared for greater effort by the enemy. Escalation in some form would be not only possible, but likely. But we have advantages. We are fighting, as we did in Korea, on a peninsula where our superior sea and air power can be most effective. North Vietnam's few powerplants and industries are vulnerable to destruction. The Gulf of Tonkin is easily blockaded. And China itself, with an obsolete air force and minimal naval power, could not defend itself effectively against a determined air and sea attack.

Nevertheless, an expanded effort by the United States in Vietnam may well be answered by an increased flow of supplies and men from North Vietnam, perhaps by an all-out attack by the North Vietnamese Army,

and perhaps ultimately by aid from China into South Vietnam. Though the flow could be hampered and reduced by air attacks it could not be completely halted. It is quite possible that the United States might become involved in a new kind of Korean war. But this would not be hopeless by any means. In fact, some well-informed authorities believe the United States could win a Korean type of war in South Vietnam-Laos against the best that the Chinese Communists could throw against us.

"What about the specter of nuclear weapons? Wouldn't Russia join in, even if China didn't have enough A-bombs to do us any harm?"

There is no certain answer to these questions, but a full scale nuclear war is highly unlikely. The United States has scared itself to death by its own nuclear propaganda. The fear of a nuclear exchange—never probable, or even likely—has been the greatest single restraint upon a positive and firm U.S. diplomacy since World War II.

Presidents and public alike have been inhibited by the nightmare of the mushroom cloud. Yet the lessons of the Cuban missile crisis should be remembered. Is it in any way probable that the Kremlin would risk for Vietnam what it would not risk for Cuba? Moscow knows our nuclear power. Would Russia invite its own destruction as a nation by invoking the use of nuclear weapons in any cause except the defense of its own soil? The questions answer themselves.

We must also remember the risks of delay. If there is a danger of nuclear retaliation today by Peiping, how much greater will it be tomorrow when China will have accumulated a stockpile of weapons? Time is restricting our options.

Clearly, then, the stakes in Vietnam are large enough to warrant the risks of greater U.S. involvement. Whether or not we raise our ante, the enemy will. The Communists are implacably determined to triumph, and the only factor that can prevent their victory is superior power in all its forms. More of the same on our part will no longer serve any purpose, save slow defeat.

What should we do? First and foremost, we must recognize as a Government and as a people that we are fighting a war in Vietnam, not merely advising how to fight one. Such a recognition would awaken a greater sense of national and military determination, inspire a Presidential and congressional enunciation of purpose, and create a more streamlined military operation in Vietnam.

Second, the United States itself must provide maximum possible security in Vietnam to major U.S. installations, such as airfields, supply depots, and headquarters. Secretary McNamara's statement that it was impossible to guard against such attacks as those recently made by the Vietcong against U.S. airfields and barracks is no answer. Of course, 100-percent security is impossible in any war; defense against terrorism and sabotage is especially difficult. But there is no doubt whatsoever that we can provide better security to key installations than the South Vietnamese, who have been responsible for the job in the past.

We need U.S. ground tactical units in South Vietnam to defend our installations. We need infantry battalions, military police companies, Army Engineers, and Navy Seabees to build aircraft revetments, dugouts, and protected barracks. Yet all this is purely defensive; it should reduce U.S. casualties but it will not win the war.

Another essential measure is simplification and streamlining of both the high military command and the "country team" units, composed of representatives from various Government agencies, that support

our aid effort in Vietnam. We must get more Americans and more Vietnamese out of the bistros of Saigon and into the bush. The coordination between the military, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the U.S. Information Agency and the Agency for International Development is far better than it once was. But it is still far from perfect, in Saigon or in Washington. The war has shown, for instance, that South Vietnamese-United States teams have been able in many instances to carry out the military portion of the "clear and hold" prescription for victory. But AID—not the military—is responsible for police and internal security forces in Vietnam, and these cadres rarely have been able to hold an area once it has been cleared of the Vietcong. Perhaps military troops should be charged with the "hold," as well as the "clear," part of the operations. Certainly internal policing needs a major overhaul.

A basic change in the prescription for victory demands a United States-South Vietnamese unified command such as now exists in South Korea.

Continuous and heavy air and sea attacks against staging areas, supply routes, training fields, camps and recuperation centers of the Vietcong in North and South Vietnam and Laos will be necessary for any appreciable diminution in the flow of men and supplies to the Communists. The one-shot retaliatory raids have only temporary and minimum military importance; viewed as political and psychological warnings, they are likely to provoke the Vietcong and North Vietnam to a redoubled war effort.

The history of airpower dictates the need for unrelenting, massive attacks. Bombing targets in North Vietnam probably would have to be broadened to include powerplants, bridges, industries, road junctions, docks and oil storage facilities. A naval blockade and naval gunfire may well supplement the air bombardment. To carry out effectively any such program as this, U.S. air and naval forces in the Western Pacific would require material strengthening.

Meanwhile, it would take years of effort inside South Vietnam itself to reduce the Vietcong to manageable proportions. Much larger and better led, South Vietnamese forces would be necessary. They would have to be supplemented by U.S. ground troops—perhaps in small numbers at first, but more later, particularly if North Vietnamese regular forces and Chinese soldiers joined the Vietcong.

How many U.S. soldiers would be needed is uncertain—probably a minimum of three to six divisions (utilized chiefly in battalion or brigade-size units), possibly as many as 10 or 12 divisions. Including Air Force, Navy, and supporting units, perhaps 200,000 to 1 million Americans would be fighting in Vietnam.

Obviously, this would mean a Korea-type conflict, a major war, no matter what euphemisms would be used. Nor could we wage it in the present "business as usual" economy. We would require partial mobilization, vastly beefed-up military production. Many weaknesses in our military structure would need strengthening. Even so, we could not anticipate quick success. The war would be long, nasty, and wearing.

No one could relish such a prospect as this; the stark statistics of war explain the President's reluctance to embark upon a path that has no turning.

Vietnam is a nasty place to fight. But there are no neat and tidy battlefields in the struggle for freedom; there is no good place to die. And it is far better to fight in Vietnam—on China's doorstep—than fight some years hence in Hawaii, on our own frontiers.

of useful products for mankind. Upon his death of January 5, 1943, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's telegram to Tuskegee Institute said, "all mankind are the beneficiaries of his discoveries."

Justice Felix Frankfurter

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. WILLIAM L. HUNGATE

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 8, 1965

Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Speaker, a few short years ago at the law school in Cambridge, a bust of Justice Felix Frankfurter was presented to take its place alongside four other great jurists of our century: Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis D. Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, and Learned Hand. Now Professor Frankfurter, for he remained a teacher throughout his judicial tenure, has joined those others in answering that summons, for which no continuance can be granted. Professor Frankfurter will require no extension of time to plead. His life exemplified the creed espoused by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes when he spoke to the 50th anniversary of his class in June 1911:

To see so far as one may, and to feel the great forces that are behind every detail . . . to hammer out as compact and solid a piece of work as one can, to try to make it first rate, and to leave it unadvertised.

All of this Justice Frankfurter has done. The words of his last major opinion filed in dissent in March 1962, in the Tennessee apportionment case sounded a warning bell that still rings true today:

The Justice wrote:

"The Court today reverses a uniform course of decision established by a dozen cases, including one by which the very claim now sustained was unanimously rejected only 5 years ago.

"Such a massive repudiation of the experience of our whole past in asserting destructively novel judiciary power demands a detailed analysis of the role of this Court in our constitutional system.

"Disregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the Court's 'judicial power' not only presages the futility of judicial intervention in the essentially political conflict of forces. . . . It may well impair the Court's position as the ultimate organ of 'the supreme law of the land' in that vast range of legal problems, often strongly entangled in popular feeling, on which this Court must pronounce.

"PUBLIC CONFIDENCE

"The Court's authority—processed neither of the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political settlements."

The struggle Justice Frankfurter went through in leaving his personal convictions behind came through most sharply in his 1943 dissent in the flag salute case. The Court reversed a previous decision and ruled that children of Jehovah's Witnesses could

not be forced to salute the U.S. flag at school. Frankfurter, disagreeing, said:

"One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in history is not likely to be insensible to the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution. Were my purely personal attitude relevant I should wholeheartedly associate myself with the general libertarian views in the Court's opinion, representing as they do the thought and action of a lifetime.

"FEELING AS JUDGE

"But as judges we are neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic. . . . As a member of this Court I am not justified in writing my private notions into the Constitution, no matter how deeply I may cherish them or how mischievous I may deem their disregard."

He was with the majority in ruling that congressional committees must make clear to witnesses the pertinency of questions; in drawing a sharp distinction between subversive thought and action; and in striking down the State Department's restrictive passport regulations as not authorized by law.

Perhaps his most bitter defeat on the Court was his last one. That was the Tennessee apportionment case where six Justices voted to allow lower Federal courts to hear the complaints of citizens who think unequal voting districts dilute their right to vote.

For Justice Frankfurter, the Court's decision to step into what he called a political thicket was tragic.

The lamps of learning he has lit shall light the paths of countless generations yet unborn.

National Lutheran Council Endorses President Johnson's Immigration Bill

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN BRADEMAS

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, February 18, 1965

Mr. BRADEMAS. Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent, I insert in the RECORD the text of a resolution adopted by the National Lutheran Council supporting President Johnson's proposal for revision of the immigration law.

Although the Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, does not officially participate in the National Lutheran Council, it wishes to be associated with the substance of this resolution.

The text of the resolution follows:

RESOLUTION ON IMMIGRATION

Whereas the National Lutheran Council has consistently expressed hope that Congress will establish immigration laws, "just to all and ministering most truly to the public welfare"; and

Whereas the National Lutheran Council has stated its "firm conviction that the existing immigration legislation has severe shortcomings, as a result of which neither traditional Christian humanitarianism nor enlightened self-interest are adequately exhibited," and has expressed hope that Congress will "seek a just and workable substitute for the national origins quota system"; and

Whereas the statement "Immigration Policy: Moral Issues and the National Interest," endorsed by the National Lutheran Council

at its meeting on February 4, 1960, commended for study and consideration the following five possible objectives as the basis of a revised U.S. immigration law:

1. To supply our permanent population with a steady proportion of newcomers who have chosen the United States as their new homeland and who can impart to their American neighbors an understanding of the cultures, attitudes, and interests of other races and peoples of the world.

2. To assume the United States proper share of international responsibility for the resettlement of refugees and of other persons urgently in need of the compassionate haven of a new homeland.

3. To facilitate the reuniting of families.

4. To facilitate the entry of persons possessing special skills or other capacities needed by the American economy and culture.

5. To admit annually a reasonable number of the persons described above on an objective basis of selection which, while discriminating, will not be discriminatory with respect to race, national origin, color, or religion, testifying thereby to the U.S. recognition of the interlocking and mutual interests of all nations with regard to the migration of people, the interaction of cultures and respect of universal human rights; and

Whereas the proposed legislation submitted to Congress by President Johnson on January 13, 1965, represents substantial progress toward the fulfillment of the basic hopes and objectives expressed in prior National Lutheran Council resolutions: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the National Lutheran Council reaffirm its concern for a fair and just immigration law, and express its hope that Congress will enact into law the principles and objectives contained in the President's proposal now before Congress; and be it further

Resolved, That the congregations of the member bodies of the National Lutheran Council be encouraged to welcome immigrants into their fellowship and to assist them in continuing integration into community life.

Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 23, 1965

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, when the history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam is finally written, a great American newspaper—the New York Times—will have a special place for having lived up to the highest standard of courageous and incisive journalism. No newcomer to this complex issue, the New York Times published articles by Pulitzer Prize winner David Halberstam and Homer Bigart which brought to light the realities of the dictatorial Diem regime. Recently James Reston has analyzed the complexities of Vietnam in a number of penetrating articles, and the New York Times has put special emphasis on Vietnam on the editorial page in a series of in-depth editorials. I commend the following three editorials to my colleagues:

[From the New York Times, Feb. 19, 1965]

THE WAR HAWKS

A comparatively small group of Americans, at this moment predominantly political in character and predominantly Republican in

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politics, is doing its best to multiply the perils and frustrations of the war in southeast Asia.

This group ignores the realities of the present situation. It ignores the obvious weariness of the people of South Vietnam. It ignores the steady stream of desertions from the Vietnamese Army. It ignores the difficulty of protecting isolated American bases against the surprise attacks of guerrillas.

It ignores the possibility of an invasion of South Vietnam by the very considerable North Vietnamese Army. It ignores the problem of how an aerial counterattack could cope successfully with a massive ground attack of this character. It ignores the possibility of Chinese intervention. It ignores the logistics and belittles the cost in lives lost, blood spilled and treasure wasted, of fighting a war on a jungle front 7,000 miles from the coast of California.

The whole aim of this group is to expand the Vietnamese war, even if it means drawing in China and perhaps the Soviet Union as well. By its lights, President Johnson's declaration that the United States seeks no wider war is as much a prescription for failure as any attempt at a negotiated peace. It is one thing to say, as Secretary McNamara did in his testimony yesterday, that this country has "no other alternative than continuing to support South Vietnam against the Red guerrilla onslaught." It is quite another to argue that the road out of the present hazardous situation is to invite world destruction. The American people made it overwhelmingly clear in the last election that they do not want to plunge recklessly down that road.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 20, 1965]

REVOLVING DOOR IN SAIGON

Personal and group ambitions seem more consequential to some of South Vietnam's key military leaders than the war against the Vietcong. The world worries about the danger of a general war growing out of the U.S. effort to underwrite Vietnamese freedom with American men, money and arms. Yet, the primary worry for many of the generals and colonels who are supposed to be in direct charge of Saigon's war effort revolves around personal power.

In his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, at almost the time the latest coup was beginning, Secretary McNamara warned that without national unity and a stable government the South Vietnamese would not be able to make effective use either of their own armed forces or of the help the United States is giving them. His words were apparently lost on the battling warlords in Saigon.

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this newest in an endless series of internal upheavals is how unprepared every American policymaker in Saigon or Washington seemed to be for it. The available evidence suggests that the abortive coup was hatched in the South Vietnamese Embassy in Washington, where Colonel Thao was press attaché until recently and where Lieutenant General Khlem is currently ambassador. The total surprise of American officialdom indicates an abysmal failure of the Central Intelligence Agency and every branch of military intelligence. It is all much too reminiscent of the days when Washington gave over-ready credence to the late Ngo Dinh Diem's glowing reports of military victories and villages made secure.

The situation in Saigon is still too obscure to permit any forecast of who will emerge as ruler for a day, a week, or a month. But there are enough puzzles about the latest insurgence to raise suspicion that the Vietcong may have infiltrated the highest councils of the Vietnamese armed forces. Certainly, there is no prospect of the kind of stable government Secretary McNamara has rightly said is essential if our aid is to be of

any real effectiveness. It is more urgent than ever for President Johnson to take a new, hard look at this worsening morass before honorable extrication from it becomes impossible.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 21, 1965]

THE DEBATE ON VIETNAM

A great debate on the Vietnamese conflict is now raging all over the United States. It goes from the White House, Congress, and the Pentagon to every home, office, factory, and farm. It is unresolved because the Government has not yet decided on its policy or, if it has, President Johnson is not telling the American people. The debate's subject, in its simplest form, is whether to fight a big war in Vietnam or to seek a way out through a combination of continuing defense and diplomatic negotiation.

The case for a vastly stepped-up American military commitment—as set forth in today's Magazine by military analyst Hanson W. Baldwin—is that the "Communist strategy of creeping aggression" must be stopped in Vietnam before it swallows all of Asia and the world. Under this theory, the United States should undertake saturation bombing of North Vietnam and send as many as a million American soldiers, sailors, and fliers into a "war to win."

Such an approach discards any pretense that our objective in Vietnam is to protect the Vietnamese people; it turns the conflict into a naked ideological struggle that ignores all the deep cleavages recent years have brought in both the Communist and free worlds. Not one of our major allies in the West could be expected to endorse, much less actively assist, an American involvement so massive it would amount to a military occupation of leaderless South Vietnam. America's efforts to demonstrate the superiority of its social system by abolishing poverty and building a Great Society would vanish under the necessity for pouring our youth and treasure into a limitless solo adventure.

On the Communist side the effect of a large-scale American assault on North Vietnam would be to resolidify the fragmented Moscow-Peiping-Hanoi axis. Communist China would have to send her land armies to the rescue, as in North Korea, or be labeled a paper tiger. Soviet Russia, now manifestly unhappy about anything that would enhance Chinese prestige or dominion, would find it almost impossible to stand aloof. The end result would be an escalation of such dimensions that no one could be sure it would not wind up in the kind of calamitous atomic exchange Secretary McNamara described so graphically in his testimony last week.

There are many, of course, who contend that the United States will eventually have to fight a nuclear war with China anyway, and that it is better to have the showdown now when our superiority in weapons and delivery devices is so great. These are the same people who a decade ago were advancing precisely the same argument on why the United States should not wait to drop the bomb on Moscow. The notion that all Communists are alike and that all must be destroyed is the road to world annihilation.

The struggle between East and West is enormously complex, and nowhere more so than in Vietnam, a country that has been occupied or neutral for 2,000 years and that now shows no will to fight in its own defense. The Vietnamese, both North and South, have an inherited fear and dislike of the Chinese. The Russians undoubtedly have at least as much desire as the United States to keep them from being swallowed into Peiping's empire.

The course of sanity is to explore the initiatives opened up by Secretary General Thant and General de Gaulle for negotiations to seek a neutralization of Vietnam and all southeast Asia. For a year the objection has

been that our military position is too weak to allow negotiations. Every week it has grown weaker, and the latest upheavals in the Vietnamese military and political structure indicate that total collapse may be imminent. To send hundreds of thousands of Americans into an endless jungle war or to bomb North Vietnamese ports and industrial centers on a saturation basis would be a surer road to global holocaust than to a victory arms can never win for either side.

All of Idaho Welcomes 1965 Girl Scout Roundup

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. COMPTON I. WHITE, JR.

OF IDAHO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 2, 1965

Mr. WHITE of Idaho. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I include the following editorial which appeared in the February 18 edition of the Bonners Ferry Herald and which expresses all of Idaho's thoughts on welcoming the 1965 International Senior Girl Scout Roundup to our northern panhandle:

ALL OF IDAHO WELCOMES 1965 GIRL SCOUT ROUNDUP

Deep lies the snow over north Idaho's Faragut State Park where the International Senior Girl Scout Roundup will be held next summer. In somber silence the pines, the firs, and the cedars await the coming of spring, and sleeping on the bosom of the earth beneath the snowy mantle lie the countless flower seeds and plants that hold the promise of many lovely tomorrows.

And, oh, the memories this land of forest and field, lake and stream, and mountain and meadow holds.

Last night the south wind brought its first promise of the welcome spring. Soughing through the pines, the breezes seemed to be reminiscing about the days gone by. If one would listen close, here's what they might have heard the breezes say:

"Long, long ago," the breeze began, "only friendly Indians came this way. Kallispelms, they called themselves. Friends of the neighboring Kootenai to the north and the Nez Perce to the south. Here they pitched their tepees, bore their children, and lived their happy lives. And the Great Spirit to whom they prayed smiled on them.

"Come then the white men, David Thompson, Joco Finlay and all the rest of the buckskin-clad explorers, adventurers, and voyagers. Strange were the names they gave: Pend d'Oreille, Coeur d'Alene, Mamaloos, Seneacquoten.

"Tirelessly the years rolled on, and little of importance happened here. It was as though Fate was saving this area for a greater purpose, and it was in 1941 when the world was engaged in its second great war that destiny decreed that this should be the site of Faragut Naval Training Station. Barracks, fieldhouses, training schools, messhalls spring up in five great camps. One hundred thousand sailors to man the greatest armada the world has ever known were trained here. From farm and city these recruits came. Pink cheeked youths they were, some sobbing out their homesick hearts in the darkness of the night, some braving their trails with fear in their hearts, some seeking excitement and adventure, all knowing that some would not return. But they were Americans—proud Americans.

A HELPFUL INNOVATION

The use of term loans in foreign operations is an adaptation of techniques developed in the United States for domestic lending. As is well known, term loans in the United States are generally made to finance acquisitions of plants, machinery and equipment, with repayment out of the cash flow—earnings and depreciation—expected to be generated by their use. The lender must satisfy himself that the borrower will have funds forthcoming to meet his obligations. The borrower can obtain terms that give flexibility in repayment schedules and permit efficient use of loan funds. Over half of the total dollar volume of business loans made by major New York City banks consist of term loans.

Banks extending term loans abroad must, however, satisfy themselves that the borrower will not only generate adequate cash flows but also will be able to convert his local currency earnings into U.S. dollars. Exchange risks—including the possibility, however remote, that exchange controls may prohibit remittances to the United States—and political risks are as much part and parcel of considerations bearing on the extension of a term loan as the general credit standing of the borrower. Other essential considerations are the balance-of-payments position of the borrower's country, the level of its gold and foreign exchange reserves and its short-term international indebtedness. Under certain circumstances, a country may appear to be "borrowed up."

Many of the term loans extended by U.S. commercial banks to borrowers in less-developed countries have been arranged in conjunction with operations of the Export-Import Bank, the World Bank, the Agency for International Development and such private lenders as insurance companies. As part of policies to encourage U.S. exports, the Export-Import Bank has recently developed comprehensive insurance coverage for banks against political, military, and commercial risks on development loans. This can be expected, as was the intention, to increase the volume of term lending, particularly to some of the less-developed countries.

On a number of occasions, U.S. commercial banks also have granted loans to foreign governments or central banks as part of packages of financial assistance extended by the International Monetary Fund, sometimes in conjunction with credits from the U.S. Treasury or the Export-Import Bank. Such arrangements have often been negotiated with Latin American nations.

Loans to Europe and Canada have been extended primarily to foreign subsidiaries of American businesses. Sometimes, U.S. firms operating abroad have also been instrumental in helping arrange U.S. bank financing for many of the foreign customers and suppliers with whom they do business. Credits have thus been granted to finance purchases of oil tankers, freighters, airplanes, machinery, electrical equipment, etc. Because of their rapid rate of obsolescence, airplanes have been particularly well suited to financing through bank term loans, with maturities adjusted to the funds generated through earnings and depreciation allowances. Shipping firms have received substantial amounts of term credit by obtaining long-term charters from major shippers of such raw materials as oil, iron ore, and bauxite and assigning the charter income to the lenders.

Technical innovations in industry have thus been matched by innovations in banking techniques. Like advances in tech-

nology, the bank term loan is spreading to meet the needs of corporate enterprise here as well as abroad. The growth of international trade and multinational business organizations naturally creates demands for flexible financing on an international scale.

TERM LOANS AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Term loans help promote U.S. exports in the period following the year when they are granted; this minimizes their impact on the balance of payments. Subsequent repayments of the loans with interest increase U.S. balance-of-payments receipts.

Foreigners not only borrow in the United States but also keep deposits in U.S. banks and hold bankers acceptances and other

short-term investments. Some of these deposits are normally connected with the loans granted them by U.S. banks. In fact, most nations hold short-term assets in U.S. banks in excess of the sums they borrow from them. The relevant data for selected countries are summed up in the table, which also shows the value of U.S. trade with the nations concerned.

Among the leading net debtors is Japan; its assets in the United States are, however, large. Japan is the second largest customer of the United States. This group of countries also includes several Latin American countries and Norway (because of shipping loans).

U.S. banking credits to foreigners set against the background of foreigners' short-term assets in the United States and U.S. foreign trade, August 1964.

[In millions of dollars]

| | U.S. bank credits abroad | | Foreign short-term assets in the United States ¹ | U.S. exports ² | U.S. imports ³ |
|---------------------|--------------------------|-----------|---|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| | Short term | Long term | | | |
| Canada..... | 694 | 270 | 3,065 | 4,572 | 4,080 |
| Italy..... | 94 | 280 | 1,057 | 825 | 803 |
| United Kingdom..... | 277 | 72 | 1,951 | 1,384 | 1,115 |
| Germany..... | 133 | 133 | 2,361 | 1,217 | 1,100 |
| Argentina..... | 176 | 78 | 307 | 215 | 145 |
| Venezuela..... | 137 | 36 | 707 | 675 | 940 |
| France..... | 42 | 25 | 1,525 | 774 | 480 |
| Switzerland..... | 88 | 25 | 1,402 | 341 | 256 |
| Belgium..... | 31 | 71 | 424 | 606 | 418 |
| Sweden..... | 31 | 69 | 509 | 275 | 197 |
| Netherlands..... | 40 | 13 | 316 | 305 | 197 |
| Japan..... | 2,471 | 333 | 2,614 | 1,868 | 1,625 |
| Mexico..... | 572 | 415 | 674 | 967 | 649 |
| Brazil..... | 153 | 209 | 221 | 343 | 582 |
| Colombia..... | 250 | 56 | 149 | 249 | 255 |
| Philippines..... | 179 | 120 | 216 | 360 | 366 |
| Norway..... | 35 | 249 | 171 | 104 | 117 |
| Chile..... | 187 | 23 | 172 | 164 | 193 |

¹ Official and private.

² Year ended August 1964.

³ Including Trieste.

⁴ Including Luxembourg.

NOTE.—The countries are arranged in 2 groups: those where U.S. bank credits, both short and long term, are smaller than short-term dollar assets held by them in U.S. banks and vice versa. Within each group, the countries are arranged according to the size of U.S. bank credits to them.

Bank lending also appears as a complicating factor in our balance of payments because of the way in which Government statisticians present their accounts. When an American citizen makes a deposit in a foreign bank or a loan to a foreigner, the transaction is recorded as a capital outflow; but when a foreigner makes a deposit in a U.S. bank or buys U.S. short-term paper, the transaction is considered as one of the means of "financing" the U.S. payments deficit rather than a capital inflow that helps reduce the deficit. A committee of Government-appointed experts, which, under the chairmanship of Edward M. Bernstein, has since April 1963 been examining the asymmetries and anomalies in U.S. balance-of-payments bookkeeping, is to report its findings this month.

One thing is certain. Bank loans abroad to finance U.S. exports and other international business do not result in a loss of U.S. international wealth. They help expand U.S. exports and job opportunities and incomes at home. They speed up economic development abroad. The law providing for the interest equalization tax, with its implied threat of removing the exemption for bank term loans, should be allowed to expire on its scheduled date at the end of 1965. Even if some immediate advantage were to be gained for our balance of payments by controls over bank lending, it would be more than offset by the damage such controls would do to the standing of the dollar as a reliable and freely usable currency.

A Bill To Broaden Coverage of Social Security Benefits

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. PAUL A. FINO

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 23, 1965

Mr. FINO. Mr. Speaker, today I re-introduced my bill to broaden coverage of social security benefits to include brothers, sisters, and other dependent relatives of a deceased individual fully insured under the act.

At present, a dependent brother, sister, or other relative of a deceased wage earner is left in the cold as far as social security payments when that wage earner dies. Except for funeral expenses paid, all of the deceased's social security contributions are lost unless there is a surviving spouse.

My proposed legislation would remedy this great injustice. Under this legislation, if a dependent brother, sister, or relative of an unmarried wage earner can show that he or she was receiving at least half support from the wage

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earner, that dependent would be entitled to monthly insurance benefits. To my mind, this sort of humanization of our existing social security law is a necessity.

What My Country Means to Me

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. E. ROSS ADAIR

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 23, 1965

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Speaker, it is with a great deal of pride that I call attention to the signal achievement of one of the eighth-grade students of the Whitley County, Ind., schools, Richard Redman. Richard, who is enrolled in Marshall Memorial School—named after Indiana's onetime Vice President—recently was judged first-place winner for his essay entitled, "What My Country Means to Me."

Richard's essay was in competition with 50 other entries in the eighth-grade contest in Whitley County schools.

We can all take to heart the warm, patriotic message of this fine, young American. After reading his essay, it is easy to understand why it was judged a first-place winner.

The prize-winning essay follows:

WHAT MY COUNTRY MEANS TO ME

(By Richard Redman, Columbia City, Ind.)

I am an American youth. Because of my age, I am not a voter, a property owner, a wage earner, or an official. Nevertheless I am a citizen. Regardless of my age—yes, even because of it—I am important to my country and my country is very important to me. What I do, say, or think at school, at home, at church, on the street, or wherever I may be is an indication of the kind of citizen that I am and want to be.

Naturally, it makes me feel proud to refer to America as my country, but when I consider how it came to be mine, my pride is overshadowed with humility. I did not choose this great land to be my homeland; it was by the grace of God that I was born here and that this land of freedom and opportunity became mine. Furthermore, as I live today in the 20th century, under the blessing of God, I am enjoying a civilization established, preserved, and extended by others; their work and sacrifices have made my country great. These facts cause me to understand and appreciate my American heritage, and they influence me to do to the best of my ability what God and my country expect me to do.

Someone has said, "The difficult thing to remember about patriotism is that it is a sentiment to which is tied a bundle of obligations." These obligations are mine even as a youth. Now and all through my life I must live and work to preserve liberty and democracy. I can do this now through obeying laws, getting a good education, and being interested in local, national, and world affairs. Later in my life, there will come opportunities for voting, jury service, and perhaps military duty, to name just a few of the many privileges and responsibilities which will be mine as a worthy citizen of this country which means so much to me.

The late President Kennedy beautifully summarized each citizen's obligation toward his country when he said, "Ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country."

As a good American citizen, I feel it is my duty to love, honor, and cherish the rights and freedoms which have been guaranteed to me and all other Americans in the Bill of Rights. This "charter of liberty" guarantees such fundamental rights as freedom of religion, freedom of speech and of the press, and the right of privacy and security. It is important for me to understand that freedom is not the privilege of doing what I want to do without regard for other people.

In spite of America's great strides forward in education, individual enterprise, industry, inventions, etc., there is still work to be done. America is not a utopia by any means. There are many problems to cope with, such as crime, poverty, unemployment, racial tension, foreign entanglements, and corrupt politics. Problems, weaknesses, and obstacles in the American way of life do not decrease my patriotism; on the contrary, they increase my loyalty and devotion to God and my country. They make me more conscious of my individual responsibility as a Christian citizen. They challenge me and all citizens "to carry ahead the ideals of democracy and keep the faith of our Fathers."

What my country means to me is summarized excellently in William Tyler Page's words, written in 1917 and later officially adopted as "The American's Creed." This creed reads as follows:

"I believe in the United States of America as a government of the people, by the people, for the people; a government whose just powers are derived from the consent of the governed; a democracy in a republic; a sovereign Nation of many sovereign States; a perfect union, one and inseparable, established upon those principles of freedom, equality, justice, and humanity for which American patriots sacrificed their lives and fortunes.

"I therefore believe it is my duty to my country to love it; to support its Constitution; to obey its laws; to respect its flag; and to defend it against all enemies."

Orders From on High

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ROBERT H. MICHEL

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 23, 1965

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent I include the following editorial from the Chicago Tribune dated February 20, 1965:

ORDERS FROM ON HIGH

The presidents and chairmen of the boards of nearly all the major corporations and banks doing a large international business were called to the White House Thursday to serve as a captive audience while President Johnson gave them their orders. His command was that they reduce overseas investments and loans this year in order to help correct the deficit in the international balance of payments which arises largely because of the administration's own policies.

The banks were told to cut foreign lending 75 percent and the corporations were directed to reduce their flow of dollars out of the country by 15 to 20 percent. The leaders of the business and banking communities were then steered respectively to the Commerce Department and to the Federal Reserve, where they were directed to file a flock of reports with Washington whenever they made a decision to send dollars abroad.

Mr. Johnson showed the iron hand in the velvet glove by expressing the hope that the balance-of-payments problem could be

solved without controls and compulsion. Yet the squeeze of Presidential power was exerted as bluntly and directly as if a collection of Soviet provincial managers, planners, and bureaucrats had been summoned to the Kremlin to get their instructions about the regulation of the Communist economy.

We have come to a fine pass in this country when free enterprise is being reduced step by step to an obsolete phrase and government calls all the signals. As one of Mr. Johnson's auditors from Chicago observed, "Nobody asked the President anything. We just sat there."

Perhaps the President's tactics will provide the financial and business community with a new perspective on his methods. Many of its members supported him in last November's election, and a roundup of opinion in the current U.S. News & World Report shows that he still commands much favor.

Many of those interviewed seem to have learned the catchwords of the "Great Society" in justification of the "new economics." For example, a merchandiser says that while red ink in Government is always a worry, "there is a question whether there is really an increase in red ink if you compare the national debt to the gross national product."

Another executive isn't worried about deficits because "a business must operate within its own relatively limited resources," while "the resources of the Federal Government are limited only by the total wealth of the country." This gentleman adds, "This philosophy would have made our fathers' hair stand on end, but nevertheless it is a fact. More and more conservative businessmen are coming to the view that you can't look at Government in the same way you view a business."

A Wall Streeter comments, "We might as well give this fiscal innovation of deficit financing an opportunity to prove itself." A fuel supplier admits the "Great Society" will produce "continued inflation and an inflated dollar, but lots of goods will be sold under it."

To a surprising degree, the greatest spender in history has been viewed up to now as a "conservative" and a "middle-of-the-roader." But we find a more dispassionate view in the dissent of one businessman: "More and more, the Government is telling you how to run your business—whom you must hire, how much you must pay, whom you cannot fire. In 20 years, if this keeps up, there will be no incentive to be a businessman."

Isn't this a fair description of what happened at the Washington conference? Was not the President telling the 370 men in his audience how to run their businesses? And what could they do but sit and take it?

Vietnam Is Not Negotiable

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CRAIG HOSMER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 23, 1965

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, the current issue of the American Security Council's Washington Report, dated February 22, contains a remarkably perceptive essay by Frank J. Johnson, the publication's foreign editor. It reads as follows:

WHY WE CAN'T NEGOTIATE NOW

A great swirl of climactic events has followed President Johnson's order to give concrete effect to his repeated warnings to the

Communists to cease their aggression against South Vietnam. The difficult but extremely necessary decisions have at last been taken. Inevitably in such cases, an atmosphere of crisis is created by the outraged cries and threats of international communism. Just as inevitably, the calls for a "negotiated settlement" are redoubled on the free world side of the line. Many well-meaning people find it difficult to understand why President Johnson does not at least accompany his military action by an offer to enter into immediate negotiations to end the Vietnam war.

Undoubtedly, the President would like nothing better—nor would any other person of good will—if negotiation presently offered a reasonable prospect of fulfilling our pledge to defend the people of Vietnam; it is this pledge which we must honor if there is ever to be any hope of lasting peace in the world. But in considering negotiation the administration is faced with a series of very unpleasant facts, which are either unknown or forgotten by the general public.

One set of facts concerns the inherent nature of guerrilla wars. The military tactics and political purposes of such wars are not subject to stalemate or compromise. For example, much of the current argument for negotiation rests on the hypothesis that a "military victory" for either side is impossible. This is begging the question. Since World War II, when the guerrilla war came into vogue, they have invariably been won or lost. Either the guerrillas "win" in the sense of achieving a takeover of the country or government in question, or else they are militarily defeated, at least to the point where they are reduced to a harmless remnant. There have been no exceptions to this rule.

The guerrillas triumphed completely against the Dutch in Indonesia, against the French in Algeria and Indochina (except here they settled for North Vietnam in 1954 rather than risk U.S. intervention), against the British in Palestine and Cyprus, and against Batista in Cuba. They were decisively defeated in Greece, the Philippines, Malaya, Burma and—apparently—Venezuela. Whenever negotiations were held it was only for the purpose of ratifying the guerrilla victory. In the majority of cases this was not of a decisive military nature. The French were never beaten in Algeria and even after Dien Bien Phu they could have held on at least in Hanoi and Saigon. The Dutch could have held Indonesia for some time as could the British in Palestine and Cyprus. But either the will to resist was broken or else a reevaluation of national interests caused them to consider the area no longer vital.

CEASE FIRE MEANINGLESS

On the basis of all past experience, therefore, a negotiated settlement in Vietnam can only have the purpose either of confirming a Communist decision to abandon the drive for control of Vietnam, or else an American decision to admit defeat and withdraw. A cease fire would be meaningless. It would only leave the guerrillas in place and free to use the interval to run in more reinforcements and arms until they were ready for the next push. Withdrawal of all Communist guerrillas behind the 17th parallel, as is sometimes suggested, would be fine, but would of course be tantamount to a total Communist defeat in Vietnam. President Johnson has no intelligence as yet to lead him to suppose that the Communists are ready for anything of the sort.

On the contrary—and this is the second set of facts prevailing in the Vietnam situation—the Communist world remains unanimous in its declarations that the only basis for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam is the complete withdrawal of American forces, which is tantamount to a complete American defeat.

These statements might be written off as mere propaganda bargaining were they not backed up by a great deal of background information coming out of Communist China, which indicate that she believes time and events are very much on her side. Since the second hypothesis for negotiations is that they must include Communist China, her attitude is obviously decisive to the outcome. Here are some of the more public facts which the President must consider:

(1) Between December 21, 1964, and January 4, 1965, the first session of the Third National People's Congress was convened in Peking. Nearly 3,000 deputies met behind closed doors to hear speeches by the leaders of Communist China. In addition to statements by Marshall Ho Lung, boasting that the Chinese people's army has been considerably enlarged, supplied with up-to-date equipment, and is now supported by powerful naval and air force units, the Chinese published, on December 30, an abbreviated version of Premier Chou En-lai's report on Chinese domestic and foreign policy.

The speech reflected great pride and self-confidence resulting from the explosion of the atomic bomb, the surmounting of the "very serious difficulties" between 1959 and 1961, resulting from the failure of the "great leap forward," and the intention of transforming China into a world power with the most modern industry, agriculture, technology, and defense within the shortest possible time. Reviewing foreign policy, Chou pledged support to all—and he listed each one—revolutionary movements and centers of unrest. He declared that Peking would consider negotiation with the United States only after it had given up Taiwan and would deal with the United Nations only when it had thrown out Nationalist China.

Chou further asserted that the East wind would prevail over the West wind, and that favorable conditions for such an outcome are the "storm centers of world revolution in Asia, Africa, and Latin America." The speech forces the conclusion that the Chinese Communists are not only conscious of their power, but are also prepared to use it to support "wars of liberation" wherever possible in a continuing struggle against "imperialism."

(2) As a concrete example that Chou meant what he said and that the "falling domino" theory in southeast Asia was not a figment of John Foster Dulles' overstimulated imagination, Peking formally announced on February 5, 1965, the formation of a "patriotic front" to overthrow the pro-Western government of Thailand and eradicate American influence there. For some time now, Communist agents have been infiltrating into Thailand in order to form the nucleus for subverting that country. The Thais have instituted energetic counter-measures which have so far kept them under control, but it is foolish to believe that Thailand would or could resist a Communist takeover backed by China if South Vietnam is lost. The Chinese do not even wait until one victim is gobbled up before proclaiming their plans to take over the next one.

(3) Mao Tse-tung stated in a January interview with American journalist Edgar Snow that the crisis in Vietnam will not lead to war between China and the United States so long as China is not invaded. He also said that the war in Vietnam would last only another year or two because the South Vietnamese are deserting in large numbers and the Americans will "lose interest." While this statement greatly reduces the likelihood of any Chinese retaliation against our raids on North Vietnam, it gives no comfort to those urging negotiation. If Mao really believes that the war will be won by the Communists in another year or two, then it is obvious that he looks on negotiation only to confirm this fact, which is

another point he actually made in the interview. Unless he can be shaken in this conviction there is no possible basis for negotiation with China.

MUST STOP REDS

It is easy for those without responsibility to call for "negotiation," as though this were the automatic panacea for all the world's ills. But the U.S. Government is faced with the kinds of facts mentioned above, as well as much more grim data of a secret nature, which cannot be shrugged off. This is why it has consistently rejected calls for a new Geneva Conference and why even the British have supported this stand. It is accepted as axiomatic by most policymakers that under present circumstances negotiation could lead only to an American defeat.

Such a defeat cannot be accepted, not simply for reasons of foolish national pride, but because the Chinese have made it so very plain that Vietnam is only part of a much wider plan for aggrandizement and troublemaking. We are helping Vietnam because it is in the interest of free men everywhere that the Communist challenge be halted at this point.

The President is trying to create a new psychological situation in Asia. His decision to retaliate against North Vietnam is the only one which offers any hope of success. It has been long overdue and is all the more difficult for that reason, but it is still not too late. Mr. Johnson should be warmly congratulated for his action. If we carry through our policy with resolution there is still an excellent chance that we can "win" the Vietnam war at least in the sense that the Communists are induced to call off the war as a bad business and either withdraw the guerrillas into North Vietnam or else cease outside aid completely and leave them to their fate. Only then can there be a genuine basis for a negotiation which will ratify this decision.

The Communists will not come willingly or easily to such a disagreeable choice. Previous U.S. vacillation has led them to count the Vietnam war as already won. It will probably take time and a great deal of punishment before they call off the war. But they are practical men and eventually bow to reality. What is essential now is that the President be given the time to make the full effect of his new policy felt in Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow without being continually badgered to negotiate. The calls for negotiation only make the task harder and bloodier because it encourages the Communists to think that we may still falter in our purpose. It is still a Chinese article of faith that the world and domestic pressures can be mobilized to thwart any resolute action by the U.S. Government. Many past follies have confirmed them in this viewpoint.

TURNING POINT IN HISTORY

A great experiment is underway—the experiment to see whether we can successfully contain Communist China on the mainland of Asia. If we cannot, the consequences to our children are hideous to contemplate. The Chinese have the numbers, the drive, the ambition, and the eventual potential to rule the world. The days through which we are now passing will mark one of the great turning points of world history.

The United States has very strong trumps to play in this contest. If North Vietnam is willing, or is forced by China to sacrifice herself in a continuing effort to win South Vietnam, there is yet one final arrow in our quiver. We can threaten China with the one punishment she would most fear: the destruction of her nuclear plants by aerial bombardment. If forced to carry out this threat, we would at least prevent or delay the looming menace of a nuclear-armed China.

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

February 23

Review and Outlook

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. J. ARTHUR YOUNGER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 3, 1965

Mr. YOUNGER. Mr. Speaker, today we hear much about an administration by consensus and I have not seen anything that points up the dangers of such an administration as well as an editorial which appeared in the Wall Street Journal on February 18. The editorial follows:

REVIEW AND OUTLOOK

PRECAUTIONS ON CONSENSUS

President Johnson offers himself as an apostle of consensus, a concept elusive enough as a word, let alone as policy. Whether this notion is promising or dangerous depends on just what he has in mind.

He seems to mean, at a minimum, less heated disagreement. "Let us reject any among us who seek to reopen old wounds and rekindle old hatreds," he enjoined in his inaugural address. "The time has come to achieve progress without strife and change without hatred: Not without difference of opinion, but without the deep and abiding divisions which scar the Union for generations."

In some respects, the vision is farsighted indeed. The President is rejecting a popular brand of political leadership which consists mostly of arousing the faithful to rise up and slay the infidel. This kind of politics sometimes has proved effective, and it must be particularly tempting for a President with huge congressional majorities.

As the President seems to realize so well, though, tough tactics have the unfortunate result of clouding communications among factions in our society. With their leaders often inciting them against each other, it's hard for opposing groups to remember that both may possibly be saying something worth listening to. Disagreement is resolved by brute force, which is less likely to yield intelligent policy than compromise borne of honest discussion.

A politics of consensus, by promoting moderation and compromise, could more nearly establish a true give-and-take discourse on national policy. That is unquestionably a high ideal, and perhaps the President is right when he says the time for it has come.

Yet there are some who are dubious about Mr. Johnson's ideal. Part of their reaction is simply aversion to the President's practical politics, and part is disappointment that the leader of the faithful professes friendship with the infidel. But a more significant part, we think, arises from concern over just what kind of tactics will be used to suppress strife and keep everyone happy.

A cynical formula for "consensus" could read merely: Throw tax cuts and lots of flattery to businessmen, the union shop and an Under Secretary of Labor to the unions, school aid to educators with a drop to Catholics, high price supports to farmers and transportation aid to cities. And so on.

The formula might build considerable harmony and reduce strife, for a while anyway. It's an ancient truism that if enough people are getting a big enough sop, they will hesitate to challenge the one someone else gets. But a consensus based on no more than this is not exactly an appealing prospect.

For one thing, a consensus thus cynically conceived would degrade rather than improve the quality of public discussion on

Government policy, precisely because its cardinal principle is that no one very seriously challenge what someone else proposes. No proposal is perfect, and without challenge, the imperfections can only be discovered too late.

Second, such an enshrinement of logrolling tends to legitimize practically anything some group is brazen enough to demand. Such a faction more or less names its own price for not rocking the boat. No one bothers to object that even if a proposal is good for someone it may be bad for all of us. What's too easily ignored is President Johnson's own warning, "The national interest is greater than the sum of all local interests."

Most important, this sort of consensus seems to add up to a cementing of one of the central philosophies of the New Deal: "Let the Federal Government do it." With the Government already so dominant in our society, our era is hardly the time to do away with debate over giving Government more responsibility and hence more power over all of us. Now more than ever, the warnings need to be heard, not stifled.

In short, a politics of consensus could provide undoubted opportunities, but it runs the considerable danger that the consensus would be primarily an agreement for all of us to look the other way while each of us steals his favorite gem from the public treasure chest.

Good Going, Goodyear

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN J. RHODES

OF ARIZONA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 16, 1965

Mr. RHODES of Arizona. Mr. Speaker, under leave previously granted, I would like to include in the Record the following self-explanatory editorial which appeared in the Arizona Republic on February 14, 1965. I join the Arizona Republic in saying, "Good Going, Goodyear." The editorial is as follows:

GOOD GOING, GOODYEAR

The U.S. State Department and Communist Rumania had it all figured out.

The Goodyear Corp. would sell a modern synthetic rubber plant to Rumania. Inasmuch as State had been assured by the Rumanian Government that it wouldn't divulge the polyisoprene secrets to other Communist countries, it wasn't like giving away important production secrets to every Communist country. And, State reasoned, sale of the plant would help bring Rumania closer to the West.

But the State Department hadn't considered the reaction of the Goodyear Corp. And Goodyear refused to sell the plant to Rumania, thereby passing up an approximately \$50 million transaction.

In the current company newspaper, published in Litchfield Park, Goodyear explained that it felt the dangers to the United States far outweighed the possible benefits in the proposed deal. The company believes the Communists could, if they desired, disrupt natural rubber markets in Malaysia, Liberia, and other undeveloped countries, using cut-rate prices (underwritten by the state) as economic clubs.

Furthermore, although respecting the State Department's belief in the Rumanians' promise, Goodyear said it preferred not to entrust its production secrets to the Communists.

The Rumanians will acquire the synthetic rubber plant, nevertheless; Firestone has agreed to build it. But at a time when Communist governments are waging war against American servicemen in Vietnam * * * when Soviet Russia stages mob attacks on the American embassy and roughs up U.S. newsmen covering the attacks * * * and when Peking and Moscow are working to undermine freedom in the Congo and throughout Africa, it is heartening to know that one major American corporation refuses to do business with America's enemies.

Lenin once said that when the time comes to strangle capitalism, businessmen will be bidding for the right to sell the Communists the rope. Perhaps so. But Goodyear has demonstrated that it will not be among the bidders.

Private Capital Flows: The Balance of
Payments Whipping Boy

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. THOMAS B. CURTIS

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 23, 1965

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, in spite of repeated promises, the administration has failed to eliminate the deficit in our international balance of payments. Last year the deficit on regular transactions amounted to about \$3 billion, compared to \$3.3 billion for 1963. Especially disturbing are the figures for the fourth quarter of 1964, which show a deficit in the order of \$1.4 billion or nearly \$6 billion on an annual basis. The First National City Bank Monthly Economic Letter for February 1965, details our deteriorating payments position and analyzes recent administration proposals to deal with the problem.

The two measures most recently proposed as solutions to the chronic payments problem are a 2-year extension and broadening of the interest equalization tax, which was originally proposed as a temporary tax, a restriction of bank lending abroad, and a program of so-called voluntary restraint on direct investment. Restrictive controls over private investment abroad in the long run would work untold damage on our own economy as well as to world prosperity and economic development. Domestically, such curbs on lending would cut U.S. exports which are intimately linked with our overseas loans and investments. The letter states that:

Postwar experience selective controls here and abroad shows unmistakably that one measure lays the groundwork and necessity for another. This is already being demonstrated. First we have the interest equalization tax, then provision for its extension to bank loans, and now more consideration of direct controls over capital. The proliferation is endless and so are the complexities.

There is an additional risk in proposing controls of this sort. They could be regarded as something which has in fact reduced the ability of U.S. dollar holders, here and abroad, to use or transfer them by their own choice. If the dollar is to remain trusted and respected, it must remain unfettered.

Michigan's visitors traveling slowly over these roads may be treated to the sight of a doe and her fawn, a strutting buck, and other animals whose habitat is within the boundaries of this forest area. Bird lovers, too, will be well repaid for their visit. Not only game birds but song birds abound. A few months ago I called attention of my colleagues to the efforts of the Forest Service to provide a refuge for the annual visit of Kirkland's warblers, a rare bird, which pays our section of the State a visit each year. Thirty-one bald eagle nests were spotted by forest rangers. Nine of these were active at time of location and 17 young were being produced.

To insure adequate cover for wildlife in the years ahead the Forest Service has a carefully managed program. Last year over 4 million trees were planted in the Huron-Manistee Forests. In addition two waterfowl dams were constructed and numerous wildlife waterholes were established.

Fishermen, hunters, nature lovers, mushroom and berry pickers, bird watchers, hikers, and all lovers of the out of doors will find the Huron-Manistee National Forests of interest.

Doing Business With Our Enemies

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. E. Y. BERRY

OF SOUTH DAKOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 23, 1965

Mr. BERRY. Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent I insert in the Record an editorial from the February 17, 1965, issue of the Buffalo, S. Dak., Times-Herald, as follows:

DOING BUSINESS WITH OUR ENEMIES

With the pledge of military aid to North Vietnam by Soviet Russia, the United States has again been placed in the position of direct trading with an avowed enemy.

There has never been any doubt as to Russia's intention to do all in her power to destroy the United States, but our leaders have been able to wink at these announced intentions and work for establishment and extension of trade with the Communists in the name of better relations. The better relations have included the stoning of the American Embassy with the approval of the Russian regime, and the jeopardizing of the lives of our diplomats in Russia and other countries under her domination.

With American boys being killed and wounded in South Vietnam, and Russian pledges of military assistance to their killers, there can no longer be any doubt that our vacillating foreign policy has led us down the street to failure in our position in the world.

It is still not too late for the United States to call a halt to this folly. In view of present circumstances, any attempt to honey up to the Communists by inviting them to the United States "to see how we live" makes about as much sense as hiring a crazed murderer to baby-sit with our children.

The United Nations have proven itself powerless to serve as anything but a tool of the Communists, who in turn laugh at any moral obligations to the world debating society. Recently, the noted political col-

umnist, David Lawrence, advocated severing diplomatic relations with Russia. He may be right.

At any rate, unless the United States ceases to play the part of the less than bright country cousin in its deals with foreigners whose goal is to destroy us, our Nation is headed for more serious trouble than it has seen in its nearly 200 years of trying to make the world a better place to live.

The action in South Vietnam may not be considered war, but to the men who are daily fighting and facing death there, it is as real a war as any ever fought. To aid their killers is to break faith with them.

Winning in Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ROBERT H. MICHEL

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 23, 1965

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent I include the following editorial from the Peoria Journal Star dated February 19, 1965:

WE CAN WIN IN VIETNAM

Before we get too worked up about the absence of U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam "who ought to be in there and doing the job right," and the resulting deaths of American specialists, and the confusion over the government of the place and its "attitude" toward the United States, etc., we had better take a look at how the job was done before.

Before the United States made the decision not to let the Communists run, unchecked, over the whole of southeast Asia, the French tried to throw them out of Vietnam.

They decided not to fool around and to do the job right.

The French sent their own regular forces by the tens and even hundreds of thousands, plus thousands of veteran German soldiers enlisted into the Foreign Legion, and went out to clobber the Vietcong.

Instead, they were clobbered themselves. They had 200,000 casualties and were run out of Vietnam altogether in a short space of time.

We stepped in to support a South Vietnam regime to prevent the Vietcong from overrunning the whole country and with that momentum and morale situation all the rest of the rich subcontinent.

The experts and the press reported that Vietnam was confused, naked, unarmed and morale shattered and "wouldn't last 6 months."

And we didn't rush in with massive combat forces to replace the French Army. We sent arms, training experts, supply handlers, and advisers—a mere handful.

That handful is now up to 23,000 men, mostly doing specialist "behind the lines" jobs, and a few serving as combat advisers. Vietnam has resisted the Vietcong, as a result, under this system not for 6 months as forecast, and not for a couple of years, but for a dozen years, virtually.

Thousands have died and are dying. Thousands of guerrillas have been killed and their bodies carefully counted, and are being killed. Somebody is fighting the forces that cut down 200,000 Frenchmen, somebody more than 23,000 American fliers, mechanics, supply experts, advisers, etc.

About 300 Americans have been killed. Would fewer Americans die if we let them have South Vietnam? And then go after us somewhere else, as they surely would?

De Gaulle has said from the first that we

can't possibly succeed where the brilliant and gallant French have failed. If they couldn't do it with strong measures and direct war, how can we do it by carefully avoiding the use of combat units and just helping Vietnamese who will fight for their own country?

The Communists and their stooges, naturally, have been using every agency and device possible to propagandize the hopelessness of our effort, as well.

And they have the great advantage of tying their control over many devices of propaganda with their control over guerrilla efforts and "incidents"—and they are making a major effort to convince us it is hopeless right now, by both methods. And to scare us, in the bargain.

The fact remains that we have, thus far, done a far better job than the French, with all the frustrations involved, and without sending in an American Army, and without suffering 200,000 casualties as they did.

The record shows that it was not a stupid policy. It was a shrewd policy.

The record shows that we have vastly improved the free world's chances over what they were when we went in with this policy, and vastly improved the situation left us by the French.

The record suggests that having corrected their major mistakes, we can correct some of our own mistakes and do a still more successful job—and we can win.

The biggest barrier to that is the encouragement the Red Chinese take and their Communist allies from our discouragement. The killing of some 30 Americans in terror raids the last week was not designed for any actual military benefit. It was designed to horrify us, and to frighten us, and thus to cause us to give up and get out.

They are fighting a political war and hope to win it, not in Vietnam, but right here in the minds and votes of Americans in the United States.

And if they do, they will figure they can win anything they want by simply scaring us "cowardly" Americans—the paper tiger. And they will push us, and push us, and push us, until we just can't stand to be pushed any more.

And therein lies the real danger of a major war.

C. L. DANCEY.

Bank Loan Curb Will Cut Exports

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. THOMAS B. CURTIS

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 23, 1965

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, the inevitable result of the application of the interest equalization tax to bank loans with a term of over 1 year will be to reduce the volume of U.S. exports. Thus a measure designed to help bring the balance of payments into surplus will actually have an offsetting effect that will tend to deepen the deficit.

The link between bank loans and U.S. exports is discussed at some length in the Monthly Economic Letter of December 1964, published by the First National City Bank of New York. The article points out how the remarkable expansion of world trade in recent years has required growing supplies of U.S. bank credit for financing purposes. The inconsistencies in the administration's

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position is evident from the fact that while presumably attempting to increase world trade, the administration now seeks to restrict the financing required to carry on that trade.

Although it is often said that term loans of over 1 year do not finance exports, the article makes perfectly clear the various ways in which such term loans do finance exports and, at the same time, increase job opportunities and incomes at home.

In view of the administration's increasing reliance on restrictions in the field of international trade and payments, I ask unanimous consent that the article from the Monthly Economic Letter be included in the Record at this point:

COMMERCIAL BANK TERM LOANS ABROAD

In the world today, nations are exchanging goods in rapidly growing volumes. Our own exports have expanded from \$15 billion to \$25 billion in the past 10 years. Understandably, the remarkable expansion of world trade has required growing supplies of credit.

Commercial banks in the United States and other principal trading nations extend credits to their foreign correspondents and customers. Indeed, the resources of commercial banks constitute a pool of private international liquidity that is drawn upon by creditworthy borrowers in creditworthy countries throughout the world.

Along with direct investment in bricks and mortar, commercial bank credit abroad has greatly expanded over the past 15 years as private U.S. capital has replaced U.S. Government aid to Western Europe and Japan—aid that had been an essential ingredient during the earlier postwar period in reinvigorating world commerce. In recent years, private financing has received further impetus from the restoration of meaningful currency convertibility among the principal nations. These trends and developments have in turn strengthened international competition in the field of money and banking; they have also created new opportunities.

Within a relatively short span of time, U.S. banks have girded themselves to play a prominent role in world finance. With the dollar the leading international currency, the United States the world's largest exporter and importer, and U.S. money and capital markets the single most important source of financial resources, this has been a natural evolution.

PATTERNS OF BANK LENDING

American commercial banks engaging in international business extend both short- and long-term credits. According to definitions used by official statisticians, short-term credits are those with a maturity up to 1 year; they are frequently renewed from year to year. Loans beyond 1 year are called term loans. These term loans have been customary in domestic financing in the United States for a quarter of a century and have, since World War II, spread to the field of international financing.

U.S. banks have outstanding short- and long-term credits abroad of \$9.5 billion. U.S. exporters, importers, and industrial and commercial firms also grant credits to their foreign clients; these amount to \$2.3 billion at this time.

Of the short-term bank credits, about \$1 billion consist of items held for collection largely on behalf of customers. An additional \$2.5 billion of the short-term bank credits represent bankers' acceptances. After a long period of inactivity, these have grown remarkably since 1950, with the encouragement of the Federal Reserve System; most acceptances are made under arrangements that involve exports from the United States. Loans to foreign banks and customers today

amount to about \$5.7 billion, of which \$2.2 billion are short term and \$3.5 billion are term loans.

THE ANATOMY OF TERM LOANS

There is general agreement that short-term loans by U.S. Banks are indispensable as a means of financing U.S. trade and other international business that directly benefits the U.S. balance of payments. Sometimes, however, the question is raised—particularly by those who tend to blame the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit on private capital investments abroad—whether loans in excess of 1 year serve purposes beneficial to the U.S. balance of payments. To

assure export financing and "normal recurring international business," the administration's proposal and the House-approved bill for an interest equalization tax¹ exempted bank loans made in the ordinary course of business as well as all obligations maturing within 3 years. Before the tax was enacted last September, however, a provision was added in the Senate giving the President standby authority to extend the tax to bank loans with a maturity of 1 year or more.

¹ The tax and its implications have been reviewed in the April and November 1964 issues of this letter.

Changes in U.S. short-term banking credits abroad

(In millions of dollars)

| | Collections | Acceptances ¹ | Loans to— | | Total ² | Long term |
|-------------------------------|-------------|--------------------------|--------------------|--------|--------------------|-----------|
| | | | Banks ³ | Others | | |
| 1955..... | 52 | 24 | 40 | 94 | 209 | 230 |
| 1956..... | 87 | 137 | 93 | 94 | 411 | 183 |
| 1957..... | 17 | 255 | 45 | 27 | 256 | 335 |
| 1958..... | 2 | 43 | 213 | 125 | 292 | 188 |
| 1959..... | 95 | 74 | 8 | 32 | 62 | 183 |
| 1960..... | 89 | 651 | 35 | 22 | 729 | 153 |
| 1961..... | 95 | 641 | 224 | 140 | 1,099 | 336 |
| 1962..... | 14 | 93 | 274 | 20 | 372 | 126 |
| 1963..... | 146 | 596 | 171 | 182 | 703 | 576 |
| 1963—January—March..... | 22 | 90 | 207 | 29 | 348 | 178 |
| April—June..... | 25 | 341 | 94 | 24 | 287 | 121 |
| July—September..... | 24 | 42 | 6 | 27 | 99 | 121 |
| October—December..... | 74 | 207 | 124 | 52 | 457 | 313 |
| 1964—January—March..... | 100 | 136 | 103 | 29 | 268 | 231 |
| April—June..... | 1 | 242 | 67 | 84 | 393 | 64 |
| July—August..... | 23 | 101 | 15 | 32 | 171 | 130 |
| Outstanding: August 1964..... | 956 | 2,840 | 1,326 | 919 | 6,041 | 3,440 |

¹ Acceptances made for account of foreigners, including varying amounts of other financing.

² Including central banks and other official institutions.

³ Excluding credits in foreign currencies, which amounted to \$689,000,000 in August 1964.

⁴ Excluding items reported by banks for the first time but representing certain credits extended previously. Such items amounted to \$85,000,000 in the 2d and \$193,000,000 in the 4th quarter of 1963. Of the latter amount, \$150,000,000 represented trade credits sold to banks by a U.S. corporation.

Source: Derived from data published in the U.S. Treasury Department Bulletin and the Federal Reserve Bulletin.

The author of this amendment, Senator ALBERT GORE of Tennessee, stated that it seemed a "foregone conclusion" that the exemption of commercial bank term loans would be used to avoid the tax and characterized it as an "important loophole." In his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee last June, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon pointed out that the rise in long-term bank loans had started before there was any thought of the tax and that, in the light of detailed information made available to the Treasury, any possible evasion of the tax through use of bank loans could not be "more than 5 percent of the total bank loans."

Changes in direction of the flow of loans to less-developed and developed countries have been remarkably similar to the changes in

patterns of direct investment. Until 2 or 3 years ago, the direction of the flows had been mainly to Latin America and Canada. In recent years, most of the term loans have gone to Europe, particularly to Italy during late 1963 and early 1964, and to Japan. The shifts in the geographic distribution are summed up in the second table.

Over the past year, changes in bank credits abroad, short as well as long term, have been particularly influenced by borrowings by Japan. These have grown substantially to support the expanding volume of Japanese trade and business activity. In recent months, the rate of bank lending to Japan has slowed down. As noted in these pages last month, Japan has floated sizable amounts of bonds in European markets.

Changes in U.S. long-term banking credits abroad

(In millions of dollars)

| | Extended to— | | | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------|---------------|-------|--------|--------|
| | Europe | Latin America | Japan | Canada | Others |
| 1955..... | 21 | 240 | 44 | 3 | 52 |
| 1956..... | 95 | 67 | 27 | 22 | 11 |
| 1957..... | 164 | 116 | 6 | 33 | 16 |
| 1958..... | 20 | 65 | 4 | 28 | 71 |
| 1959..... | 28 | 131 | 3 | 5 | 72 |
| 1960..... | 1 | 125 | 3 | 28 | 64 |
| 1961..... | 126 | 17 | 5 | 198 | 10 |
| 1962..... | 86 | 45 | 50 | 29 | 6 |
| 1963..... | 518 | 16 | 129 | 19 | 49 |
| 1963 ¹ | 27 | 16 | 2 | 19 | 30 |
| 1963—January—March..... | 150 | 30 | 35 | 28 | 77 |
| April—June..... | 82 | 1 | 30 | 10 | — |
| July—September..... | 259 | 18 | 62 | 8 | 2 |
| October—December..... | 155 | 9 | 62 | 6 | 11 |
| 1964—January—March..... | 80 | 15 | 14 | 13 | 2 |
| April—June..... | 49 | 28 | 8 | 14 | 31 |
| July—August..... | 1,385 | 1,037 | 333 | 270 | 415 |
| Outstanding: August 1964..... | | | | | |

¹ Excluding the \$193,000,000 item described in footnote 4 to the preceding table. Its geographical distribution is as follows: Europe, \$5,000,000; Latin America, \$134,000,000; Japan, \$46,000,000; and others, \$8,000,000. The distribution of the \$86,000,000 item has not been published.

ical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98-98h) and the supplemental stockpile established pursuant to section 104(b) of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (7 U.S.C. 1704(b)). Such disposition may be made without regard to the provisions of section 3 of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act: *Provided*, That the time and method of disposition shall be fixed with due regard to the protection of the United States against avoidable loss and the protection of producers, processors, and consumers against avoidable disruption of their usual markets.

"Sec. 2. The Administrator is also authorized, without regard to the provisions of section 3 of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act, to make available an additional fifty thousand short tons of lead now held in the national and supplemental stockpiles for direct use by agencies of the United States Government."

The committee amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed.

The title was amended so as to read: "A bill to authorize the disposal, without regard to the prescribed 6-month waiting period, of lead from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile."

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the two bills just passed.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

LET US STAND IN VIETNAM

(Mr. ZABLOCKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, I know you are fully aware of my deep and continuing interest in the situation in Vietnam.

Today I want to reaffirm my view that this area must not be permitted to be lost to the Communists, either by default or by design.

Whether we like it or not, we have a political and moral commitment to the people of South Vietnam to assist them against Communist insurgency from within, and Communist aggression from without.

This commitment has been confirmed by three successive Presidents of the United States.

This commitment cannot be lightly dismissed or negotiated away. Unpleasant as it may be, our choice already has been made. We must stand firm in Vietnam.

This does not mean, Mr. Speaker, that negotiations may not ultimately help resolve the situation in Vietnam. But negotiations should not, must not, be used as a coverup for surrender. And unless the position of the free people of

Vietnam, aided by the United States, is considerably improved, negotiations now may only result in a complete rout of those who are trying to contain Communist expansion in southeast Asia.

For who, Mr. Speaker, would be willing to take the side of a "paper tiger" to oppose the expanding military might of Red China? If Vietnam goes down the drain, if we now withdraw our support from the effort being waged by its people, where will we make our stand? Which country in the Far East would be willing to put any trust in us then?

These questions are ignored by those who advocate immediate negotiations—or, in truth, our prompt withdrawal from Vietnam. And yet these very questions must be faced, and answered, before we embark upon a course which will lead us past the point of no return not only in southeast Asia but in the Far East and in Western Pacific as well.

It is for this reason that I have obtained permission to insert in the Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD an article which appeared in Sunday's New York Times, by the respected military commentator, Hanson W. Baldwin. Mr. Baldwin urges greater use of American military power in Vietnam. He believes we must stand firm and fight now to avert irreparable defeat.

Although I do not agree in every detail with Mr. Baldwin's observations and recommendations, I believe that his views deserve the careful attention of my colleagues.

EXCISE TAX ON AUTOMOBILES SHOULD BE REMOVED

(Mr. FARNUM asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FARNUM. Mr. Speaker, in joining with my distinguished colleague from Michigan, the Honorable MARTHA W. GRIFFITHS, and with other Members in support of a bill to remove the 10-percent excise tax from automobiles, my primary concern has been the economic well-being of the Nation rather than short-range interests of my district and State.

I have explained this in detail to those who have approached me from the city of Pontiac in my district and from other great automobile manufacturing centers.

A point I made was that unless the tax savings were passed on to the consumer, the measure would have not my support but my opposition.

I have received assurances that a reduced take-home price for automobiles will be the result of removal of the tax.

I wonder if the honorable Members are fully aware of the significance of, in effect, a substantial cut in the price of automobiles to the people of each and every one of the 50 States?

Most understand, I am sure, that when the automobile business is poor, the Nation's entire economy tends to be poor; when the automobile industry is hard at work, most of America also tends to be hard at profitable work.

Among the reasons for this is that automobiles, wherever they may be

assembled, are the product of practically all of the States.

To manufacture millions of automobiles you need materials in units often ordered in the tens of millions. It would be idle to tell the exact number of acres of cotton, of sheep ranches, of chemical plants needed to produce the raw materials for the many millions of yards of fabrics needed merely for automobile interiors.

Similarly astounding statistics could be gathered in telling the story of paint ingredients and their compounding, of metal mining and of fabrication of parts resulting, of rubber components, and of all the rest.

As impressive as that aspect of automobile manufacture is in all 50 of our great States, it is not the equal, possibly, to the economic effect produced locally when great numbers of persons are able to enjoy the ownership of new automobiles. The entire locality of sale soon undergoes economic invigoration.

To understand why this is so, it is merely necessary to visualize a gasoline service station. This is possibly the most common sight in the land and it is the outward manifestation of a great supplier and service industry that is even more diffused than the once centralized assembly of automobiles.

Once the mind is focused on this huge generator of economic well-being, it would be difficult indeed to think of any part of America that would not get a substantial local economic boost out of increased ownership of new automobiles.

A remaining question to be faced is, Can the Nation afford the tax removal? A better question is, Can the Nation afford not to remove this outdated and outmoded tax?

We have had considerable proof recently, and increasingly are getting more of it, that over a period a tax cut may not reduce revenue—if the cutting is well planned. A cut in the excise tax on automobiles may well leave the U.S. Treasury in a better position, after a reasonable time, than it held before the cut.

I ask this honorable body to consider again the great economic activity that a price cut in automobiles would stir up throughout the 50 States. Economic activity of this kind always is reflected in tax revenues from various sources and it requires little imagination to see that cutting the excise tax on automobiles would result in increases in revenue from a host of other sources.

There is one final thought I would leave with the honorable gentlemen. This is the joy a new automobile brings to its owner. Is there a better way to pursue happiness, and to bring domestic tranquillity within the family circle, than in a gleamingly new automobile fresh off the showroom floor? I doubt it. A reduction in automobile prices, through an overdue cut in the excise tax, would make meaningful the "unalienable right" to pursue happiness for Americans from Hawaii to Maine and from Alaska to Texas.

PEDDLERS OF HATE

(Mr. SCHWEIKER asked and was given permission to address the House

for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. Speaker, I call the attention of my colleagues and the Nation to a vicious anti-Semitic campaign being waged on college campuses in the Philadelphia area and elsewhere. A lunatic fringe group calling itself the Christian Youth Corps of St. Petersburg, Fla., has mailed to college students a vile anti-Semitic letter seeking to raise an army of hate. The leaders of the group are identified in the letter as a Col. Oren F. Potito and a Lt. Philip D. Le Bus. This fanatical group talks hysterically about—and I quote—“Red hordes that will soon attack the United States.” This extremist group in its hate letters asks, and again I quote, “young Christian Americans of Anglo-Saxon stock to join us in the fight to save our beloved Nation from the Jew-Communist conspiracy.” This so-called Christian Youth Corps goes on at length in its vicious diatribe to make the Jewish religion synonymous with communism and it then urges college students to become “brothers-in-arms,” to equip themselves for “guerrilla warfare operations” by obtaining knives, rifles, 1,000 rounds of ammunition, and other war supplies. Mr. Speaker, like most of my colleagues, I have seen a great deal of the hate trash which fanatical groups such as this “Christian Youth Corps” circulate throughout the Nation. But I have rarely seen material as vicious as this. I am alarmed, Mr. Speaker. I am alarmed that not enough light is being thrown on the activities of such crackpots. I am today asking that the House Committee on Un-American Activities investigate the operations of this vicious group of hate peddlers calling itself the Christian Youth Corps. They might more properly be called vigilantes of hate. The committee investigation of this group could properly be handled with the proposed committee investigation of that similar group calling itself the “Minutemen.” I urge my colleagues to support such an inquiry to shed light on the outrageous activities of these groups.

Mr. Speaker, WCAU radio in Philadelphia has done a great public service by calling the public's attention to the hate-mongering Christian Youth Corps. I am inserting WCAU's editorial. In addition, Mr. Speaker, I am inserting a copy of the Christian Youth Corps letter because I feel my colleagues and the people of this Nation should have an opportunity to see for themselves the vile trash which these hate peddlers are circulating:

[WCAU radio editorial]

INVESTIGATE HATE ARMY

Hate peddlers have launched a vicious anti-Semitic campaign on college campuses in the Philadelphia area and elsewhere.

A lunatic fringe group has sent its hysterical outpourings to at least one fraternity at the University of Pennsylvania.

Behind this attack is a recruiting campaign for an army of hate.

The organization which is trying to capture the minds of college students calls itself the Christian Youth Corps. It's based in St. Petersburg, Fla.

The ravings of that organization fell on fallow ground at the Penn fraternity house. These decent, intelligent young men scorned the barefaced appeal to join an army of hatred.

But will other young men across the country have the intellectual fortitude to resist this base attack, particularly where religious intolerance already exists? We hope so.

But there's an old saying that if you throw enough mud on a fence, some of it will stick. There's always the possibility that such propaganda will take root in some young and impressionable minds.

The blazing emblem of this Christian Youth Corps is a black cross on a field of white and red. That's the color scheme of the Nazis. The impression it gives, along with the printed matter, is more suggestive of the swastika.

The Youth Corps calls the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt a tool of what it describes as the Jewish brain trust. They say this brain trust arranged the Second World War.

The Youth Corps describes Philanthropist Samuel Fels as the man who financed the Russian revolution, and killed 21 million Christians. But the University of Pennsylvania is proud to point to the Fels Institute of Local and State Government on its campus.

And here's a direct quote—from this so-called Christian Youth Corps: “Today Jews control our Government and our money system, and are responsible for all the racial strife that is tearing the Nation apart by organizing and financing pro-Communist organizations such as the NAACP, CORE, ACT, and the Black Muslims.”

Throughout the diatribe, the Jewish religion is made synonymous with communism. For example, the Christian Youth Corps calls on youth of Anglo-Saxon stock to fight to save this country from the, and we quote, “Jew-Communist conspiracy.”

The Christian Youth Corps warns college students a Communist attack will come very soon. It tells them they better be on the right side, or be destroyed with the Jews. They urge the students to obtain a rifle and 1,000 rounds of ammunition. They urge the students to join their army of 10 million Christians, including the Minutemen, now facing investigation by the House Un-American Activities Committee.

WCAU radio has pledged to expose the activities of hate groups wherever we find them. We are sending copies of this hate propaganda to the appropriate Government agencies and officials. And we call for a complete investigation of this attempt to recruit a lawless army of hate in our Nation.

CHRISTIAN YOUTH CORPS

Asks young Christian Americans of Anglo-Saxon stock to join us in the fight to save our beloved Nation from the Jew-Communist conspiracy.

Only the Christian young men of this Nation can save it from the ever tightening Red grip that Satan's children (international Jewry) are fastening upon us.

Prepare yourselves for this battle for Christ, when the Christ hating Jews unleash their Red Communist hordes upon us.

Remember that Karl Marx was a Jew, whose real name was Moses Mordecai Levi, the son of a rabbi. Lenin and Trotsky were also Jews, as are all top Communists.

That the Russian revolution was financed by American Jews Jacob Schiff and Fels, owner of Fels-Naphtha Soap Co. More than 21 million Christians have died in Red purges since.

That international Jewish bankers (the House of Rothschild) promoted World War I and succeeded in getting Christian to fight

against Christian until 15 million were killed. The Jews and communism were the only profiteers.

That U.S. entry into World War II was conveniently arranged by the Jewish brain trust that ran the (Rosenvelt, his Dutch Jew name) administration, to prevent destruction of communism by Germany.

That all but one of the atomic spies who gave our atomic secrets to Russia were Jews.

That today Jews control our Government and our money system; and are responsible for all the racial strife that is tearing the Nation apart by organizing and financing pro-Communist organizations such as the NAACP, CORE, ACT, and Black Muslims.

Christian Anglo-Saxon young men we ask you to join us in our battle against Judaistic communism. Remember what our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ said to the Jews, “You are Satan's children and his works you do.”

All atheistic communism it attempting to do is take control of the world for Satan, and international Jewry is carry out this plan to the letter.

However, Almighty God is going to give we Christians the final victory through his beloved Son when He returns. You had better be fighting on the right side or you will be destroyed as will be the Jews, and all other enemies of Christ.

We are brothers-in-arms with the U.S. rangers, the California rangers, the Minutemen, the Texas Rangers, the Green Mountain boys in New England, and many other smaller localized organizations all of which comprise a vast national Christian army of over 10 million patriotic men who are ready to defend this Nation against the Red hordes that will soon attack the United States.

Each man needs the following basic equipment for guerrilla warfare operations.

1. Any standard rifle of at least .30 caliber.
 2. One good quality hunting knife, 6-inch blade.
 3. At least 1,000 rounds of ammunition.
 4. Regulation canteen-holder—webbed belt.
 5. Any suitable type backpack on which can be mounted; a good quality sleeping bag; a good quality two-man tent.
 6. Three pair of camouflage fatigues of heavy duck cloth.
 7. At least one pair of insulated paratroop type boots.
 8. Seven-day supply of concentrated food packs.
 9. At least 500 water purification tablets.
 10. Snake bite and first aid kit.
 11. One mosquito bar.
 12. One camouflaged waterproof poncho.
- This is a basic equipment list that will allow you to operate an an effective guerrilla unit.

We shall fight from the fields, from the plains, from the swamps, and from the mountains; and although overwhelmingly outnumbered in men and equipment we shall still be victorious for we have Almighty God on our side and at the precise moment his heavenly armies will intervene and give us the victory through the triumphant return of His blessed Son.

Let us remember the words of our late Christian president who was assassinated by the anti-Christ Jew-Communists, “I am a Berliner,” and in the spirit of these brave people let us prepare to defend our Christian heritage for Almighty God, for Christ, and the Nation.

For more information write to: Col. Oren F. Potito, or Lt. Philip D. Le Bus, Post Office Box 20183, St. Petersburg, Fla.

LE BUS ANTIQUE AEROPLANE CO.,
St. Petersburg, Fla., January 31, 1965.

ATO FRATERNITY.

DEAR BROTHERS: It pleases me to tell you that we now have a large number of brothers in the corps ready to fight for Christ and Nation.

the offer of the Japanese to mediate. Perhaps, if we could suggest something, I would most enthusiastically join the Senator in a plea for vigorous action by the administration to enlist the participation of our allies. If any such vigorous action is in fact being taken, it is so quiet, so submerged, so subdued, that even we who are extremely sensitive and have many places where we can get information, have heard nothing about it.

I believe it is in this area that we should push and press. Bringing in our allies does not have so many of the connotations of negotiations with the other side—that is, with the Communists; but we really should make massive demands and keep at it eternally to get help in this situation, so that Asians may get into the struggle, which is a struggle for the whole of Asia.

Mr. DODD. I wholly agree with the Senator from New York. I have said so many times years ago.

Mr. JAVITS. The Senator is correct.

Mr. DODD. When I came back from the trip which I made, I referred to it on the floor of the Senate. I then thought it was urgent and necessary. It is even more urgent and necessary now. I completely agree.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Connecticut yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MUSKIE in the chair). Does the Senator from Connecticut yield to the Senator from Oklahoma?

Mr. DODD. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. HARRIS].

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, I wish to associate myself with the remarks of the Senator from Connecticut and to commend him for the excellent thinking through which he has done on this grave problem and for the presentation of his very important recommendations in this critical situation. I commend him particularly for the overall position that what we are doing is so much better than two or three of the other alternatives which are available to us, among which are pulling out altogether from South Vietnam or neutralization without adequate safeguards, which would result in the same end as withdrawal from South Vietnam and eventual withdrawal from southeast Asia.

I believe that a general debate on this and all other matters of foreign policy are of great benefit, and help the people of this country establish a general consensus, which we as public officials have the responsibility not only to discover but also to lead toward. Nevertheless, it seems to me that we must be careful that we do not by our statements indicate to the people of southeast Asia, or to those who are our adversaries there, that this country plans any kind of negotiation which would result in our abandonment of the people of South Vietnam and, by any such statements, perhaps, accomplish the same results which many fear—that is, that we would force the administration to ever-increasing military efforts to keep those people from thinking that we are going to pull out.

I believe that is the greatest danger in the dialog on this subject. I believe that every Senator and others who have spoken have had much to add, but I especially wish to commend the Senator from Connecticut and to associate myself with his strong recommendations, particularly in regard to the intensification of political warfare in that troubled sector, and the encouragement of greater collective action by other people of the Asiatic nations.

Mr. DODD. I am deeply grateful to the Senator from Oklahoma for his comments.

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Connecticut yield?

Mr. DODD. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. MONRONEY. I should like to join my distinguished junior colleague in complimenting the able and distinguished Senator from Connecticut on his stand and the position he has taken in regard to Vietnam.

I had the great good fortune to represent the Senate in a visit to southeast Asia between Thanksgiving and Christmas for 3 days—to make the most of some 3 days by interviewing men who had served in that theater. Later, I talked to many who have served throughout the entire Far East theater of operations. I am convinced, as the Senator from Connecticut is convinced, that an attempt to arrange a negotiated settlement at this time would be folly in the extreme.

The Communists could use these so-called negotiations merely as a stalking-horse to get their apparatus more firmly at work or to gain time, or to gain place, or gain a position, or gain land, or gain in the conflict. I spent some time in Korea—3 days there. The only reason the Korean armistice has worked is the fact that we have had military power back of the 38th parallel, in a commanding position in the mountains, and have got air cover behind that, and tanks behind the air cover to make that line stick.

Otherwise the armistice agreement would not have been worth the paper on which it had been written, if we had had to depend on the Communists. Then it was the Korean Communists; this time it is the Vietnamese Communists. They are all of the same breed of cats. They may differ in their ideologies, as between the Chinese Reds and the Russian Reds, but they are both Reds; they are both Communists. In 99 percent of the cases, agreements are made by them for the very purpose of breaking them and misleading and tricking their opponents, and without any hope of having them honor their written commitments in any manner, shape, or form.

I am surprised that so many Members of the Senate, with good and peaceful intentions, invariably are taken in by this absolutely phony argument, which bears the hallmark of deceit and intent at misrepresentation and the obvious purpose of deceiving. I am surprised that it should fool anyone. I regret very much that so many of my able and distinguished colleagues in the Senate, who are in a position to know better, seem to

think that because peace is so wonderful and so much to be sought after we should allow the Communists to trick us into negotiations, which would be used to exploit us for their purpose. The way to get peace is to try to improve our position, to be able to proceed from a standpoint of strength, rather than from a standpoint of weakness. When we reach that point we shall not be laying ourselves open to helping them in their objective to propagandize themselves and the alleged position that they have in Vietnam.

I compliment the distinguished Senator on his firm position.

Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I am extremely delighted to state that my views have in the past coincided with the views of the Senator from Connecticut and coincide with them today. It is my recollection that in the Korean negotiations, the proposal to negotiate was not made by the United States, but by the North Koreans. Does the Senator have a recollection on that point?

Mr. DODD. That is my recollection.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I am quite certain that that is correct. Now it is proposed that we negotiate, and those who make the proposal used the analogy of what happened in Korea. Actually there is no analogy.

I heard the discussion about terrorism. I would like to hear the Senator's view on whether the terrorism is in the main practically and in completeness the acts of the guerrillas of North Vietnam against the peasants in the hamlets in South Vietnam.

Mr. DODD. I do not want to be understood as altogether absolving the South Vietnamese from any acts of terror. Unhappily, these things have occurred on both sides. However, I believe that the overwhelming number of acts of terror are chargeable directly to the Communists. There is no doubt about that. Terror is a part of their policy; whereas to some extent it may be true of South Vietnam, it is not the stated policy.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I agree completely with the Senator from Connecticut that it is their technique to intimidate and terrorize the peasants working in the fields and living serenely in their homes, descending upon them at night to decapitate their leaders and place their separated heads on poles, so that the peasants will begin to fear that if they take up the position of chieftan or leader they will likewise suffer the same fate.

Mr. DODD. That is why it is done.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I heard the discussion between the Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from Illinois about drawing a lesson from what happened following the violation of treaties going back to 1939. Unless we take a look at these incidents of appeasement we shall miss completely the lessons that must be drawn from past conduct in order to guide ourselves in the future.

Mr. DODD. That is very true. I do not offer these analogies because I think think they are exact parallels. The Senator understands that, I am sure. There are always some differences. I know that. However, we learn from what happened in the past, certainly from what happened in the near past, and we study these happenings in order to learn from them. If others made mistakes, we should try to learn how to avoid repeating them. I drew these analogies for that purpose. There are other examples in history—these are not the only ones—but the ones that I drew on are the latest and perhaps the most pertinent.

Mr. LAUSCHE. There was the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations covenants, the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, and the Lucarno Treaty. All of them contained provisions which were violated by the Japanese as early as 1922.

Mr. DODD. Yes.

Mr. LAUSCHE. By Hitler beginning about 1932, and by Mussolini at the same time. In instance after instance it was thought that if we would give in, it would be the end of it.

Mr. DODD. That is true. I referred to Nuremberg and what we discovered there. One of the things we learned was that at the time Hitler ordered his troops to occupy the Rhineland, he had given instructions that if they met any opposition at all they should immediately retreat. How easy it would have been for us to stop him cold then. There was considerable dissatisfaction with Hitler in his own military circles, and, as we know, there was an attempt made later to get rid of him.

We failed in that situation to take the appropriate steps. Our failure enabled Hitler to remain in power.

There were those who said, "Oh, no; war would result if we tried to stop Hitler now, and it would be terrible." We did not do what we should have done, and in that way a terrible war was brought on.

Mr. LAUSCHE. It has been suggested that we negotiate the future political status of South Vietnam. What does that mean? Does it mean that we should negotiate a new type of government for South Vietnam?

Mr. DODD. I do not know. I do not believe that the Senator from New York meant it that way. As I understood him, he made a good point. I am sure the Senator from Ohio shares my feeling on that point. As I understood the Senator from New York, we do not want to do anything that will give the impression that we are for unconditional surrender and, on the other hand, we do not want to give the impression that we will have nothing to do with the Communists. That is all that the Senator from New York meant, I am sure.

Mr. LAUSCHE. There is now in existence a pact by which we have abided and by which the South Vietnamese have abided, but which the North Vietnamese have violated.

Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct.

Mr. LAUSCHE. That is the Geneva Pact of 1954.

Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct.

Mr. LAUSCHE. In addition, to that, a new agreement was made in 1962, in Laos.

Mr. DODD. Yes.

Mr. LAUSCHE. There we followed the policy of negotiation.

Mr. DODD. Yes. I believe it was in 1961.

Mr. LAUSCHE. May I ask whether the Laotian agreement worked out as it was anticipated it would work out by the sponsors of it?

Mr. DODD. Not at all. It could not have worked out worse than it did. For the people of Laos and the people of southeast Asia and for us it has been a complete farce. It has been repeatedly violated, and it is being violated every day. It is another case of our inability to trust those people.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I commend the Senator from Connecticut for his presentation, because I believe what he has said and what others have said on this point will bring home to the minds of the American people that what is involved is not merely wanting to be in southeast Asia, but that our national security is involved. In my judgment, words to the contrary, are not at this time helpful to the achievement of the common objective that we seek to achieve.

Mr. DODD. I am grateful to the Senator for his compliment, which I do not deserve, but which I enjoy.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

APPOINTMENT BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TYDINGS in the chair). On behalf of the Vice President, pursuant to Public Law 87-758, the Chair announces the appointment of the Senator from Vermont (Mr. PROUTY) as a member of the National Fisheries Center and Aquarium Advisory Board for a 4-year term.

INCREASE OF FUND FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I move that the Senate resume to the consideration of Calendar No. 64, House bill 45.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TYDINGS in the chair). The bill will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 45) to amend the Inter-American Development Bank Act to authorize the United States to participate in an increase in the resources of the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Arkansas.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I wish to make a brief statement in support of S. 805, a bill to amend the Inter-American Development Bank Act to authorize the United States to participate in an increase in the resources of the Bank's Fund for Special Operations.

I say that the statement will be short. I do so not as an indication of the strength of my support for the measure—indeed, I thoroughly approve of this bill—but in order to spare Senators a complicated and wearisome recital of factual material. A plethora of facts and figures will be found in the printed material on Senator's desks. As with data on any financial institution, there is virtually no end to the figures, charts, and tables. Oversimplification of such material in this case may be a service rather than a danger.

I have said that I heartily approve of this bill, and I am sure that my reasons for this position will be shared by a great number of Senators, for this is the kind of foreign assistance activity in which the United States should be engaged. The purpose of the bill is easily and fully identifiable. The financing is of a kind which is particularly suited to the needs of friendly countries. We can readily keep track of the process of lending through ample public information on projects and their results. Self-help and responsibility are engendered through the participation of the countries being assisted. Criteria for eligibility are kept high. And the United States does not become embroiled in political squabbling or become the target of resentment and unseemly pressures.

However, before elaborating on any of these points it is necessary to give at least a very simplified explanation of the purposes and effects of this proposed legislation. We should start, I think, with the important fact that Latin American countries by and large are in a position where they find it increasingly difficult to service loans for economic and social development on conventional or hard terms. In addition, many vitally necessary projects in the so-called infrastructure category must be undertaken as a precursor to overall economic development. Since these projects do not represent an immediate or short-term economic return, they generally cannot be financed through ordinary banking operations. It almost goes without saying that loans for social projects such as housing, technical training, and education require special kinds of financing.

The need for this kind of lending activity was recognized at the time of the Inter-American Development Bank's establishment 5 years ago, and a Fund for Special Operations was created as a completely separate window of the Bank to service this requirement. At the same time, the initial resources made available to this special Fund were quite modest in comparison with the amounts subscribed toward the ordinary conventional lending operations of the Bank. Moreover, it was not then recognized how closely intertwined were the fields of economic and social development, and the Fund for Special Operations was not designed as an underwriter of social projects. To fill the resulting gap, the United States in 1961 unilaterally contributed a large sum to be administered through yet a third window by the Inter-American Bank; this window has been known as the Social Progress Trust

should have been made public. I do not see much sense in classifying this material and concealing it. The people do not know these facts.

Mr. DOMINICK. It is particularly important with respect to the argument made by those who would like to see us negotiate and neutralize. The South Vietnamese villages are not with us. But it is very difficult to have them cooperate with us if they are under the grip of terrorism and many people in their areas are being murdered. Until we give them the security they need, it is hard for them to be able to do anything.

Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, one of the things that has not been made plain in the overall debate, I feel, is the fact that there is a contest of willpower in this area. There is no doubt in my mind, from the study that I have made of the overall situation, that the Communists are using the so-called national liberalization plan as a test mechanism to determine how great the willpower of the free world is. If this plan should be successful in persuading us to negotiate or neutralize, it is inevitable that this technique will spread widely throughout the world, through Africa, South America, and Latin America.

It is already being used. But I believe it will be accelerated sharply. I think the Senator brought that point out very well. I congratulate him on making a very useful contribution.

Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I yield.

Mr. MUNDT. I congratulate the distinguished Senator from Connecticut for having presented a most conclusive and comprehensive statement on this whole Vietnamese problem. It is the type of white paper which I hoped the State Department would have placed before the American people long ago.

I believe it would still be well for them to do so. In his analysis of the historic developments of the problems and the consequences involved in this important theater of the world, the Senator leaves little doubt as to his accuracy.

While men may disagree among themselves as to the various processes to be used to bring this matter to a successful culmination, the matters that the Senator has anticipated are the type that should emanate from the State Department, carrying the full weight of the administration and the Government. I am sure that would convince many fine American citizens, who are beginning to doubt their own judgments in these areas, as to what is involved.

I congratulate the Senator on a most comprehensive study. I am happy to note the emphasis and the importance which the Senator places on a step-up political warfare in this area.

The distinguished Senator from Connecticut has long tried to establish a training institution in this country so that we could prepare Americans to go overseas for the type of warfare we wish to pursue, with a stable, constituted government in Vietnam.

I hope that the State Department, which has shown such a stubborn reluctance to provide the type training required for this type of warfare, will consider carefully the emphasis that the Senator places on this particular recommendation for future activity.

The Senator talks about cadres of trained political leaders and emissaries from these countries who are equipped and capable so that they could deliver the type of guidance and inspiration needed by our friends in South Vietnam. Unfortunately, this is always debated in a vacuum in our ability to wage a cold war.

I happen to be one of those who believe honestly that had the other body approved in 1960 what the Senate then did approve, legislation for the creation of a freedom academy—following a wonderful report written in large part by the Senator from Connecticut, as a member of the Committee on the Judiciary, emphasizing the need for this adjunct to our contest against the Communists overseas—we would have had 5 long years within which not only to train ourselves, but also to provide for young governmental officials and career people in the government in Saigon to come here and learn the full truth about the techniques and devices employed by the Communists. These officials and career people would have learned to understand the maneuvers and manipulations of the Communist conspiracy, and been trained to be better able to convince their fellow citizens on the free side of the Vietnamese struggle of the dividends which accrue to freedom, and the importance of Communists.

There would not have been the melancholic succession of quick changes in the officialdom of South Vietnam. We would have obtained what all hands agree is an indispensable requirement in bringing success to our efforts there—the creation of a stable government in South Vietnam which has not only the will to win, but also the respect of the local people, so that it in turn would support the Government and maintain its stability in office, so that the people there could get on with the work to be done.

Mr. DODD. The Senator gives me credit for the idea of the Freedom Academy. It was the idea of the Senator from South Dakota. I was merely a minor help in getting it through the Senate. The Senator from South Dakota deserves great credit for it.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I yield to the Senator from Texas.

Mr. TOWER. I join my distinguished colleagues from South Dakota and Colorado in commending the able and distinguished Senator from Connecticut for his comprehensive contribution to the dialog on southeast Asia. It must be made clear to the American people that we must take stringent action in southeast Asia if we are to deter and discourage further aggressive adventures by the Communists. Again I thank the Senator from Connecticut very much.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I yield to the Senator from New York.

Mr. JAVITS. The speech of the Senator from Connecticut is altogether too provocative and he has done his homework altogether too well for him to be complimented merely on a good job. It is a good job, however, and I should like to join my colleagues from Texas, South Dakota, and other States who have said so. Any time the Senator devotes himself to this kind of work, it helps the country.

The Senator from Connecticut has done a thorough job in presenting new ideas. This is the place for them, for we are not inhibited by the administration or its policies, especially when a Democrat puts forth a good idea.

One lack, as I have said before, is that retaliation has been pictured as a policy. It is not a policy. It is a reaction. We support it. We close ranks behind the President. We have common interests in it and in the losses. The losses break our hearts, but we try to do something about them. However, it is not a policy.

The Senator from Connecticut is trying to work out a policy. Whether it be a good or a bad policy, he is right in trying to work it out, because he proposes something positive, which takes us on a road where there is a big lack. That is what is causing doubts among the people as to whether this country is going to pull out of South Vietnam or go forward.

Granting all that I have said, I should like to ask the Senator some questions.

In the first place, the Senator does not deal with something that troubles many of us, and that is the question, "Is there still a majority in South Vietnam who do not want communism? Do a majority of the people want to fight against it?" We cannot fight a war without soldiers. That statement goes whether the fight is for an ideology or for freedom. That is one question we must always determine. We cannot put our head on other people's shoulders and assume they are "buddies." We may, for example, be bitterly opposed in Albania and other places, because the people there may want communism. They may like it. That is a very gnawing question with respect to South Vietnam: What is the attitude of the people of the country?

Only a declaration of the President of the United States can answer. I know that is so often said that it must sound like a cliché, but it is the President who has the vast reservoir of intelligence information. I think all of us, notwithstanding difference of party, would accept a declaration on the facts by the President of the United States. We are talking about the Presidency; it is not the man or party we are talking about. It is the office we are speaking of.

So, first, we ought to have a declaration and assurance, based on the whole combination of intelligence, diplomatic, and military advice, that a majority still favors fighting communism in that country.

I wish the Senator would comment on that point.

Mr. DODD. The Senator from New York was not in the Chamber when I

commented on that point; but I pointed out that, from all the information I can get, the Vietnamese people are overwhelmingly in favor of resisting Communist aggressors.

I pointed out that the people of Vietnam have a long history of resistance against oppression. I know and I have pointed out that many people believe that the people of South Vietnam have no will to fight, and that communism has an attraction for them. But the record shows that at the several different periods in their history, when they have been under attack, they have demonstrated their will to resist. It was the people of Vietnam who successfully resisted Genghis Khan. In our own time, they threw out the French. And they had been free for 500 years before the French occupation. They are proud of the fact that they threw the French out with their army of 500,000 men. So, I repeat that the Vietnamese people have historically displayed the will to resist and they are displaying the same will today. They behave very well, in fact. And the evidence is that they are overwhelmingly anti-Communist.

I pointed out that some people say the Vietnamese do not know anything about freedom, and that it is silly to talk about freedom for the Vietnamese. There are, however, three or four or five kinds of freedom.

The primitive peasant in the mountains knows what freedom is. Many of them have lived under communism, so they also know what slavery is.

The freedom enjoyed by the Vietnamese peasant I call a natural freedom. The peasant can plant his own seed, raise his crops and sell his produce. He has a family life, he can guide the upbringing of his children, he can elect local officials. If, in addition, the government builds a school, and dispensary, or supplies him with fertilizer, he thinks he is about as free as anybody in the world can be.

They do not have to have democratic, parliamentary freedom such as we have. I do not mean to detract from parliamentary democracy, but historically it is a refined form of democracy. However, it just is not true that the Vietnamese people do not know very much about freedom. They do know much about it. They have demonstrated that again and again.

There is another kind of freedom, and that is freedom from foreign domination. They know the meaning of this, too. As I said before, they defeated Genghis Khan, and they threw out the French. That they have the will to resist communism is borne out by the fact that 1 million have fled south. Roughly 5 million of them have, at one time or another, fought the Communists.

If we make allowance for wives and children, that would make a figure of 9 or 10 out of 14 million. The percentage may even be higher.

Again I repeat that the Vietnamese people do have the will to resist. All they want from us is aid to counterbalance the technicians and personnel, and weapons that the Communists have been

pouring in to support the Vietcong guerrillas.

I cannot give the Senator from New York the declaration which he wisely says we ought to have on Vietnam. I cannot speak in that capacity. I can say that, from my information—and I cited it—I am convinced that the facts are as I have stated them.

Mr. JAVITS. The Senator referred to the fact that the answer to my question is mentioned in his speech. I was not present in the Chamber all the time he was making his speech, but I have read it. I would not have presumed to ask the Senator these questions had I not read it. The purpose of my questions is more for emphasis.

The Senator from Connecticut has already answered a collateral question in the course of his last reply; namely, whether the South Vietnamese want our help.

I am pleased to hear the Senator say that a declaration by the President on this subject would be a good thing. It is necessary. I am not critical, but that does not stop us from urging what would be good for the country and the world.

Mr. DODD. I knew the Senator was present. I was aware of his presence while I was speaking.

I think it is good to do anything that would help our people understand where they are, and what we are trying to do in Vietnam.

Mr. JAVITS. One big point being made is on the question of negotiation. The Senator has said that the demand that we negotiate now over Vietnam is akin to having asked Churchill to negotiate with the Germans at the time of Dunkirk and President Truman to negotiate at the time of Pusan. I assume that also goes for President Kennedy with respect to Castro.

Let me ask the Senator this question, which concerns a Presidential declaration. I do not know what the answer of the Senator will be, therefore I may be making a mistake, because a trial lawyer should not ask a question to which he does not already know the answer, but I believe that—

Mr. DODD. That is not what is worrying me. I am worrying as to whether I know the answer.

Mr. JAVITS. It is important that we explore each other's minds to see whether we agree with each other's point of view.

As the President has stated, we are ready to negotiate. We are ready to negotiate if negotiations do not represent a sellout of the people of South Vietnam or a sellout of the cause of freedom.

I should like that formula better, because this is a big question in the world: "Is the United States in a mood for unconditional surrender?" The Senator and every newspaper editor in the world know precisely what I mean by that.

What are we saying here—that someday, somehow, as in the case of the Berlin airlift, or other emergencies which looked as though they would never be settled, some way will be found out of the situation? The same thing occurred in

Korea. The day came when there was some kind of negotiation, good, bad, or indifferent. Therefore, would the Senator, consistent with his conscience and his views, subscribe to the proposal that we should assert that we are ready to negotiate, provided it is not a sellout negotiation and not a negotiation for face-saving purposes because we wish to find a good reason to pull out, but that we are ready to negotiate honestly and legitimately for a political settlement of the issue, now, tomorrow, or at any other time?

Mr. DODD. Perhaps I could answer the Senator's question better and more directly if he would tell me what it is that he would suggest we negotiate.

Mr. JAVITS. I suggest that we negotiate the political future of South Vietnam, or that we encourage South Vietnam to negotiate it, in or out of the United Nations, in or out of the Geneva conventions, so long as the conditions which are the framework of the negotiations do not show the United States to be pulling out of South Vietnam.

Mr. DODD. What I am worried about is the fact that we already have an agreement. We have already negotiated one. It has been violated. What do we negotiate? Do we sit around a table and say, "You have broken your agreement. Stop doing it. Get back and obey its terms." I suppose that could be described as negotiation in a crude sense. But it seems to me that this is all we have to negotiate.

I do not like to use the term "negotiation" when what we are really talking about is a breach of covenant. If I have a contract with the Senator from New York and I should break it, I believe that he would use stronger language than negotiation.

I do not wish to be evasive. If it would help to sit down and talk with the Communists, I would be in favor of it. But, I have serious doubt that it would help us in this crisis. Certainly, in a general sense, the President has stated that we are always willing to negotiate.

If there is anything, really, to negotiate, and if it would help, I am sure the President would do it.

I would put it a little differently. We do not know what there is to negotiate. We already have an agreement. We say, "We have an agreement which you have violated and which has caused some trouble. All you have to do is to retire from your aggressions, and cease attacking your neighbor." If the Communists are willing to talk about this, then I suppose we should do so.

Mr. JAVITS. I have suggested the framework for negotiations, and let me say that the Senator has just made what could be an excellent opening statement by the United States in such a negotiation. I believe that within that framework, the Senator and I could agree.

But let me make one further comment on this subject which is important; in debate and in fortifying our own conscience on this issue, we must not forget that we are supposed to have allies in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, in mutual defense agreements, even in

except through some newspaper articles. So far as I know, no formal inquiry was ever made, although there have been many ugly rumors. But officially, we do not know why Diem was overthrown, or how his death occurred.

That was the beginning of our trouble in South Vietnam. I make this statement only for historical reference, so that I may put my response in better perspective. We have since the death of Diem been plagued with the fall of one government after another in South Vietnam. There must be a stable Government, and we can and must try to help the South Vietnamese achieve it.

Mr. ELLENDER. Suppose we cannot accomplish that?

Mr. DODD. I do not think that will happen. I think it can be done.

Mr. ELLENDER. The Senator has been speaking about Diem.

Mr. DODD. It is an "if" question. I do not know that anyone can ever answer it. The Senator says "suppose." I could add a hundred other suppositions that would make his question of no moment. Suppose we were attacked by the Soviets tomorrow morning with nuclear weapons; I do not think we would then be able to do much in Vietnam. But I do not believe that will happen. I do not think we get anywhere by such suppositions.

We must strive to assist the South Vietnamese in obtaining a stable government. I think that with our help, they can establish such a government; then we shall do better.

Mr. ELLENDER. I should like to speak about Diem, if the Senator will permit me to do so.

Mr. DODD. Certainly.

Mr. ELLENDER. I was in South Vietnam within a matter of months after Diem took office and on several occasions thereafter. I remember on my second visit there discussing with him the existence in his country of two pockets or areas, one in the delta and one to the northwest of Saigon, that were infested with Communists. He knew that. As I recall, we made efforts to encourage him to take action to satisfy those people, but we could never get him to do so. Those two pockets continued to grow in size. They may have been dominated by Buddhists, because it is alleged that 90 to 92 percent of the people are Buddhists.

Mr. DODD. No; the Senator is in error. This is a common mistake. Not more than 30 percent of the population are Buddhists.

Mr. ELLENDER. Thirty percent are Buddhists?

Mr. DODD. Thirty percent. I can document my belief.

Mr. ELLENDER. I wish the Senator would.

Mr. DODD. This is a common error. Such statements are made frequently. There is nothing to substantiate the figure of 90 percent.

Mr. ELLENDER. What is the division?

Mr. DODD. I should like to place that information in the Record in an orderly way. I shall discuss it.

Mr. ELLENDER. I want the Senator from Connecticut to know that I have taken part in debates in the Chamber in respect to South Vietnam on many occasions, but I am not one to try to dictate to the President what he ought to do.

Mr. DODD. Neither am I.

Mr. ELLENDER. We have gone so far now that I do not know what the whole picture is. I still contend that unless we can persuade our allies to assist us in that area, and unless we can enable the South Vietnamese to build up to the point where they will have a strong, stable government, there is no telling how long we shall be in that country, and there is no telling how many American lives will be lost. I doubt that there is any way to win there under present conditions.

As the Senator may recall, the late President Kennedy said—and I well remember when he said it, because I discussed it with him in person, following my last visit to South Vietnam—that if victory were to be attained in South Vietnam, the South Vietnamese would have to achieve it. In my opinion, that cannot be done unless there is a stable Government there that is willing, with our assistance, to fight. Does not the Senator agree?

Mr. DODD. Yes. I am much in agreement with the Senator from Louisiana. I have great admiration for him. I know how hard he has worked on these subjects and how widely he has traveled. I am grateful to him for his comment. I shall touch on these subjects later.

Mr. President, I reiterate my earlier request that this colloquy be placed at the end of my speech.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ELLENDER. I am deeply interested in what the Senator is saying. If I do not remain in the Chamber all the time, I shall read his speech in the Record. I should like to have the benefit of his statistics concerning the religious aspects of the trouble in South Vietnam.

Mr. DODD. Yes. I am grateful to the Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. President, I am pleased to observe in the Chamber the distinguished junior Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING]. I am happy that he is here, because I hope to receive his views as I proceed to discuss this subject.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I am delighted to yield to my distinguished friend the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I had the privilege of reading overnight the very able address of the Senator from Connecticut. In fact I read it over no less than three times.

Mr. DODD. I am indeed complimented.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I commend the Senator for many features of his address. First, I commend the spirit which animates his speech, the refusal to indulge in personalities, the crediting of high motives to those who differ in their prescriptions.

Mr. DODD. If I may interrupt, that could well have been learned from the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I commend the general elevation of attitude and the powerful logic of the speech. This is the most puzzling and dangerous problem which our country has faced since October 1962.

I agree with the Senator from Connecticut that many Americans do not sufficiently appreciate what the loss of South Vietnam would mean to the free world and to the anti-Communist forces. I am not an expert on the subject of this territory, but a study of the map indicates what is involved. The Senator is completely correct in his statement that the fall of South Vietnam, or a withdrawal from South Vietnam, unless conditions change, would mean the almost immediate fall of Cambodia and Laos into the Communist camp. Laos is already half there; Cambodia is perhaps half there.

Then, if Senators will look at a map of the area, they will see that Thailand would be half encircled. As the Senator from Connecticut has pointed out, the North Vietnamese announced a few days ago that they were setting up a committee for the national liberation for Thailand.

Mr. DODD. Yes.

Mr. DOUGLAS. With that kind of power base, with North Vietnam pushing, with China behind North Vietnam, and with the United States out of the area, would not Communist influence take over Thailand and then spread north into Burma and south into Malaysia?

Mr. DODD. Most assuredly.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Then to the 650 million Chinese would be added 250 million Malays. What then would be the position of India?

Mr. DODD. Then it would be hopeless.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I remember talking many years ago with an eminent Indian, who was not pro-Western and not pro-Communist, but rather was a neutralist. I addressed this question to my Indian acquaintance: "How long could India be kept neutral if southeast Asia were to go Communist?" The reply was almost immediate. "We could not keep India neutral for more than a year."

I know that the "domino" theory is being attacked now as not being applicable; but if these were an absence of force to check the Chinese, it would seem to many of us to be almost inevitable that all of Malaysia and virtually all of India would go Communist. We would then face a combination of 350 million Indians, 250 million Malays, and 650 million Chinese—1,250 million people. That would not be merely a change of political government but the conquest of a doctrine bent on world domination which treats the United States as its basic enemy.

Mr. DODD. Oh, no.

Mr. DOUGLAS. It would be a powerful force dedicated to the defeat of the United States of America.

If the Senator from Connecticut would permit me to do so, I should like to underscore some of his remarks on neutralization. I suppose that if there could be genuine neutralization, that would be highly desirable.

Mr. DODD. Of course; I should have made that point. No one would be happier than I if genuine neutralization, as the Senator puts it, could be achieved. I was talking about neutralization in the sense in which the Communists use it. We are too inclined to believe that the Communists mean genuine neutralization, when what they mean, in fact, is communization.

Mr. DOUGLAS. If it were genuine neutralization, it should certainly apply to North Vietnam as well as to South Vietnam.

Mr. DODD. That would be genuine neutralization.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Even if it were applied to South Vietnam, it would not be effective in view of Communist philosophy and power, unless there were some adequate supervisory body having real authority to police the agreement.

We have all noticed press reports, which are authentic, that North Vietnam has even expelled the small inspection teams which, under the Geneva Convention of 1954, were placed both in North Vietnam and South Vietnam, to see what was taking place and to report. They are being expelled and forced out. So there will be no eyes and no voices—no eyes to detect and no voices to report the military preparations and movements of North Vietnam.

Mr. DODD. That is correct.

Mr. DOUGLAS. If there were a strong, effective United Nations, with a mobile police force, that force could be placed in this area to help fill the power vacuum.

Mr. DODD. There is no doubt about that.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I was in Egypt and Israel in 1956, shortly after the Suez hostilities. I was greatly pleased about the excellent work of the United Nations police force. The Senator from Connecticut and I may have differed somewhat about the role of a United Nations police force in the Congo, but to my mind it represented a healthy principle.

Mr. DODD. I have no difficulty with the Senator from Illinois on that point. I am sure the Senator would agree that we can make mistakes. But the principle is correct: A United Nations police force should be used wherever this is feasible.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Yes. Unfortunately, as we all know, the Russians and, I am sorry to say, the French also, have virtually stymied the creation of such a force by refusing to contribute to its support.

Mr. DODD. Yes.

Mr. DOUGLAS. So it will be almost impossible in the near future to finance and to place a United Nations police force in the field.

Another political change is occurring inside the U.N.; namely, a shift of power from the Assembly to the Security Council, where the Russians can interpose a

veto and thus stymie any resolution of the U.N.

As one who has always been a supporter of the U.N., and who still is, I observe many signs that the United Nations is being weakened in the same fashion that the League of Nations weakened in the middle and late 1930's. I hope that this will not happen.

Mr. DODD. So do I.

Mr. DOUGLAS. We should try to prevent that from happening, but we should not ignore reality.

To those who say that there is no analogy between the cumulative conquests of Hitler and Mussolini in the late 1930's and the cumulative developments of the Chinese in Asia in the 1960's, I should say that there is grave danger that they delude themselves. It would be a terrible thing if we woke up to find all of Asia Communist.

Mr. DODD. It would be a dreadful disaster. Earlier I described it as an "unthinkable thought," borrowing my words from the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. DOUGLAS. It would have tremendous propaganda influence in Africa, much greater than the Russians alone could have, because the Russians, after all, are members of the white race. But the members of the yellow race or the brown race can make a much greater appeal to the blacks than the white nations can.

The Senator from Connecticut has performed a real public service in stressing the dangers. It should be noted also that he cannot be accused of being a war hawk. He does not advocate the indiscriminate bombing of North Vietnam or a bombing attack on China.

Mr. DODD. No.

Mr. DOUGLAS. He suggests the possibility of guerrilla warfare in the north, which would have to be done by South Vietnam, rather than by the United States.

Mr. DODD. Only because of what North Vietnam is doing to South Vietnam. This seems to me a proper corrective measure only so long as North Vietnam persists in its activities.

What we all hope for, I need not say to the Senator, is a settlement of the differences between countries, so that they can drop their arms and get on with the business of improving the lives of their people.

Mr. DOUGLAS. The Senator proposes political warfare and economic aid to be of real benefit to the people of South Vietnam; the development of SEATO; and various other measures.

I feel certain that the country will appreciate what the Senator from Connecticut has done. I urge that his warnings and his suggestions should not be dismissed summarily.

I can remember how, in the 1930's, after two trips to Europe, I felt that the combination of Hitler and Mussolini was moving to take over the free world. I believe that it was the duty of all who loved freedom to resist that movement. There is a similar obligation upon us today to resist totalitarianism of the left, as well as totalitarianism of the right. One is as bad as the other.

Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct. I am glad that the Senator made that observation.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I thank the Senator. Perhaps certain features of his program, such as the proposal to capture a staging area just inside of Laos may not be the right thing to do. But, in general, the program suggested is modest, moderate, and in good temper. I hope his program will be considered by the American people and that it may serve to offset some of the finely motivated but incomplete suggestions that have been made.

Mr. DODD. I am deeply grateful for the observations of the Senator.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I yield.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I congratulate the distinguished Senator from Connecticut on making what I think is a valuable contribution to the national debate on what we should do in southeast Asia.

I not only had an opportunity to read the statement before it was delivered, but I also had the pleasure of listening to the delivery. There are several points that the Senator made which I think were publicly made for the first time. The one that I should like to emphasize at this point concerns some of the strategic implications, gained by looking at a map, of what might happen if the Red Chinese decide to move south.

The implication is rather plain that the Senator does not think they will do that. I agree. Among the things that would deter them from doing that is the presence in Taiwan of a highly trained air force. The Nationalist Chinese very much want to go back to the mainland if they have an opportunity. If the Red Chinese forces were to be drawn to the south, that would give them the chance to move, which chance they might not have again.

The Senator presented figures on what the Vietcong has done in the way of murder and terror within the country. The Senator said that almost 500 a month, or 6,000 a year, within the village hamlets have been murdered by the Vietcong.

Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct.

Mr. DOMINICK. I wonder if the Senator can tell me where the figures originate.

Mr. DODD. I hope the Senator will be satisfied with my statement. I am sure they are from an official source of the administration.

Mr. DOMINICK. The reason I asked is that figures have been given to me which are of a very substantial nature, but not quite that large. When I have mentioned the figures from time to time, in the process of meeting with groups and talking about the terrorism that has been inflicted, people had not heard of this before. They had never understood what was going on. They had no concept of the problem.

Mr. DODD. I do not know whether the Senator was in the Chamber before, but when I obtained the figures, I said, "Why in the world have the figures not been made public?" I think the figures

EXILES

Raising a touchy political issue, the students also questioned the status of five generals exiled to the mountain resort of Dalat by Premier Khanh when he seized power last January. General Khanh charged at the time the generals were plotting a neutralist solution for the country's war against the Vietcong Communist guerrillas. He said Wednesday the five officers were being returned to active duty.

The students asked whether this meant that the generals were falsely accused or whether General Khanh now is willing to admit high-ranking neutralists in his high command.

The Vietcong's clandestine Radio Liberation joined the anti-U.S. chorus yesterday with a broadcast plea to South Vietnamese religious leaders, intellectuals, and soldiers to help drive out the Americans.

Turning around U.S. charges that the Vietcong deliberately fomented interreligious strife, the Red National Liberation Front's top political official, Nguyen Huu Tho, said the "U.S. aggressors and their lackeys" plotted to separate Buddhists from Catholics "with the aim of invading our country and enslaving our people."

[From the Evening Star, Sept. 7, 1964]

VIETNAM ANSWERS SOUGHT

(By Marguerite Higgins)

What do the Buddhist political leaders of Vietnam really want?

What is the objective of the drumfire of propaganda and demonstrations against the predominantly Buddhist government of Vietnam that began as early as last April—a time, unfortunately, when the American Embassy and the American people had their mind on other things?

In secret meetings in Saigon late last week with top Buddhist leaders, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor tried urgently to find the answers to these questions because, among other things, he is under pressure from Washington to explain increasingly worrisome signals as to Buddhist intentions.

During the meeting, General Taylor addressed most of his questions to the Reverend Thich Tam Chau, a refugee from North Vietnam, a genuine anti-Communist in principle albeit something of a timid soul in practice, and ostensibly the leader of the United Buddhist Movement of Vietnam.

But the answers that really counted belonged to the Reverend Thich Tri Quang, a one time associate of the Communist Vietnam, the mastermind of the anti-Diem campaign of last summer and fall, and currently the spearhead of a deadly struggle for power inside the Buddhist movement against the Reverend Tam Chau. Tri Quang is additionally the leader of a sometime open and sometime secret drive to topple the Khanh regime.

There are some who say that the Buddhist Monk Tri Quang is, next to General Khanh, the most powerful Vietnamese figure in South Vietnam today and that tomorrow he may be the most powerful.

It is of significance therefore that General Taylor's telegrams on the Buddhist situation produced so many somber faces around the Department of State.

For the time being, at any rate, it appears according to Ambassador Taylor's assessment that the moderates among Vietnam's nearly 5 million Buddhists (out of a population of more than 14 million of which the majority are ancestor worshippers) are being skillfully and relentlessly outmaneuvered by the extremist wing led by the Reverend Tri Quang, whose flamboyant oratory and calls for direct action have far more appeal, for example, to Vietnam's citified, riot-prone young people than the pleas for caution issued by the Reverend Tam Chau.

As to the political game being played by the Reverend Tri Quang, a key administration official who had read General Taylor's telegrams summed things up this way:

"A defensible case can be made for the theory that Tri Quang will sooner or later seek to undermine any stable anti-Communist government in Vietnam in the belief that anarchy will drive the United States to go home, permitting the emergence of a neutralist or possibly pro-Communist state with himself at the helm."

He continued: "If Tri Quang wants to deliver Vietnam to neutralism or communism under his own leadership, it would explain the mystery of why he raised the false issue of persecution which is ridiculous in light of all the concessions—indeed the favoritism—shown the Buddhists by Khanh's regime."

"But the cry of Buddhist persecution—as Tri Quang well knows—brings an almost Pavlovian reaction in the outside world where most people are too uninformed and too naive to believe that a Buddhist monk might make up such accusations out of whole cloth to gain his own ends."

The issue now seems less and less whether the Reverend Tri Quang aspires for a neutralist and pro-Communist Vietnam under his leadership.

It is focusing more and more on the fact that his actions are pointing in that direction. The question now is whether anything can be done effectively to stop him as he operates from within the privileged psychological sanctuary of being a Buddhist monk.

[From the Baltimore Sun, Nov. 5, 1963]

REDS SEEK NEW COUPS OF BUDDHIST-LED TYPE—REPORTED TRYING TO SPREAD VIETNAM RELIGIOUS REVOLT TO LAOS

(By Paul W. Ward)

NEW YORK, November 4.—Having seen Buddhism spearhead a drive that toppled Vietnam's Diem regime, Communists now are trying to organize like offensives elsewhere in southeast Asia.

So it was learned here today following announcement that a United Nations mission sent to South Vietnam October 22 to investigate charges that Buddhists were being persecuted there has completed its task and will reassemble next Monday in New York.

IMMEDIATE TARGET

Laos, which lies just west of Vietnam and also abuts Communist China, appears the immediate target of a campaign originating in Peiping. Its aim is to set Buddhist communities throughout Asia to filing complaints against elements of Laos' coalition Government akin to those they had been pressing against the Diem regime at Saigon until it fell last Friday.

The chief indication was provided in broadcasts from Hanoi, in North Vietnam, and Peiping reporting that the "Laotian Buddhist Association [has issued] a statement strongly protesting against the bombardment of a monastery by the Phoumi Nosavan troops and reactionaries among Kong Le's troops."

Gen. Phoumi Nosavan heads the anti-Communist wing of a troika-form government set up in Laos last year to carry out an agreement to neutralize that southeast Asian kingdom worked out at a Geneva conference which included the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China among its participants.

Gen. Kong Le commands the troops of the coalition's neutralist factions and enjoyed avowed support by Peiping and Hanoi until the Communists concluded several months ago that he is sincerely neutralist and will not help them take over Laos.

COMPENSATION DEMAND

Since then, they not only have been denouncing him but trying to win over his subordinate officers to their side.

The Laotian Communist radio station, calling itself the voice of Laos, also broadcast the statement attributed to the "Laotian Buddhists Association," that alleged their foes had "destroyed a [Buddhist] monastery and acting Buddhists" at Ban Ton Nuong in Kleng Province's back county by a bombardment during the night of October 16-17.

The statement demanded "that the Phoumi Nosavan clique compensate the losses and immediately stop all moves against the Buddhists." Otherwise, "it would bear full responsibility for the consequences," it said, adding:

"All Laotian monks and Buddhists are urged to strengthen their solidarity, heighten their vigilance, and resolutely oppose all schemes of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys."

The Communists have been denouncing the anti-Communist and neutralist factions of Laos' coalition government as puppets of the United States, just as they formerly denounced South Vietnam's Diem regime and are currently trying to discredit on like grounds the military junta that displaced it Friday.

To further what began as a Buddhist campaign against the Diem regime, Communist China also staged shortly before that regime's fall a 3-day conference of Buddhist clergy and laymen from 11 Asian countries.

Held in Peiping's Fayuan Monastery the conference was devoted in large part to orations against "the United States—Ngo Dinh Diem clique" at Saigon.

MONKS REPORTED BEHEADED

Its participants, now touring Communist China under the aegis of Peiping atheist regime, included:

1. The Venerable Thich Thien Hao, listed as president of the Luc Hao Buddhist Association of South Vietnam, who made a long speech about atrocities, including beheadings and disembowelings of Buddhist monks, that he attributed to "the United States-Diem clique."

2. The Venerable Theppouary Pramaha Khantank, named as president of the Buddhist Association of Laos, who charged the United States is trying to turn that country into a "colony" and demanded that Washington cease giving military aid to the Laotian Government, asserting:

AUGUST DENUNCIATION

"We Asian people and Buddhists are the masters of our own affairs. We don't need any other masters lording it over and ruling us."

Mainland China's Communist rulers, who in August denounced as "political agents" of Chiang Kai-shek a group of Buddhist monks from Formosa then visiting India, also brought together in Fayuan Monastery Buddhist monks and laymen from Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand, and North Vietnam, which, like Cambodia and Thailand, also abuts Laos.

Having produced on October 20 a formal appeal to Buddhists everywhere to join in the anti-Diem campaign, the conferees gave themselves over to a series of fetes arranged in their honor by the Peiping regime that only a few years ago was charged before the United Nations Assembly here with having destroyed more than 1,000 Buddhist monasteries in Tibet.

NORTH VIETNAM CUARGES

There was no Tibetan participation in the Buddhist conference at Peiping.

North Vietnam's Communist regime has sent to the International (i.e., Polish, Indian, and Canadian) Control Commission for both parts of Vietnam a compilation of "Buddhist persecution and atrocity" charges against the Diem regime that said in part:

"Gen. Ton That Dinh, military governor of Saigon, personally directed troops to martyrize pupils of Vietnamese and French middle schools" on September 7.

TO HEAD NATIONAL POLICE

He currently is slated to be Interior Minister (i.e., chief of police forces) in the new regime at Saigon, having turned revolutionist after being refused the same post in the Diem regime, according to reports relayed from Saigon via Washington.

Today Moscow's radio stations continued to denounce the military junta in Saigon just as they previously had denounced the Diem regime as an American puppet and the United Nations mission to Vietnam as a Washington invention designed to protect and preserve the Diem regime.

Meanwhile, it was noted here that in Burma, homeland of U Thant, United Nations Secretary General, the military regime in control at Rangoon is under attack from the venerable U Kaythara, who, at 83, is the ranking Buddhist priest at Mandalay.

Addressing mass rallies assembled in defiance of the regime and overtly inviting arrest, he has also been predicting that Gen. Ne Win, the regime's head, will meet the same end as Gen. Aung Sau, Burma's national hero, who was assassinated in 1947.

In a statement relayed from Saigon and issued here today, a spokesman for the fact-finding mission that headed back to New York yesterday contended its departure from Vietnam was not occasioned by the coup d'etat there, but was "as scheduled," although in statements prior to the coup the mission had claimed inability to estimate when it would complete its on-the-spot investigation.

Today's statement also said the mission "had not been able to interview Thich Tri Quang [a Buddhist monk] who was in asylum at the U.S. Embassy" in Saigon. It added that "the former government of the republic had informed the mission that, according to the laws of asylum, a person in asylum was not allowed to make any contacts whatsoever while in asylum."

BURMESE COMPLAINT

Meanwhile, there were these additional developments at United Nations headquarters:

1. James Barrington, Burma's chief delegate here and its representative in the currently recessed disarmament conference at Geneva, complained in one of the Assembly's standing committees about a tendency toward "bilateralism" by Washington and Moscow and consequent bypassing of the lesser powers, including neutralists, in disarmament matters.

2. Mrs. Agda Rossel, Sweden's chief delegate took steps in another committee to initiate debate on a resolution—sponsored also by Austria, Ceylon, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela—that is aimed at getting all governments to follow the example Liechtenstein set in 1798 by abolishing capital punishment.

During the delivery of Mr. Dodd's speech,

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. I believe that my record on the scoreboard of the Americans for Constitutional Action is even lower than the record of the Senator from Connecticut.

I share with the Senator from Connecticut the feeling that it only demonstrates that we are trying in new ways to have the government use its powers for the people without at the same time jeopardizing individual freedom. We can only hope and pray that among the makers of these arbitrary scoreboards there could be a greater reflection of the consensus of our own people in our own

States. Then I think the scoreboard would be very different for the Senator from Connecticut and myself.

Mr. DODD. I appreciate the Senator's making that observation. The Senator is one of the great minds in this body. He stands out particularly in the area of which he has spoken. I am happy to be in his company on that scoreboard.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the colloquy in which I have just engaged with the Senator from New York be placed at the end of my remarks so that I may have my speech in continuity.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, am I to understand that the Senator from Connecticut does not wish to yield?

Mr. DODD. I am happy to yield. I merely wish that whatever yielding I do may appear at the end of my remarks, unless there is some reason for it to appear elsewhere.

Mr. ELLENDER. I have been listening to what the Senator has said with much interest, because I have visited southeast Asia on many occasions. I have often described to the Senate—and I believe my reports will so indicate—the situation that was prevalent in southeast Asia. I am almost certain that my good friend will agree that were he to go to South Vietnam now, he would find things quite different from what they were when he visited that country 4 years ago.

Mr. DODD. I am sure that is true.

Mr. ELLENDER. There is no doubt about that. On several occasions I made the statement on the floor of the Senate that unless we could persuade our allies to assist us in carrying this load—and I am sure the Senator agrees that that ought to be done—and unless a stable government could be established in South Vietnam, we would be in serious trouble.

Mr. DODD. Yes. I wholly agree with those two points. I refer to a speech I made 4 years ago, in which I made the same point. I said I thought it was absolutely essential that our friends and allies in that part of the world join us in the struggle to preserve the freedom of the South Vietnamese. I pointed out—and I shall touch on the issue later today—that there is a basic structural fault in the SEATO organization which gives a veto power to any one member; and, as the Senator knows, that power has been exercised by France and Britain.

We must have a stable government in South Vietnam. The Senator is a well-informed Member of this body on these problems. I have great respect for his opinions.

Mr. ELLENDER. The question I should like to ask the Senator is as follows: Should we continue to intensify our efforts in that area if we cannot get our allies to assist us or if a stable government is not established in South Vietnam? That is the question.

Mr. DODD. The Senator's question is part of a larger question. There are many things we must do. Those are two things that we must do. I believe that we must get our friends and allies in that part of the world to assist us. We

are getting them. Already Korea has announced that it is sending men to that area.

Mr. ELLENDER. Two thousand men.

Mr. DODD. Two thousand men. The Philippines are sending in several thousand men. All this is encouraging. They are starting, at least. I would like to see other nations do as much or more, and I expect that they will. I believe we are underway, and that this is no time to quit, because now we have the signs and beginnings to indicate that our allies are starting to do what the Senator from Louisiana and I believe they should have done long ago.

Mr. ELLENDER. I am not suggesting that we quit now.

Mr. DODD. I know the Senator is not.

Mr. ELLENDER. We have gone so far into it that we may well find ourselves in over our heads.

What I fear—and I have said so on the floor of the Senate and have included it in my reports—is that the situation that now exists in South Vietnam may become similar to the one that now exists in South Korea. The Senator will remember that the South Korean war was supposed to be a United Nations affair, in which all the membership of that great organization was to join us in fighting in South Korea. But what happened? We took hold of the situation there; and as I recall the figures, 96 percent of the cost of that war was paid by the United States, and about 95 percent of the foreign men who died in that conflict were Americans.

Mr. DODD. I accept the Senator's statistics.

Mr. ELLENDER. That is as I remember them.

Mr. DODD. They seem to me to be approximately correct.

Mr. ELLENDER. Today we are stuck, as it were, in South Korea. We are trying to maintain 18 local divisions there. It is very costly to do that. In addition, we are maintaining 2 of our own divisions there. As the Senator from Connecticut knows, we cannot pay the expenses of our soldiers there with collar buttons. It is necessary to have the money and the wherewithal to do it.

What I have feared all along is that unless we can persuade our allies to assist us in South Vietnam, and unless a stable government can be established there, a condition may develop which will be worse than the situation that confronts us in South Korea. That is what has worried me.

Mr. DODD. I know the Senator from Louisiana is worried; and so am I. It is a proper problem to worry about. There is no question that a stable government must be established in South Vietnam.

The trouble began, in my opinion, with the assassination of Diem. Diem was the best thing we had going for the free world in that area, and the tragedy of his death still haunts us.

I hope that at some time the proper committee will conduct a formal inquiry as to his overthrow and assassination and what part, if any, officials of the U.S. Government played in this tragedy. We have never been told anything,

of conducting antigovernment propaganda from this sensitive vantage point.

End the custom that came into practice during the Khanh regime where even a proven Vietcong agent would often be released if, as became standard operational procedure, the prisoner would state that he was "Buddhist" and claim—with Buddhist backing—that his imprisonment therefore amounted to religious persecution.

PUBLIC RECOGNITION

If it sounds a bit insane that practices such as these have been permitted to take place in a nation supposedly at war with the Communist Vietcong, it can only be replied that the new premier is the first to have recognized publicly these insanities and may soon lose his political head as a result.

But now that the United States privately recognizes that Thich Tri Quang is working at totally cross purposes in Vietnam, is there not some way to checkmate his design for chaos? Or has it already gone too far?

The fate of the new civilian regime should provide some clues as to the answer.

[From the New York Times, Oct. 18, 1964]

POLITICS HAMPER'S VIETNAM'S WAR

(By Peter Grose)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, October 17.—Maxwell D. Taylor, the U.S. Ambassador, was given a poignant insight into the whys of Vietnamese politics the other day. Talking socially with a middle-aged politician, the Ambassador broached the subject of present political pressures from diverse groups on the Saigon Government and the possibly harmful effects of this agitation in the war against the Communist Vietcong insurgents.

"You Americans view all this in the terms of your own country," said the politician, not as a reproach but in an effort to let Americans understand what is going on in Vietnam.

"You must realize that this period—these few weeks—is the first moment in my lifetime that we Vietnamese are able to participate in the normal political interplay your democratic countries have enjoyed for decades.

SEEMING CONTRADICTION

"First we were under French domination, then came the war and rule by the Japanese. After the war we had to choose between the French again or joining the Communists. Those of us in the south got our independence with a non-Communist government but Diem kept all political parties down just as the French had.

"When Diem was overthrown it was the army that ran everything. They let us politicians talk in the open but nothing we said ever seemed to have any effect on the decisions of the military government.

"Now at last we are able to act as real citizens, not just as tools of one or another group which holds all the power, whether spokesmen of the people like it or not. There's nothing disloyal about politics."

The conversation, trivial in itself, nevertheless made an impression on Ambassador Taylor, who now freely admits that his frequent visits to Vietnam as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not prepare him for the political complexities and struggles he faces in the role of Ambassador.

Gradually U.S. officials are discovering a seeming contradiction underlying American and Vietnamese attitudes toward the war effort against the Vietcong. From this contradiction comes American impatience with Vietnamese intramural quibbling over forms of government. From it comes also Vietnamese suspicions about American motives here, suspicions that are only increasing.

COLD WAR TRENCH

To Americans, Vietnam seems to be a trench in the cold war, a chosen battlefield for the non-Communist world to confront Communist expansionism.

The Vietnamese do not see their plight in these terms at all. The upheavals of the last 2 months have made abundantly clear. To the articulate Vietnamese, the struggle is to build a viable nation and government, a government of justice truly representative of what the leading forces of society want. For too long they have lived under a government and policies imposed upon them by outside influence. Communism would be another of these outside influences, but perhaps so now is the American notion of winning a war at whatever cost by whatever government.

THE COMING STORY

Resolution of this contradiction will be the story of South Vietnam in the months to come.

Considering the lack of political opportunity, the fumbblings of the Vietnamese in their quest for representative and just government should come as no surprise.

Nor is the accumulation of transitory political institutions—piled up in a haphazard and seemingly self-nullifying manner—alien to Vietnamese experience as any examination of the postwar years under the French will show.

At the top of the political pile now is an ad hoc body of 17 men called the High National Council. Appointed September 26 by Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh, the chief of state, after consultations with leading religious and social groups of the nation, the council is designed to resemble a representative assembly, not for the purpose of governing the country but only for deciding how the country should be governed.

The constitution it produces is supposed to be provisional, the personnel installed in high office only temporary, until some kind of national elections can be held.

The 17 men are a strange mixture. Only a few have any personal political futures or ambitions.

So remote from immediate cross-currents of politics does the council seem that many Vietnamese have dubbed it the "High National Museum." To American policymakers and Vietnamese officials, however, the council is the only available link between the tormented past and the promised land. Seldom has so much international stress been placed on such a weak link.

The extent of the council's responsibilities is unclear, the demands put upon it are enormous and diverse. So-called civilian government is the goal, but Premier Nguyen Khanh has insisted that the armed forces must have "a place of honor" in the government to compensate the military establishment for its sacrifices in defending the nation on the battlefield.

The religious and political groups pressing for civilian government have not made clear whether they will be satisfied with civilian ministers alone or whether they will press further for military officers to be replaced as chiefs of some—or even all—of the country's 45 provinces.

Once the principles of government structure are determined, who are to be the personalities to fill leading posts? Some political groups insist that only immediate elections can bring forth leaders truly claiming the confidence of the people. Others recognize the difficulty of holding elections in the midst of a guerrilla war and propose instead the naming of "acceptable" persons as yet another interim measure.

Whether this course would solve anything is open to question since the ideal of a popularly supported government would remain remote.

Yet this is the ideal ever before Vietnamese political figures these days as they luxuriate in the democratic interplay they missed for so long.

WAR IS NOT THE ISSUE

If it all sounds remote from the war in the countryside, it is. The campaign against a purposeful Communist enemy is not much

of an issue in the political jousting of Saigon. No agitation group admits to being neutralist; even the most intransigent of politicians can be at same time sincerely anti-Communist.

The political groups making the most headway among the people outside of Saigon—the Central Vietnamese Political Movement led from Hue University is a prime example—are not openly advocating a cease-fire or a negotiated settlement with the Vietcong and suspicions to this effect once expressed are vehemently denied with seeming conviction.

If the war is not an issue and all groups wish to continue the anti-Communist struggle and that is the end of the story, American policymakers should be able to sit back and await with equanimity the outcome of Vietnam's first self-conscious adventure with democracy. But, of course, this is not the end of the story and the Americans realize perhaps more clearly than the Vietnamese that the Communists are moving effectively into the governmental vacuum, in the countryside at least.

American officials maintain they have no ready answer to Vietnamese political strivings, no ideal government structure to propose. This time they are willing to let the Vietnamese work out their own government just the way they want it. But what the Americans in contact with members of High National Council are encouraging is rapid adjustment and conciliation toward some common denominator—anything in fact that would restore the central direction to the war effort that has been lacking since Premier Khanh stepped down as President last August 25.

So the interplay goes on and no end is in sight. The stable and popular government that the Vietnamese seek and that the Americans hope will arrive from somewhere before it is too late seems as remote as ever.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 13, 1964]

BUDDHIST POWER GROWS—IN SOUTH VIETNAM THEY HAVE CREATED A STRUCTURE THAT DRAWS THE LOYALTY OF MANY PERSONS

(By Peter Grose)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, September 12.—A Buddhist revolution is taking place in South Vietnam. Its lines and goals are still far from clear even to many of the Buddhists themselves, but seasoned observers consider it the most significant and far-reaching trend in present-day southeast Asia. Its implications stretch far beyond the frontiers of this country. They extend not only to nations nearby but also, because of Buddhism's unclear relation to the ideology and power of communism, the Vietnamese experience could alter the entire power structure the United States has been fighting to maintain in the southwestern Pacific.

The Buddhists seem to be gambling that they can produce a new basis for stability.

So far what has actually happened is that the American-supported Premier of South Vietnam, Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, has accepted in general and in detail an immediate Buddhist formula for reforming his Government along new civilian lines. This is the outcome, now apparent, of this country's political crisis last month.

PREMIER FIRST

That crisis was the second step in an evolution starting 16 months ago. The first step was reached last November, when 9 years of rule by President Ngo Dinh Diem collapsed in a bloody coup d'état. Both the Buddhists and the Vietnamese Army contributed to President Diem's downfall, but the Buddhists were neither organized nor motivated to fill by themselves the void left when President Diem was removed.

Since November 1 the army has governed South Vietnam. On January 13 there was a change in leadership—General Khanh took

over where a junta had failed to get off the ground—but throughout his first 7 months in power the army remained Premier Khanh's principal base of support, his only real claim to hold power in a land torn by war and popular dissent.

Now the Military Revolutionary Council, the instrument of army rule, has been disbanded. A constitution that seemed to institutionalize military dictatorship was withdrawn. Premier Khanh is in the process of easing his former military cronies out of their Government positions. Many have already resigned.

"I am still a general," Premier Khanh said the other day, "but I am Premier first." The former field commander now wears civilian clothes. He has shaved off the little goatee he sported throughout the military phase of his rule. He never stated publicly why he had grown this beard in the weeks preceding his coup d'etat, but from the smiles and jokes of officers around him it is clear the goatee had a certain barrack-room symbolic value to the military clique that helped him into power. Now both the goatee and the clique are gone.

NEW FOUNDATION

The full story of why the army gave up so easily has yet to come out—maybe it was only a tactical retreat to prepare for new power plays, perhaps by a younger generation of colonels. Some elements would have the people believe there were secret inducements—that is to say, money—that persuaded certain individuals to abandon their claims to power. More likely the generals felt an onrush of frustration and helplessness from 10 unpleasant months in power, even a feeling that they might as well get out while the going was still good.

However it happened, the army says it has abandoned its foray into politics and now theoretically will return to the business of fighting a war. Political power is forming on a new foundation.

Spokesmen in the Buddhist hierarchy will firmly deny any political aspirations for themselves as persons or for Buddhism as such. They are speaking, they say, solely in the name of the Vietnamese people of whatever religion.

A GOOD CLAIM

In fact, Buddhist leaders have as good a claim as anyone else, and better than many, for presenting the views of "the people," for Buddhism is the family religion of the vast majority of Vietnamese. It has been so for centuries. Premier Khanh himself has long had a Buddhist shrine to his parents in his house.

Figures are difficult and misleading since there are a few criteria for claiming to be a Buddhist. Out of a population of 14 million an estimated total of 5 or 6 million people are practicing Buddhists responsive to the voice of the hierarchy. Many more who say they are Buddhists if asked pay little more than lip service to any religion. Others adhere to Buddhist-oriented sects that nevertheless shun the central Buddhist organization.

Furthermore, there are clear geographical distinctions of attitude among even the most faithful of Buddhists. Until recently the most politically active were bonzes, or monks, from North Vietnam who had fled to the south to escape Communist rule. They gravitated toward Saigon, establishing their own pagodas separate from the pagodas of their brothers native to South Vietnam.

Northerners are outspoken in their opposition to communism and have supported the military government in active prosecution of the war against the Communist Vietcong. The best known spokesman for the Northern refugees is Thich Tam Chau, who holds the position of rector, or chairman of the Buddhist Secular Institute, the organizational center of Buddhist political activity. At the opposite extreme in zeal are the

Buddhists of the far south, the populous and rich Mekong Delta. In this area the orthodox hierarchy is weak, laymen have greater influence and religion plays a lesser role in the comfortable life of the population. Here also thrive many independent sects of Vietnamese Buddhists as well as a militant anti-Communist group of Buddhists of Cambodian origin who adhere to the "hinayana," or "lesser vehicle," branch of international Buddhism. Vietnamese Buddhism is predominantly "mahayana," or "greater vehicle," in which the Buddha is deified.

HARDEST TO DEFINE

It is the Buddhists of central Vietnam who have spurred the most significant recent advances into politics. Their intellectual center is at Hue. These are the Buddhists hardest to understand or define in political terms. They profess anticommunism and antineutrality, but they also seem far from happy with the present American policy for fighting the war.

Their undoubted leader is Thich Tri Quang, considered by many the mastermind of last year's Buddhist revolt against President Diem. By seeking refuge in the U.S. Embassy a year ago, he forced the U.S. Government to take sides with the Buddhists against the Diem government, which was trying to arrest Buddhist leaders.

Though Tri Quang lacks Tam Chau's prestigious position as head of the Secular Institute, he seems now to be the most influential single Buddhist in the country. There are some observers who look upon his political skills as setting the pattern for Buddhism throughout southeast Asia.

A long-term Buddhist revolution is taking place both within the movement and in the country at large. Its goal is undefined. Its purpose, according to the bonzes, is to "protect Buddhism." Neither the meaning of this phrase nor the means to realize it have been made clear to nonbelievers.

A basic strain within the movement is the whole question of whether Buddhism should deal in temporal politics. Any typical Buddhist declaration will be couched in terms of religion, shunning partisan involvement in worldly political matters. Bonzes such as Tri Quang will evade difficult political questions by insisting they are solely men of religion and not competent to speak on matters of politics.

DRIVE REMOVED DOUBT

Considering their role last year and this, it is difficult to refrain from charges of hypocrisy on this point. Any doubt about the potential political strength and interests of at least some Buddhist leaders was removed in their campaign against President Diem.

With the November coup their effectiveness seemed ended for the moment, since they had no viable organization capable of retaining political control after 10 centuries of relative noninvolvement. Quickly but quietly this was changed.

Starting on January 3, when the "Vietnam Unified Buddhist Church" came into being, the Buddhists under Tam Chau and Tri Quang have established a shadow government across the country, a shadow rapidly assuming substance. At the top there are two "institutes," one for religious affairs, which has nominal and honorific responsibilities equivalent to those of a chief of state, and the other for secular affairs, which, like a premier, wields actual power over the organization.

POLITICAL STRUCTURES

In the secular institute there are six "general offices," resembling ministries, for clergy affairs, Buddhist studies, cultural affairs, construction and finance, lay peoples' affairs, and youth. Each general office is headed by a commissioner.

Down in the provinces there are delegates and deputies, all bonzes, mostly in their

thirties of early forties, all appointed, like the Government's province chiefs, by their own administration in Saigon.

This is the political structure the Buddhists were erecting during the 10 months of military rule over South Vietnam.

How effective would this structure be in support of a government favorable to Buddhists? The matter has not yet been put to a test—little has so far been demanded of the Buddhist population by their leaders. But many observers think the test will come in the next months as long as Premier Khanh leans more and more heavily on apparently the one non-Communist element of the nation that has not yet been brought into active participation in the Government.

[From the New York Tribune, Sept. 11, 1964]

VICT: BUDDHIST PRESS LASHES UNITED STATES

SAIGON.—South Vietnam's leading Buddhist publication yesterday blamed the United States for the political and religious turmoil that has swept the country since mid-August.

The publication, Hai Trieu Am, charged indirectly that Americans are manipulating the Saigon government to extend U.S. influence in South Vietnam—an accusation previously voiced privately by some Vietnamese officials.

The paper also backed rebellious students' charges that Americans triggered the recent bloody clashes between Buddhists and Roman Catholics in the northern city of Da Nang.

PROTEST

More student trouble developed yesterday as Saigon's politically active student union denounced the ruling military government for not creating a promised "high national council" quickly enough. The council is to take steps within 2 months toward setting up a civilian government by late next year.

Hai Trieu Am, in voicing the Buddhist charges, said that "if one wishes to learn the deep reasons for the anger of the people of Da Nang, one must find them in the August 16 constitution, which certainly was not drafted by Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh."

INFLUENCE

The inference was that the Military Revolutionary Council, which approved the constitution, as well as strongman General Khanh were influenced by the United States.

The constitution, under which General Khanh was elevated from Premier to President and given sweeping powers, was rescinded in response to violent rioting and Buddhist demonstrations. General Khanh reverted to Premier and became the dominant member of the ruling military triumvirate. On Wednesday he also took over the Defense Minister's post.

The Buddhist publication criticized American press reports of Buddhists' razing of the Catholic sector of Da Nang, charging they failed to indicate the real causes of the rioting.

Asserting that "since the distant past until the arrival of Americans here, Buddhists have never destroyed or burned any houses," Hai Trieu Am said that "the immediate reason (for anger in Da Nang) was the shots fired in the air by Americans."

U.S. soldiers had fired shots in the air to disperse Buddhist demonstrators who tried to break into the U.S. Army compound in Da Nang.

The student union, meeting ostensibly to debate criteria for prospective civilian statesmen's conduct, denounced former U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge for allegedly being soft on the late President Ngo Dinh Diem. It charged that Mr. Lodge recently told a Paris audience that Mr. Diem, who was overthrown and slain in last November's coup, might have survived if he had been a better President.

The students termed this "a flagrant interference in the affairs of Vietnam."

to be, the problem of containing their power and rendering them relatively harmless should not be insoluble.

The methods of doing this are hardly up to Americans to decide. The best they can do is to encourage Premier Tran Van Huong to face up to the situation and take corrective action. The worst they can do is to keep insisting that Huong find some ground for compromise with men who are actively seeking to overthrow his government.

The problem of dealing with widespread and well-organized subversive conspiracies, after all, is not exactly new. Even the fact that this conspiracy may command wide public support does not make it all powerful. The French, for example, faced something of the same situation with the Communists in the late 1940's, complete with infiltration of the army, police and government, nationwide strikes and impressive street riots. It was not necessary to annihilate the Communists to contain the threat to the security of the state.

What gives the Buddhist conspiracy its uniquely dangerous twist is the pseudo-religious cover of its leadership. The majority of Buddhists in Vietnam are quite certainly neither proneutralist nor pro-Communist. Yet the militant leaders in Saigon naturally seek to identify themselves with, and presume to speak for, every Buddhist in the world.

Certainly they will raise the cry of religious persecution at the first hint of trouble. Given the experience of the unfortunate President Ngo Dinh Diem, it is a highly effective form of defense. And every effort must be made to avoid lending credence to the charge.

It seems improbable, therefore, that an attempt to crush the conspiracy by force will be called for. But short of this, there are plenty of things that the Saigon government could do.

It could, for instance, put considerably more backbone in suppressing the kind of senseless juvenile hooliganism that fills the daily news columns from Saigon.

It could screen out of the army and police force those elements which might be likely to side against the government in any real showdown with the Buddhist leadership.

It could strengthen the hand of more conservative (and more religious) Buddhist leaders who, at present, are themselves the targets of strong-arm tactics by their militant coreligionists.

It could, in short, face up to the problem instead of shrinking from it. What is essential in Vietnam is that the power to overthrow governments—any government which they do not control—be taken away from this handful of monks. If this is not done, and soon, there will be no prospect whatever of any stable government in South Vietnam.

[From the Washington Evening Star, Jan. 8, 1965]

BUDDHISTS BRAG OF SUBVERSION

(By Marguerite Higgins)

On the bulletin board of the newest pagoda in Saigon there recently has appeared a communique in which the Communist-oriented wing of militant Vietnamese Buddhism claims to have subverted at least four regiments of the Vietnamese National Army.

The sinister Thich Tri Quang, Vietnam's ace toppler of governments, boasts that 2,000 officers of the Vietnamese army would lay down their arms and refuse to fight the Communists if he ordered them to do so. How valid are these boasts?

It is a crucial question—and an appalling one. For if the Vietnamese regular army has been subverted to this extent today, what will happen tomorrow?

First, it should be pointed out that there appears to be a widespread misconception in this country about the southeast Asian Buddhist movement. According to the re-

spected work "Buddhism in Vietnam," written by Dr. Mai Tho Truyen, the greatest Vietnamese authority on Buddhism, the movement in Vietnam has expanded to at least 4 million persons (or about 30 percent of the population of 14 million). But again according to Dr. Truyen, the overwhelming majority of Vietnamese Buddhists do not agree—and indeed disapprove—of the Communist-tinged extremism and violence of the Thich Tri Quang wing.

Dr. Truyen, who is additionally head of South Vietnam's powerful Buddhist Laymen's Association, cooperates with and supports Vietnam's Buddhist-dominated government led by Premier Tran Van Huong. Certainly the Huong government has no quarrel with the Buddhist but rather vice-versa.

As Huong put it in a cabled answer to my question on the subject:

"You refer to a quarrel. But my government has never answered attacks and accusations directed against the government and myself by certain Buddhist elements. If these attacks were halted, the quarrel would die automatically."

But if there is a genuine schism in the Vietnamese Buddhist movement between the moderates and the extremists, and if the extremists are in the minority, how have they managed to infiltrate the Vietnamese army?

It goes back to last summer when Gen. Nguyen Khanh was still fighting for his political life and was under the illusion that he could appease his most vocal tormentor—the same extremist monk, Thich Tri Quang—by giving in to his demands. One of these demands was to give Quang the right to assign Buddhist chaplains to every army company.

Three-man Buddhist chaplain teams (in reality political cells) were soon thereafter attached to the army and soon trouble started. A few irate Vietnamese commanders began to expel the chaplains when they caught them distributing tracts telling soldiers they need not obey their officers if they felt they were acting in the interests of colonialist Americans or persons unfaithful to the nationalist cause.

But for the most part, individual Vietnamese army officers have been unwilling to take upon themselves the expulsion of these cohorts of Thich Tri Quang, particularly so long as his capacity to wrest further appeasement from the government and from the Americans seemed unchecked.

In any case, the capacity of a militant minority to make trouble out of all proportion to their true importance is part of the current political landscape in Vietnam. And even if Quang's boast of subverting the Vietnamese armed forces is exaggerated, it is surely criminal negligence not to take whatever steps necessary to destroy his capacity to spread political poisons among Vietnam's fighting men.

[From the Evening Star, Jan. 7, 1965]

THE BUDDHISTS IN VIETNAM

In some ways, the American Government is its own worst enemy in Vietnam. In its refusal to come to grips with the problem of Buddhist subversion and its fatuous insistence on the theme of a "broadly based civilian government in Saigon it is in itself largely responsible for the near paralysis of the regime of Premier Tran Van Huong, a paralysis not likely to be broken by today's reported agreement to form a new coalition council.

The threat raised by the militant Buddhist leaders is now perfectly clear. After months of behind-the-scenes incitement of disorder, the two top "venerables," Thich Tri Quang and Tich Tam Chau, are in open revolt against the Huong regime. They are threatening to overthrow it, using the same methods of mass disorder that led to the

downfall of President Ngo Dinh Diem in November of 1963.

It is also perfectly clear that the Buddhist leaders would use the same tactics against any effective anti-Communist government in Vietnam. So it is high time to stop acting as if the significance of these men is to any substantial extent religious. Whether or not they are actually agents of the Communists makes no real difference. The fact is that their activities are destructive to the freedom of the country and that attempts to arrive at some sort of compromise with them will very probably prove fatal.

Estimates vary on the effectiveness and size of the Buddhist apparatus in Vietnam. The more effective, however, the more essential it is that it be dismantled or neutralized without delay. The Huong government should be getting the strongest American encouragement to this end.

It is not getting any such thing. The Huong government, in dealing with the Buddhist threat, is inhibited, as all governments since the overthrow of Diem have been inhibited, by the feeling that the Americans are more interested in preaching democracy in Vietnam than they are in effective government there. We seem to be defending our fuzzy liberal ideal against the army—the only real source of strength for any government in Vietnam.

The sad fact of the matter is that American policy is still very much under the influence of the men who were responsible for the overthrow of Diem and who are still determined to justify their action. It apparently makes little difference that the highest officials of the administration are convinced—and were convinced at the time—that this move was a tragic mistake. The same thinking that produced the mistake is still shaping our policies in Vietnam today. It is time the nonsense stopped.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 21, 1964]

BUDDHISM WIDENS WORLD ROLE

With Christmas less than a week away, Buddhism continues to be active on the world's newsfronts.

The South Vietnamese Government has been on full alert, braced against the possibility of large-scale Buddhist demonstrations. Tension between some of the country's Buddhist factions and the Saigon government has been increasing daily.

In the midst of the Vietnamese friction, the religion that claims as many as half a billion adherents is being buffeted by new winds from Communist China and soothed by statements from the Vatican.

COOPERATION ASKED

Among the past week's developments involving Buddhism around the world:

Pope Paul VI appealed for Buddhists and Roman Catholics to cooperate, "especially in certain zones where the two communities live together and are confronted with the same problems." The zone that best fits this situation is Vietnam.

The Chinese Communist Government stripped the Dalai Lama of Tibet of his remaining post as chairman of the preparatory committee for the "Tibet Autonomous Region" of China. It called him a "traitor who is an incorrigible running dog of imperialism and foreign reactionaries."

The move dropped all Chinese pretense that the Buddhist god-king of Tibet, now in exile in India, retained any further secular or spiritual authority in his conquered land.

The Theravada Buddhist sect, an important minority in Vietnam, sent a petition to the government asking for arms to fight the Communist Vietcong. It is unlikely it will be granted.

REACTION WATCHED

Vietnam has been badly fragmented by fighting religious sects before. And Thera-

vada, weak as it may be in Vietnam, represents 95 percent of the population of adjoining Cambodia, a country with strong anti-Saigon leanings.

Political observers in Saigon were watching closely reactions of Vietnam's ranking Buddhist layman, Mai Tho Truyen, who returned home Friday from a World Buddhist conference in India.

Mr. Truyen is a vice president of the world body but, more importantly for Vietnamese Buddhism, he is a member of the High National Council, the Saigon government's interim legislature.

Mr. Truyen has not joined the recent Buddhist protests and is regarded by some as the best hope for getting antigovernment Buddhist priests together with the government of Premier Tran Van Huong.

The Vietnamese Commissioner General for Buddhist Youth Affairs, Thich Thien Minh, said Vietnamese Buddhists had striven hard to live up to "Lord Buddha's teachings of compassion and altruism." He said the best way for Buddhists to combat communism was to come together in one united, centralized body to advance the Buddhist ideology and eliminate social injustice.

DISSENT INDICATED

In another quote, the State Department in Washington termed a letter written to President Johnson by another Saigon Buddhist leader, Thich Tam Chau, "a propaganda device and not an appropriate means of communicating with the President of the United States." The priest had written charging Premier Huong's government with oppressing Buddhism.

Meanwhile there has been evidence that not all Buddhists follow the protesting priests. It is known that many of the monks in the vanguard of last year's struggle against the Ngo Dinh Diem rule have opposed the current anti-Huong campaign. At least one of them, Thich Duc Nghiep, has been denounced by the North Vietnamese Government.

Thich Duc Nghiep has opposed the anti-Huong demonstrations and urged priests to take to the countryside to preach against the Vietcong.

Perhaps his followers are gaining ground. A week ago violent demonstrations and self-immolation by priests was predicted. But they failed to materialize. The same predictions have been made again.

NEW AGITATION

The Government has obviously mustered some support for its position and has successfully clamped down on troublemakers.

But some sources report agitation now is strong in the large cities of Hue and Da Nang farther north where Saigon control is less effective.

Meanwhile, the Saigon government has admitted that the Buddhists are not the only factionalists dividing South Vietnam.

It announced the formation of an Armed Forces Council to iron out differences between the old guard officers and the "young Turks."

And Chief of State Phan Khuc Suu has proposed that seven new members be added to the High National Council. He suggested names representing the south, central, and north sections of the country in order to try to overcome regional factionalism.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 2, 1964]

SAIGON SCHISM: BUDDHIST STRUGGLE SAPS FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNISTS

(By Takashi Oka)

SAIGON.—The struggle between Premier Tran Van Huong and the Buddhist leadership continues, and South Vietnam is the loser.

Neither side talks to the other except in propagandistic appeals to the population.

Each day of political instability at the center makes more difficult the task of pacification against Communist insurgents in the countryside.

Washington, engaged in intensive review of its Indochina policy, must decide whether or not continuation of military and economic aid on the present scale of more than \$500 million a year can bring victory against the Communists without taking the war into North Vietnam.

It must also decide how this aid can most effectively be used as leverage to promote political stability within South Vietnam.

It is the second of these two tasks that preoccupies the American Embassy here these days. Washington formally supports the Tran Van Huong government, which came into being according to provisions of the October 20 constitution and which cannot legally be overthrown unless the 15-man High National Council votes it out.

Yet there is full recognition that Buddhism in South Vietnam constitutes a powerful political force, that leaders of the Buddhist hierarchy have been dissatisfied with the Huong government from its inception, and that whatever legal rights and wrongs of the situation, an all-out confrontation between Buddhists and the government can benefit no one but the Communists.

REGIME ATTACKED

Americans have, therefore, sought to keep an open bridge between the government and Buddhist leadership. But the task becomes more difficult with each passing day.

Saturday Thich Tam Chau, one of the Buddhist hierarchy's two most prominent leaders, held a press conference bitterly attacking the Huong government.

The following day he permitted a student-sponsored funeral procession for a youth killed in government-student clashes last week to start out from Buddhist headquarters, the Vien Hoa Dao or Institute for Execution of Dharma.

Buddhist sources say Vien Hoa Dao will call for popular noncooperation with the government.

A nightly program of loudspeaker broadcasts from within Vien Hoa Dao is to be launched this week. Those who gather in streets to listen will do so at their own risk, presumably.

BUDDHISTS ACCUSED

The government accuses the Buddhists of mixing religion and politics by using the religious prestige of the hierarchy to promote secular causes such as the overthrow of the government. Thich Tam Chau responds that "all things in the world are related."

To an observer the Buddhist hierarchy seems to be testing its strength with the people. Last August's events have already proved that on some issues they can win overriding popular support.

Whether this support will stay with them on lesser issues is problematical. But the Huong-Buddhist confrontation has had a snowballing effect. What seemed bridgeable and nonessential at the start has built up into a major test of strength from which neither now can afford to withdraw.

CAMPAIGN HINTED

[Meanwhile, the Associated Press reported the Buddhists may again turn to suicide by fire in an intensive campaign to overthrow Premier Huong's government, quoting an unnamed Buddhist leader.

[Leading monks deny there are plans for more such suicides. But Buddhist strategists generally keep their plans secret to the last moment.

[A Reuters dispatch said government forces are pressing their gains against Communist Vietcong guerrillas while the Buddhist leaders work out a strategy for ousting the civilian government.]

[From the Washington Evening Star, Nov. 12, 1964]

PAINFUL VERDICT IN VIETNAM

(By Marguerite Higgins)

Key U.S. officials in Vietnam have come to a painful but significant conclusion. It is that a tiny faction of Vietnamese—too clever to reveal their motives and too powerful for comfort—are bent on using the cloak of religion as a cover for undeclared warfare designed to prevent the emergence of a stable government in Vietnam. In other words, whenever any regime in Saigon shows any sign of being able to govern the drive to topple it will begin.

There are some dissenters from this view in the Embassy in Saigon. But this conclusion is nonetheless held widely and strongly enough to explain why the Embassy gave the strongest sort of backing to the decision of Vietnam's new premier, Tran Van Huong, last weekend to call out the army to repress the Buddhist-instigated demonstrations against his fledgling government.

WILY MONK

Thus Tran Van Huong's new regime, for whom practically nobody has great hopes, is momentarily one up on the wiliest, slickest demagog in Vietnam, the Buddhist monk, Thich Tri Quang, who, Americans believe, was behind last weekend's initial attempt to topple the latest Saigon regime, just as he had previously masterminded the toppling of Ngo Dinh Diem and Gen. Nguyen Khanh.

But in this matter of government toppling, the smart money is on Thich Tri Quang, especially if his boasts of having swung some personalities of the Catholic, Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao faiths into his camp, are at all true.

It has taken some time for U.S. officials to permit themselves to face the fearsome and indeed awesome truth about Thich Tri Quang. Of late, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor in Saigon and State Department officials in Washington have taken to describing Thich Tri Quang as "the Makarios of south-east Asia."

There used to be brisk arguments among Americans in Saigon and Washington as to whether Thich Tri Quang, who once served with the Communist Viet Minh and whose two brothers serve Ho Chi Minh, is "still a Communist."

It is only recently that Americans have begun to realize that this begs the real issue which is whether Thich Tri Quang serves Communist ends. And the answer here is that if the Vietcong themselves had been writing the scenario as to how any given Buddhist monk could play into their hands, they could not have improved on the real life doings of Thich Tri Quang, including his current attempt to topple the new civilian government.

For if Thich Tri Quang and his followers can, by demonstrations, riot, and propaganda successfully keep on perpetuating the near chaos that has prevailed from the top down in Vietnam, it is just a matter of time until the Vietcong take over the country from within.

The civilian regime of Tran Van Huong required great courage to proclaim the separation of politics from religion, because if this much needed step were carried out it would checkmate some of the antigovernment troubles masterminded by Thich Tri Quang.

It would, as a few examples:

End the vigilante squads of Buddhists who have taken law into their own hands in the provinces and arrested Catholics on the pretext that they are Diemists (it is a pretext because almost all educated Vietnamese worked for the government between 1954 and 1963 and hence were Diemists).

End the system where triumvirates of Buddhists are attached to Vietnamese battalions with the divisive and dangerous habit

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A clear-cut Communist victory in South Vietnam, the domino theorists maintain, would have worldwide repercussions. The Communists in Peiping would win the argument with the Communists in Moscow over how to spread their ideology. Communists would expand their Chinese-style subversive activities in Africa and South America, confident that the United States would refuse to become involved in another expensive guerrilla war.

LEAVE THE WEAPONS BEHIND?

The domino theory is based, of course, on the presumption that without U.S. aid South Vietnam would collapse before the Communists. But if the United States did withdraw, most probably American weapons and equipment now stored in that country would be left behind. The South Vietnamese armed forces would certainly not succumb to the Communist guerrillas overnight.

But psychologically, South Vietnam would be weakened. The South Vietnamese military situation, after all, has steadily deteriorated despite American aid of more than \$1,500,000 a day and the presence of 22,000 American advisers. Without American support, the best guess is that the South Vietnamese would quickly seek a political, rather than a military, solution to the Red threat.

The Communists probably would be willing to negotiate a cease-fire, figuring it would be less expensive to them to subvert the Government from within.

BATTLE WITH NO FRONTLINES

The United States, even if it pulled out of South Vietnam, still would remain the strongest military power in Asia. The 7th Fleet now protects Formosa from Communist Chinese invasion and could quickly hustle troops to any Asian country threatened by Communist military forces. But, the domino theorists say, the 7th Fleet has failed to prevent Red subversion in Laos and South Vietnam. Although the United States is the world's mightiest military power, they say, nuclear bombs, tanks, and aircraft carriers are of little use against a guerrilla force fighting a battle with no front lines.

At a press conference last week, Secretary of State Dean Rusk ducked a question about whether the United States still subscribed to the domino theory.

He did say, however, that if South Vietnam were lost to the Communists, "they would simply move the problem to the next country and the next and the next. And, as I say, this is not dominoes. This is the kind of Marxism that comes out of Peiping."

Mr. Rusk asserted that South Vietnam's "primary requirement" in the fight against the Communists is national unity. "Unity," he said, "would be worth many, many divisions." But there was no unity in South Vietnam last week.

The latest upheaval began in the same way as most of the previous coups and attempted coups—with the rumbling of trucks filled with soldiers in the streets of Saigon. The purge was carried out speedily. Soldiers, under command of a clique of 9 junior officers, arrested most of the members of the 15-man High National Council, the country's provisional legislature, and several dozen other political figures.

The officers acted, they said, because the council was dominated by "counter-revolutionary elements that were acting against the spirit of national unity." The arrested council members, the officers said, had been "conspiring" against the armed forces in hope of furthering "their own personal ambitions."

OFFICER FACTIONS FEUD

But more than the personal ambitions and rivalries of the officers seemed to be involved. The nine officers all hold key positions in the

military, although in seniority they rank below many officers without field responsibility. The two officer factions have been feuding for months. On December 18 the junior officers formed an organization called the Armed Forces Council, with no representation from the senior officers. The council then drew up an order calling for mandatory retirement of all officers with at least 25 years' service. This would retire about 40 officers, including Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh, former Premier who is popular with South Vietnam's Buddhists.

The High National Council refused to approve the order. So the junior officers abolished the legislative group. The purge leaders, Air Commodore Nguyen Cao Ky, commander of the air force, and Brig. Gen. Nguyen Khanh Thi, commander of the 1st Army Corps, defended the military's right to "act as mediator" of disputes within the Government.

The officers said their move was aimed at eliminating political interference in the conduct of the antiguerrilla war. But, although they disbanded the legislative arm of the Government, they pledged continued support to Premier Tran Van Huong and his Cabinet. The Premier has been under attack by militant Buddhist organizations almost since he took office October 30. The purge leaders indicated they believed their move would pave the way for reconciling the Buddhists and the Huong government.

MOTIVES CALLED SINCERE

The U.S. Embassy in Saigon quickly opposed the purge. Conceding that the officers' motives in attempting to stabilize the Government were sincere, Embassy officials said the purge would only further disrupt the Government. U.S. Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor held hurried consultations with the junior officers, General Khanh, and Premier Huong. The officers refused to back down.

General Khanh's position in the maneuvering was unclear, but there were plenty of rumors. One said he had been at odds with the junior officers in recent weeks because of his refusal to pledge his support to Mr. Huong, his successor as Premier. The junior officers were said to have threatened December 6 to jail General Khanh unless he publicly announced support of the Premier. It was rumored, too, that General Khanh was quietly conferring with Buddhist leaders, presumably in hope of capitalizing on any Buddhist-provoked overthrow of the Huong government.

In a radio address after a meeting with Ambassador Taylor, General Khanh accepted full responsibility for the purge. Then he swung into his attack against the United States. "We make sacrifices for the country's independence and the Vietnamese people's liberty, but not to carry out the policy of any foreign country," he said. He defined the role of the military as "acting as an intermediary to settle all disputes and differences if they create a situation favorable to the common enemies: communism and colonialism in any form."

CRITICAL OF AMBASSADOR TAYLOR

In private interviews with American reporters, General Khanh was sharply critical of Ambassador Taylor. If he "does not act more intelligently, the United States will lose southeast Asia and we will lose our freedom," said General Khanh. He charged the U.S. Envoy had acted "beyond imagination as far as an ambassador is concerned."

In Washington, the Johnson administration replied with a message of support for its man in Saigon. "Ambassador Taylor," said the State Department, "has been acting throughout with the full support of the U.S. Government."

Secretary Rusk, at his news conference the next day, took a more conciliatory tone

toward the junior officers and General Khanh. The remarks by General Khanh, he said, "might have been made in the heat of the moment." But Mr. Rusk suggested that U.S. aid might be curtailed if the difficulties in Saigon continued.

The latest flare-up came just as plans were shaping up for South Vietnamese air strikes against Communist Vietcong supply bases and infiltration staging areas in Laos near the South Vietnamese border. Gen. Phoumi Nosavan, Deputy Premier of Laos, visited Saigon last week, presumably to put the finishing touches on plans to strike at the Communist bases.

THE FLAMES OF WAR

These preparations were enough to alarm the Red Chinese, who threatened to plunge Indochina into war if the United States bombs supply lines through Laos. "The flames of war will spread to the whole of Indochina if U.S. imperialism succeeds in its criminal scheme," warned the Peiping People's Daily.

Whether the United States would go along with these plans in view of the present turbulence in Saigon was uncertain. For one thing, it was no longer clear who actually held power in the country. U.S. officials were unsure whether General Khanh had again assumed the role of strong man or whether he was only acting as the mouthpiece of the junior officers. Nor was Premier Huong's position clear. Despite strong gestures of support from Washington, the Premier remained in the background, tacitly, at least, giving his approval to the purge. The Buddhists, too, stayed quiet, awaiting the military's next move. The United States alone was standing fast publicly against the purge. And the United States suddenly seemed to have very few friends in South Vietnam.

RICHARD EGAN.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Dec. 25, 1964]

MATTER OF FACT: How Not To Do It

(By Joseph Alsop)

HONG KONG.—The political trouble in Saigon began at almost the moment when this reporter was starting home for Christmas. But even on the road home, with no opportunity to study detailed developments, it is easy to see that we are being given another demonstration of how not to do it.

The Vietnamese generals have no doubt contributed their share to this demonstration, but so have the Americans. To be sure, the fault on the American side does not lie with Gen. Maxwell Taylor. The fault lies with the instructions that General Taylor was given, and even more with the ludicrously unrealistic ideas and prejudices in which those instructions partly originated.

It has been the same old story from the period when large numbers of U.S. officials, military officers and one must add, newspapermen, were doing everything in their power to undercut the beleaguered Chinese Nationalist Government, down to the present melancholy moment. Almost always, the same two tendencies have recurrently marked—and too often fatally marred—American dealings with situations like that in Vietnam.

In such situations, first of all, a good many Americans mysteriously tend to be hypercritical of precisely those allied leaders whose aims and purposes most closely coincide with American interests. It is never enough, for Americans of this stripe, that our interests are being served.

Whether in China, or Korea, or today in Vietnam, they must always be designing ideal governments; their ideal governments generally exclude the local leaders whose aims coincide with American interests. This was

emphatically the case in Vietnam in the years of Ngo Dinh Diem, and in a considerable measure, it is today.

The rights and wrongs of the young generals' renewed intervention in Vietnamese politics cannot be judged from this distance. But from any distance, it is perfectly clear that these are the men most deeply committed to resisting the Communist attack on South Vietnam. It is also clear that with the possible exception of Prime Minister Tran Van Huong, they are the most effective personalities on the scene.

The motives for their renewed intervention may well have been a great deal more justifiable than one might suppose from a brief perusal of the pompous pronouncements of the State Department spokesman. Just before they acted, for example, there were strong indications that Phan Khac Suu, the nice, bewildered old gentleman who is the official chief of state, was about to make a dangerously muddled compromise with the political Buddhists.

Moreover, you need only ask any American in Saigon, whether political or military, what protection we have against a neutralist government finally coming to power because of the general deterioration in South Vietnam. The answer always is, "The army leaders will not permit it." In these very possible circumstances, in short, we are actually counting on the army leaders' intervention.

Because of American tendency No. 1, however, the army leaders are now the targets of the State Department's righteous indignation. As for tendency No. 2, it is symbolized by Phan Khac Suu, the chief of state above mentioned. He has clean hands and sore feet. And he wonderfully illustrates the usual results of ideal government designing.

It was a fairly hair raising experience to go straight from an audience with this amiable old man, with his white foot bandages and obvious feebleness, to a long meeting with one of the ideal government designers. "Now," this American kept saying, "we've got a government we can really work with—a government with real promise of stability." And he went on to talk with pious enthusiasm about the high national council's promising first attempts to prepare a national election in South Vietnam.

In reality, it would be flattering to call the high national council a basket of eels. As for the notion of holding a general election in Vietnam at this juncture or at any time in the near future, this alone would almost excuse the dissolution of the high national council by the young generals.

Working for sane civilian leadership by men like Prime Minister Huong is one thing. Trying to stage a kind of comedy or parody of normal, duly elected democratic government in Saigon at this stage of the war, is quite another thing. The purpose of the parody is clear, of course. It looks nice in the papers back home, and thus consoles the large element in the U.S. Government that always worries about appearances.

The time has come to say, however, "To the devil with appearances. What matters is averting a shattering defeat."

[From the Philadelphia Inquirer, June 17, 1964]

ON THE SPOT: VIETNAM ERRORS OFFER VITAL LESSON

(By Marguerite Higgins)

NEW YORK.—One way for the United States to better its present chances (perhaps 50-50) of winning the war in Vietnam is to face coldly and honestly the consequences of its past mistakes.

Putting aside matters of America's image, world opinion, and the like, the greatest, and possibly disastrous, blunder of the last year was the decision to signal the overthrow of the Diem regime in midbattle. Quite apart from the resulting chaos and disorganiza-

tion that permitted the Vietcong to take over 7 million (out of 14 million) Vietnamese in 2 months, the demoralizing effect of the first and second coup d'etats on Vietnam's fledgling officer corps has changed the very nature of the war.

The demoralization is such that many Vietnamese officers have become de facto hors de combat even though they are nominally still at their posts. The morale of many key officers has been crippled because they do not know whom to trust. In the wake of the successive purgings of the "ins" by the "outs" during the two revolts, who can blame these officers if they are fearful of taking responsibility and executing orders. After all, their general or other superior officer may be "in" today "out" tomorrow. If they do their duty today they may be punished tomorrow.

And the United States is not without blame for this uncertain atmosphere. If the American Embassy in Saigon had spoken out half as forcefully against the reign of terror perpetrated recently (mainly against Catholics) in Vietnam as it did during the so-called Buddhist crisis, there might be a saner atmosphere. The phony trial of the Catholic Mayor Dang Sy, the war hero (seven decorations) who was condemned for having carried out orders of his Buddhist superiors in Hue last May, is but one example of this reign of terror. And if Catholics carry signs saying "Henry Cabot Lodge Go Home" it is because they think the United States has stayed strangely silent in the face of what almost everybody on the scene in Saigon considers a mockery of justice—only one among many.

In any case, the morale of many Vietnamese officers in crucial areas is shot.

Further, this country is going to have to stop trying to fight this war with its left hand. It is not serious warfare, to give but one example, to send over military advisers for 1 year only. The advisers are the first to say it. Said Maj. Olen O'Connor, of Arizona: "It takes about 6 to 8 months to get to know your Vietnamese opposite number and work smoothly with him. And just as things are really beginning to mesh, it is time to go home."

Further, the Communists, who convinced themselves early in 1964 that the United States was about to bow out of Asia, must be put on notice that this country will do whatever is necessary to prevent a Communist victory. This means, if necessary, the commitment of American troops, sabotage and other dirty tricks in North Vietnam, etc. The Communists know that the United States has the power to win in southeast Asia. And if Peking and Hanoi are convinced that the United States is prepared—at last—to use it, the invocation of this power may not be necessary.

6. THE BUDDHIST MILITANTS

[From the Washington Star, Jan. 23, 1965]
ISN'T IT TIME TO FACE TRUTH?

(By Marguerite Higgins)

The spectacle in Saigon of brown-robed monks egging on delinquents, both juvenile and adult, to smash the windows of our libraries leads to one insistent question:

Isn't it time the United States told the American people the truth concerning the way in which a handful of Buddhist politicians in Vietnam have used a religious cover to camouflage a campaign of chaos that for the last 18 months has served only Communist ends?

Is it embarrassing to admit that the United States made a mistake in giving asylum at its Saigon embassy no less than twice (3 months in 1963, 1 day in 1964) to the intellectual powerhouse of the rock-throwing clique, the Buddhist Monk Thich Tri Quang?

Is it difficult to acknowledge that perhaps we should have checked a little further into Quang's past, his two arrests by the French for serving with the Communists, his state-

ments that Marxism and Buddhism were alike, his furtive meetings with leaders of the Vietcong National Liberation front?

Will faces turn red if we admit further that for many months Quang bamboozled many well-meaning Americans into believing his absurd claim that his particular clique of Buddhists represented "85 to 90 percent" of the Vietnamese people when in point of fact Buddhists in Vietnam may just possibly constitute 30 percent of the people (see "Buddhism in Vietnam" by Dr. Mai Tho Truyen, chairman of the Vietnamese Association of Buddhist Laymen) and further, Quang's faction is bitterly opposed by truly religious Buddhists such as those at Saigon's Xa Loi Pagoda, which is not on speaking terms with the Buddhist center run by the Communist-tinged extremists?

Embarrassing as all this may be, embarrassment has become, and resoundingly, the lesser of the evils. The moment of truth is at hand.

The truth is vital because otherwise American opinion is going to fall, just like that into the trap so cleverly and deviously prepared by Quang—the trap of believing that the so-called and in fact nonexistent "Buddhist majority" of the Vietnamese people have turned against the United States.

The truth is, and it needs to be repeated loud and clear, that the man behind the persons cradling the rocks that smash our library is Quang as well as others who have been been intriguing with the Vietcong Communists for a very long time, as the American intelligence record—to its credit—shows even though the policymakers have chosen to disregard the evidence.

But if and when the majority of the American people begin to believe that utterly false, but so carefully prepared, piece of Communist-abetted propaganda to the effect that the illusory Buddhist majority wants us to go home, then the clamor for Americans to give up and get out of Vietnam could become irreversible.

All right, so the United States made a mistake back in the summer of 1963. We can now see, in retrospect, that the Vietnamese army, the Vietnamese security police, and Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem were completely right when they tried to tell us from the very beginning of the Buddhist crisis that in Vietnam the Communists do not, after all, play cricket, but play dirty. They play real dirty and indulge in precisely such tricks as infiltrating the Buddhist movement, and not only that, infiltrating also, to some degree, the Catholics, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, mountain tribesmen, the ancestor worshippers, and the many other non-Buddhist sects and religions of Vietnam.

More recently, Premier Tran Van Huong was perfectly correct in warning that acc-government topper Quang talked like a Communist, acted like a Communist, and served Communist ends.

The United States' mistakes are painful, but not shameful. Contrary to the Communists, we have not been plotting for 25 years to seize Vietnam and have not meticulously studied every village, every province, every religion, every superstition, with the aim of subverting them to our ends. If it is any comfort, our inexperience is born of virtue—the virtue of a Johnny-come-lately desperately seeking to save a drowning man without time to find out much about him, let alone bone up on his family tree.

And the essential, and most salutary point of admitting past mistakes is that this is the only way to stop repeating them.

[From the Washington Evening Star,
Jan. 8, 1965]

CONTROLLING THE BUDDHISTS

If the militant Buddhist leaders in Saigon are recognized as subversive conspirators instead of the spiritual characters they pretend

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At Bienhoa, 20 miles outside of Saigon, a new papermill will officially begin production today. The opening will culminate 26 months of construction work, frequently interrupted by skirmishes between Vietnamese troops and the Vietminh.

At Anhoa, 530 miles north of Saigon, work on a giant Government industrial complex is moving steadily ahead, despite frequent incursions by guerrillas.

The first phase of the project, including a coal mine, a hydroelectric plant, a nitrogen fertilizer plant, and a calcium-carbide plant, is about 75 percent completed and should be finished by early next year.

INTERNATIONAL TEAMWORK

The Cong Ty Ky Nghe Glay Vietnam pulp and paper mill was completely built by the Parson & Whittemore-Lyddon organization, with a team of workers and technicians that included Vietnamese, Americans, Canadians, Taiwan Chinese, Frenchmen, Germans, Indians, and Swiss.

The plant was built under difficult conditions. An American executive who visited the site said that workers were frequently the target of snipers—particularly occidental workers.

The mill, which will produce newsprint and writing paper, is owned by the Vietnamese Government. Foreign exchange for the purchase of machinery was provided by the Agency for International Development, and Parsons & Whittemore has subscribed for 19 percent of the share capital.

The Anhoa site, less than 100 miles south of the 17th parallel, partitioning Vietnam, was selected for the industrial complex because of the coal deposits at nearby Nongson.

The industrial project in the populous province of Quangnam, was aided by a \$1.7 million grant from the Development Agency, \$400,000 of which was used to purchase a fleet of 14 pieces of construction equipment from Allis-Chalmers International.

The Nongson coal mine is already in operation and last year produced some 200,000 tons of anthracite.

A SECOND PHASE

The second phase of the giant project, which is also owned by the Vietnamese Government, is scheduled for completion by 1968. This phase will include a caustic-soda plant, a glass factory, a cement plant, a dry-ice plant and several other producing facilities.

A third phase, which will depend on whether more coal can be found in the Nongson bed, will include development of nearby magnetite, hematite, gold, copper, lead, and other metal deposits and a factory for ore concentration.

The French and West German Governments have also made grants to assist the Anhoa-Nongson complex.

The project area is accessible by a railroad, two highways, and the Thubon River. Because of heavy guerrilla activity, however, military helicopter is often the only safe way of reaching the development.

One American technician, who recently returned from working on the complex, said that the first thing he was issued when he arrived was an M-1 rifle.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 19, 1964]

VIETNAM

(By Robert R. Brunn)

WASHINGTON.—Communist North Vietnam's woes are giving sizable encouragement to the South Vietnamese regime and the United States.

Some kind of a respite is being offered hard-pressed American officials dealing with the guerrilla war. They argued that now is the time to place aggressive pressure on the Communist forces.

Self-admitted weaknesses of the Hanoi government of North Vietnam, some rather surprising assumptions by the Communists, and U.S. intelligence assessments add up in this way:

Hanoi grimly assumes that the anguish-provoking war will continue, without any question through 1964 and beyond. This is despite Washington's acknowledgement that the next 4 months are "crucial."

Hanoi is combating the widening unpopularity of the war in the south which is draining off resources from a seriously depressed economy. Apathy often characterizes the civilian attitude.

MOSCOW REJECTION

Last year's North Vietnamese harvest was at least 20 percent below 1962's middling harvest. Some starvation is visible but there is no general disaster in sight.

Moscow has flatly turned down a direct Hanoi plea for aid to support the war. The North Vietnamese reason that they can't afford to turn their backs politically on Peiping, and that Peiping's gasping economy can give them little help in terms of food or weapons.

Morale among the Communist Vietcong troops in the guerrilla war is a continuing problem for the North Vietnamese Government. Analysis has seen absolutely no evidence that the division between pro-Peiping and pro-Moscow camps seriously hampers the war effort, as such. The major Hanoi decision to side openly with Peiping was bound to leave a disappointed minority but there have been no demotions, no dissident voices raised.

Hanoi has a healthy, decisive respect for U.S. military power and sees the superior weapons, equipment, and manpower of the South Vietnamese are still a major obstacle to victory. The Communists fear an escalation of the war, bringing an open U.S. invasion of North Vietnam, and this has tended up to now to keep the Communist military effort within a limited framework.

While the Vietcong at times has its guerrillas at battalion strength, they are in no position to coordinate such units in massive movements against the South Vietnamese. One factor is the lack of well-anchored supply bases for such operations.

Neutralization of North Vietnam is considered to be utterly out of the question in the minds of the Hanoi regime.

Much of the above analysis comes out of a careful American study of the most important statement made by the Hanoi government in several years.

PROTRACTED TRIALS

It was spelled out in two articles in the January and February issues in Hanoi's principal journal, Hoc Tan, and a third article in the newspaper Nhan Dan.

This official line laid down by the articles in Hoc Tan is designed to seep down through the ranks of the faithful and be imported to South Vietnam and discussed by the fighting guerrillas, observers here believe.

When the articles speak of new, hard, long, protracted trials in the war and use the word "protracted" over and over again, the signal is that the Hanoi Communists are not thinking in terms of a rapid termination of the war or the imminent defeat of the South Vietnamese army.

On the contrary, the Communists expect a mounting military initiative in South Vietnam and complain that often they will have to meet modern weapons with rusty nails and crossbows.

ECONOMIC DRAIN

Analysts emphasize there is no widespread disaffection in North Vietnam. The farm situation is grim but not beyond hope.

But there is little doubt there is a solid body of opinion in the north that the never ending war is the primary cause for the weakness of their economy.

The war in South Vietnam is seen here as basically an indigenous one, gaining in its support from within Vietnam. It is a dirty war and one which has its grim aspects for the Communists who have had no spectacular victories. These magazine articles were designed to buck up the morale of the fighting men.

5. COMMENTS AND EDITORIAL OPINION

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 23, 1965]

NEGOTIATIONS

It would be a mistake to allow the world to believe that the people of the United States have fallen into an irreconcilable division on the question of whether we should or should not negotiate a settlement in South Vietnam. There are differences of opinion, but they do not relate to the idea of negotiation; they concern the kind of negotiation. Sentiment surely is overwhelmingly in favor of negotiations that would end the fighting, set up enforceable peace terms, preserve the rights of our friends in South Vietnam and leave intact the honor and prestige of the United States. Just as certainly, sentiment is against negotiations that would not do this. The choice is not "negotiations" or "no negotiations." The question is: "What kind of negotiations?"

In 1954, the French were driven into negotiations of a kind we must avoid. Mendez France was in desperation. He had promised to get France out of Indochina. To do it he had to abandon many of the people of North Vietnam to Communist vengeance. He had to get the Soviet Union to intervene with Ho Chi Minh and by allowing the EDC treaty to fall in the French chamber he encouraged that collaboration. But French power was being drained away in Indochina. The nation was literally bleeding to death. History can forgive a weak power at the end of its resources for upsetting its allies in Europe, for deserting its comrades in arms in Indochina and for closing its eyes to the consequences in Asia. France had no other choice.

The United States, however, is not a small European power at the end of its military, economic, and political resources. It is a great global power whose might is undiminished. It will be judged by different standards. It cannot permit savage reprisals to be worked upon anti-Communist South Vietnamese. It cannot allow them to die by battalions in order to save the lives and property of Americans. It cannot offer the Soviet Union or any other intervenor political concessions at the expense of European allies. It cannot be indifferent to the extension of Chinese Communist power in Asia.

Many feared at the time that the 1954 negotiations would not end the fighting. And indeed they permitted it to continue on terms advantageous to communism. They did not provide a settlement that enforced itself or one that permitted anyone else to enforce it.

Can negotiations in 1965 do any better? If the North Vietnamese and their Chinese sponsors understand the difference between a powerful United States and an exhausted France they might. But they must be made to understand that difference. If they are convinced that this country has the power and the will to pursue its legitimate ends as long as it may be necessary to do so, negotiations might be feasible and arrangements of an acceptable peace possible. Until the posture of the United States is understood by those with whom negotiations must be conducted, this country must look to the practical military means of better protecting its position in South Vietnam.

It is perfectly clear that we need greatly to increase the effectiveness of our conduct of the war inside the borders of South Vietnam. Several immediate steps are self-evident to military authority: (1) The routes by which

North Vietnam is maintaining replacements and supplies for 35,000 infiltrators must be more nearly sealed off by the use of more troops on the border and by a tighter naval blockade; (2) the ratio of South Vietnam to Vietcong forces must be raised from 5 to 1 to at least the 8-to-1 level by which the British gained success against Communists in Malaya; (3) points from which troops are embarked and material shipped in North Vietnam must not enjoy immunity from reprisal attack; (4) the command structure of the South Vietnam forces must be stabilized; (5) the South Vietnam civilian government must be strengthened.

There is no time limit in which we must achieve these objectives. The scale of expenditures is not prohibitive. We can keep up operations on an even greater scale, year after year and decade after decade, if that is vital to our interests.

At the same time, it must be acknowledged that nothing is possible without a primary effort by the South Vietnam people themselves. The war against the Vietcong is their war. And it is a war which only South Vietnam forces can win. The struggle for the loyalty of the people is the struggle of Vietnamese leaders. It is conceivable that the South Vietnamese may fall completely on these fronts. If that happens, regretfully and sorrowfully, it will be necessary for us to be governed by what we can do and not by what we would like to do or what we ought to do.

At the same time that we proceed to the more effective prosecution of the war and the more efficient organization of the civilian Government in South Vietnam, we should continuously make known the very limited nature of our objectives. Unlike the French in 1954, we have no colonial ambitions. We wish to see an independent South Vietnam, safe from external aggression, free to choose in peace the kind of government its people wish (even if it is a Communist government in the end), open to normal trade and intercourse with North Vietnam and other Asian neighbors with whom it surely must be closely associated in the future. Such a South Vietnam would not menace any Asian neighbor or threaten any legitimate interest of North Vietnam.

More than mere oral assurances are needed to assure the future of such a country. There are, however, many sorts of satisfactory performance bonds that could be given by a North Vietnam Government desiring peace on these terms.

Surely there is not much mystery about the conditions to settle the war in South Vietnam. When there is a fair prospect for arriving at these conditions, there will be little difference among Americans as to the wisdom or desirability of negotiating.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, Feb. 15, 1965]

WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP—VIETNAM: THE DOMINO THEORY

(By Crosby S. Noyes)

With the way things are going in Vietnam it is only natural that a certain amount of thought should be given these days to the domino theory.

It was President Eisenhower who first used the metaphor to explain and justify our presence in Vietnam. If our position there should topple, he thought, a whole series of non-Communist states in southeast Asia would almost automatically fall under Communist rule.

The domino theory is a good deal less popular in administration circles today than it once was. As the political situation in Vietnam deteriorates and the possibility of Communist victory grows, serious consideration is being given to the ways and means of limiting the extent of a possible defeat there.

Since administration leaders tend to question the validity of the domino theory, they also tend to deny rather emphatically any total withdrawal of American military power from southeast Asia in the event of a withdrawal from Vietnam. The argument sometimes made by Vietnam bitter-enders, that it would mean a retreat back to Hawaii and an end to our presence in Asia, is rejected.

It can be argued on the contrary that there is no country in the world harder to defend against Communist subversion than South Vietnam. The almost impossible task of trying to create a country where none exists in the midst of a revolution that had been in progress for a decade before the Americans arrived would not confront us elsewhere.

Thailand, for example, would provide infinitely more favorable ground for resistance to the Chinese Communist thrust. There, at least, there is a sense of national identity and a tradition of government authority. And while the history of the country is not exactly one of heroic defense of freedom, the Thai, with encouragement, have shown themselves quite determined in opposing Communist pressures.

These pressures, perhaps, could be expected to increase if the position in Vietnam were lost. But the problems of waging a subversive war against a country as relatively well organized as Thailand are enormously different than in Vietnam. There is no reason to suppose that Mao Tse-tung's guerrillas would find the waters of Thailand's population very congenial.

Open military pressure through Laos would involve substantial risks for the Chinese. As a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Thailand could call on—and presumably receive—aid from Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Britain, and the United States.

Under the terms of this treaty, in fact, the power of the United States is already committed in Thailand, to the extent that it might be needed to resist either Communist subversion or outright attack. And though there is little reason to believe that our commitment would reach anything like the proportions in Vietnam, there is no reason whatever to suppose that it would be withdrawn.

There are those in Washington today who deplore this state of affairs. The advocates of worldwide American "disengagement" are inclined to the theory that American power and prestige should never have been committed in Vietnam in the first place. And from here they argue that its commitment in any of the so-called soft areas of southeast Asia—which, presumably, means all of it—should be avoided at all cost.

There are also those who contend that any substantial transfer of American power to Thailand would simply serve to invite increase Communist pressures there. The converse of the domino theory is that the only way to contain the spread of militant communism in the area is by strict noninvolvement and the encouragement of neutralist states on the periphery of China.

The trouble with both theories is that they are belied by the evidence. The evidence is that strong Communist pressure already is being brought to bear on neutral states in southeast Asia. It may be that these pressures can be resisted by reasonably well integrated nations with a reasonable amount of political stability and military backing. It is not to minimize the seriousness of a defeat in Vietnam to say that it would not necessarily mean defeat everywhere.

It is time to face up to the fact that we are engaged in a continuing process of containing or at least limiting the thrust of Communist China which threatens all of southeast Asia. To pretend that this thrust does not exist, or that it does not represent a threat to vital American interests, or that it can be limited by diplomacy, could well turn defeat into disaster.

[From the National Observer, Dec. 28, 1964]
AT A CROSSROADS IN ASIA?—VIETNAM: FADING FRIENDSHIP AND NEW FOCUS ON DOMINO THEORY

The speaker was no leftist demagog, though his attack on U.S. policy was full of words like interference and colonialism. The speaker was, instead, an American ally in a war against communism, South Vietnam's Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khanh. And his words raised serious questions about the very basis of American policy in southeast Asia.

It is better, said General Khanh, "to live poor but proud as free citizens of an independent country rather than in ease and shame as slaves of the foreigners and Communists." South Vietnam, he added, should be prepared to go it alone against the Communist Vietcong and spurn further U.S. help.

Washington was stunned by last week's attack from the wily ex-Premier, once regarded as South Vietnam's best hope of achieving victory over Red guerrillas. And the question, once again, was being asked in the Nation's Capital, "What would happen if the United States pulled out?"

CURTAILMENT OF AID?

To be sure, no high administration official went so far as to urge outright withdrawal. But Secretary of State Dean Rusk, expressing the Government's opposition to last week's Saigon house cleaning by young army officers, hinted at a curtailment of proposed U.S. aid. "Obviously," he said, "if there are problems of unity, there are certain kinds of assistance that are simply not feasible." And Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield revived his proposal to transfer the question of Vietnam's future from the battlefield to the conference table. "I don't think neutrality is a bad word," he said.

Indeed, the voices urging a sharp reappraisal of America's Asian policy received an additional boost on Christmas Eve. A terrorist bomb exploded in the garage of the main U.S. officers' billet in Saigon, killing 2 Americans and injuring 110 persons. The bomb apparently was smuggled into the heavily guarded building in a U.S. jeep, another indication of increasing Vietcong boldness despite the intense U.S. effort in South Vietnam.

Why doesn't the United States pull out of Vietnam? The answer can be summed up in three words: The domino theory.

Through the years, American officials have argued that if South Vietnam were to fall to the Communists, the other nations of southeast Asia would likewise topple—like a row of stacked dominoes.

WHAT THE REDS WOULD GOBBLE

Landlocked Laos, already two-thirds in Communist hands, would be swiftly gobbled up by the Reds. Thailand, which caved in to Japanese invaders after only 5 hours of fighting in December 1941, would sue for some accommodation with Red China in hope of preserving a semblance of its long-cherished independence from foreign rule. Burma, whose government already has cut most of its ties with the West, would become little more than a Chinese province. Cambodia, recently professing friendship with China, would succumb quickly to Communist domination.

The domino theory extends even further. Pessimistic proponents of the theory fear that if the United States is forced out of South Vietnam, either by a Communist conquest or by the Saigon government, all of Asia might be opened to Chinese Communist penetration, either through subversion or outright invasion. At least, they argue, strongly pro-Western nations such as Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Formosa could no longer trust the United States to fulfill any promises to protect them. India, Pakistan, and South Korea, too, might have second thoughts about alining themselves too closely with the United States.

Significantly, it is the latter, less-alarmist group that holds the controlling viewpoint inside the Johnson administration.

The administration has endeavored to convince congressional critics of U.S. policy in southeast Asia that this calmer attitude is justified, and that American policy, heavily committed physically and psychologically in Laos and South Vietnam, should continue in its present framework.

To buttress that position, administration officials said that while there has been increased Communist infiltration, North Vietnam has by no means committed all its power to either the Laotian or South Vietnamese conflicts.

Perhaps more importantly, these officials assert, the Chinese Communists, who give the North Vietnamese moral and physical support, continue to demonstrate considerable caution about any direct involvement with the United States.

State Department Press Officer Robert J. McCloskey said yesterday that there have been indications in recent weeks of North Vietnamese military movements into southern and central Laos.

McCloskey said he could not state either the size or objective of the infiltration. He said, in answer to questions, that the troop movements might or might not be a seasonal increase coinciding with the ending of the rainy season, a shifting of forces, or a movement designed primarily to send reinforcements to South Vietnam.

Many officials here believe that the troops are being funneled through the so-called Ho Chi Minh network of trails in Laos, for use in South Vietnam.

McCloskey described the situation as "a cause for concern but not for alarm." He said, "We're following the situation closely."

Other authoritative sources said it appears that the thousands of South Vietnamese who were being trained in North Vietnam for use in the south are about used up, and that the Communist northerners are now sending down native-born men from the Red territory.

But while there have been published reports that between 15,000 and 20,000 men have been filtered into South Vietnam from the north during 1964, official sources here yesterday would speak only of "several thousand" men. In addition, it was said, these numbers have been offset by an increasing callup of South Vietnamese forces to fight them.

In Laos, officials said that since last May, when U.S. T-28 "reconnaissance" and "escort" planes were sent in to help the royal Government withstand the Communist Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese, the neutralist central regimes position has improved considerably.

What has helped improve it is what officials will not admit publicly—the air pounding of Communist positions by American jet fighters during recent months.

[From the New York Times, June 26, 1964]
HANOI IMPROVES SUPPLY LINE TO SOUTH VIETNAM—MORE TROOPS CROSS LAOS BY HO CHI MINH TRAIL—ANALYSTS FEAR LARGE FORCE MAY OPEN NEW FRONT

(By Hedrick Smith)

WASHINGTON, June 25.—Recent U.S. reconnaissance missions have confirmed earlier reports that Communist forces have been improving their road network in southern Laos and have considerably stepped up the pace of their supply convoys there.

Officials here report that the Communists now have stretched their road network south from Tchepone, previously the terminal point for truck traffic on the supply network known as the Ho Chi Minh trail. Other links of the network are reported to have been improved.

The Ho Chi Minh trail, a complex of dirt roads tapering off into scores of jungle trails,

has long been one of the principal supply routes from North Vietnam to Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam.

Officials declined to give precise figures on the number of trucks recently seen operating in the Tchepone region, but intelligence estimates indicate that roughly 3,000 North Vietnamese troops are on more or less permanent duty in southeastern Laos near the South Vietnamese border.

FEAR OF NEW MOVES RISES

This concentration and the increases in supply convoys during the recent dry season are reported to have raised fears among U.S. officials, including Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, about North Vietnamese intentions.

Officials have been worried for fear the Communists might try to infiltrate large forces across the Laotian border into the central Vietnamese highlands while South Vietnamese Government forces were largely concentrating on fighting guerrillas south of Saigon.

Other officials suspect that the activity in southern Laos may be a prelude to future offensives against Saravane and Attopeu, two rightwing strongholds in southern Laos. Hostile forces nearly surround both towns now.

Since neither town is in the Mekong Valley, some analysts here are concerned lest the Pathet Lao assume they can be attacked without fear of American intervention. The United States has often warned that its mantle of protection extends over the Mekong Valley bordering Thailand.

The stepped-up operations in southern Laos, officials said, began last fall and have increased in tempo this spring since pro-Communist Pathet Lao units gained control of the Nakay Plateau in January.

These officials consider the southern operations to be unrelated to recent offensives by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops around the Plaine des Jarres in north-central Laos.

That fighting, which pushed the United States toward the brink of a major conflict, has now almost halted.

Although the ground fighting was confined to the region north of Pakxane, Laotian Air Force T-28 fighter-bombers, supplied by the United States, have carried out strikes this month against some Pathet Lao positions in southern Laos as well.

Officials here have also dropped hints that some plans held in readiness would call for the South Vietnamese Air Force to raid Communist supply routes in Laos and possibly in North Vietnam.

So far such raids are considered a fairly distant possibility. Premier Nguyen Khanh has told U.S. officials he is opposed to carrying the war beyond his borders until he has developed a more stable base at home.

The principal roads from North Vietnam into southern Laos are Route 8, from the city of Vinh through the Nape Pass, and Route 12 through the My Gia Pass, a bit farther south.

Since last fall, intelligence reports indicated that the Communists were building up Route 12-A to connect Route 12 at Nhommarath with the town of Muong Phine about 80 miles to the south on Route 9.

From there, truck loads of troops and shipments of ammunition, weapons, fuel, medical supplies, and other equipment were reported moving east toward Tchepone on Route 9 and also down Route 23 toward Saravane, 80 miles to the southwest, to Pathet Lao guerrillas operating in that area.

S. MORE VIETNAM

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, Feb. 19, 1965]

DETENTE HOPE DECEIVES UNITED STATES, LATINIS SAY

(By Marguerite Higgins)

SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO.—It is commonplace in Central America to hear experienced

diplomats express the hope that Washington is getting over its hypnotism with the idea of a Russian-American detente and its misinterpretation of the Sino-Soviet split.

What hypnotism? What misinterpretation?

Said an experienced Venezuelan diplomat: "No country in Latin America would be happier to welcome a rapprochement between Washington and Moscow—if it were genuine. But we fear it is not genuine so far as Latin America is concerned. Indeed we believe that hope of a detente has been used by Moscow to pull the wool over Washington's eyes while the Communists down here profit from America's nonseeing attitude to intensify guerrilla activities, violence, and terrorism—or at least try to."

"As to the Sino-Soviet split, we think that far from restraining the Soviet Union, it has merely spurred Moscow on to greater assistance to so-called wars of liberation in Latin America—assistance designed to prove that Moscow is not soft on the West as Peiping says."

CITES ATTACKS

"Washington was apparently surprised," the diplomat went on, "to hear of the Kossygin visit to North Vietnam. We were not surprised at all. For in Cuba, Russians, Chinese, and North Vietnamese have been cooperating in the training and planning for guerrilla attacks in Latin America."

According to Cuban broadcasts and to the Cuban press, a delegation from the Vietnamese liberation front, more commonly known as the Vietcong, came in 1964 to Havana where it signed a mutual aid pact with the Venezuelan guerrilla forces.

The Venezuelan guerrillas, who halted their attacks briefly in 1963, are once more in the mountains, burning and killing and blowing up things.

The fact that the overwhelming majority of Venezuelan peasants hate the guerrillas does not deter their terrorist leaders any more than the fact that the Vietnamese peasants hate the Vietcong deters Hanoi.

Intelligence reports indicate that this weird consortium planning and plotting liberation wars from Cuba includes four countries—Communist China, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and North Vietnam.

Here in Puerto Rico it is very unpopular for strangers to speak of Communist doings or even intentions. This is understandable perhaps in light of the tourist trade and continuing attempts to lure American business investment.

MINORITIES EXPLOITED

And, of course, this is perfectly correct. There is no Communist threat to Puerto Rico in the sense that the Communist consortium in Cuba and local extremists have made any real inroads in this country. Indeed, no responsible official or writer has ever alleged that the Communists are about to take over in Puerto Rico.

But whether Castro and his cohorts are exploiting certain minority elements in Puerto Rico and seeking to prepare the ground for mischiefmaking in Puerto Rico is another matter.

In relatively prosperous Puerto Rico there is plenty of evidence that the ideological divisions of the Communist camp have not prevented their cooperation in seeking to propagandize persons who hopefully may one day serve their purposes.

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 6, 1965]
CHINA PICKS THAILAND AS NEXT TARGET—PLEDGES SUPPORT TO REBEL MOVEMENT

TOKYO, February 5.—Communist China announced today that a "patriotic front" had been formed in Thailand to overthrow the pro-Western government and eradicate American influence there.

It was the first time that Peiping had openly named Thailand as the next target of a Communist campaign in southeast Asia.

Thailand is the staunchest U.S. ally on the Asian mainland. Bangkok, the capital, is the headquarters of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)—the American-led defense alliance in the Orient.

(In Washington, U.S. officials expressed concern but said that Peiping's announcement of support for the front had been anticipated.

"It strikes me as the logical step in Peiping's policy of supporting subversion wherever possible in southeast Asia," one official said.)

[From Bangkok, Reuters reported that Thailand had tightened its anti-Communist security as refugees from the fighting in Laos continued to enter the country across the Mekong River. Police sources said 56 Communist suspects had been arrested in northeastern Thailand in the past few days. Latest figures place the number of Laotian refugees at 15,000.]

Communist China's designs on Thailand were made clear in a broadcast of the New China news agency heard here today, although the "patriotic front" was first announced January 1 in a clandestine Thai-language broadcast.

Today's broadcast urged "all patriotic people to unite as one and launch a resolute struggle to drive out U.S. imperialism and realize the independence, democracy, peace, neutrality, and prosperity of Thailand."

The broadcast outlined a program aimed at "overthrowing the Fascist dictatorial government"; withdrawing from SEATO and "driving all imperialist troops . . . out of Thailand"; economic reforms with emphasis on restricting foreign capital "whose aim is to seize profits from Thailand . . ." and "suppressing and meting out severe punishment to traitors and bureaucrats who oppress the people."

The "reforms" followed the same revolutionary textbook that the Communists have used in Vietnam and tried to use in Malaya and the Philippines.

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 16, 1965]
COMMUNISTS PLAN VENEZUELAN TERROR
(By Norman Gall)

CARACAS.—The Venezuelan Communist movement, after 13 months of relative quiet since the December 1963 elections, is planning a "counteroffensive" aimed at conquest of power through another cycle of terrorism and heightened guerrilla warfare.

According to recently obtained internal Venezuelan Communist Party documents, the current "defensive situation" of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) scheduled to last "at least 6 months" will give way to coordinated violence in urban and rural areas and in infiltrated military installations.

Venezuela's Communists received a severe setback when their call for boycott of the presidential election was ignored despite threats of violence. The small party never received widespread support, even before the government restricted it in an effort to end terrorist acts.

The "defensive situation" described in a memorandum of the party's politburo circulated in recent months among FALN guerrilla units consists of accelerated programs of training guerrillas abroad, a campaign for amnesty for jailed insurrectionists, offers of a truce to the government, quiet gestation of more guerrilla operations and deepening infiltration of the regular armed forces.

According to this memorandum, the "general counteroffensive plan" consists of:

"Simultaneous insurgency in military installations with occupation of strategic objectives with sufficient flexibility to establish a long struggle. In these military insurgencies previous arrangements should be made for distribution of arms to our cadres and to the civilian population under our control."

Action of urban guerrillas, "including those formed with personnel and equipment coming from abroad, against industrial installations permitting a notable economic paralysis."

"Specialized action to disrupt roads and installations for centers of consumption which could supply troops for combat against our units.

"Provocations at military bases and in cities to occupy troops which otherwise could act against our insurgents, and guerrilla activity to occupy enemy forces (in the mountains)."

Some longtime students of Communist operations here question FALN's present capacity to execute such large-scale operations, though current military estimates place rural guerrilla strength at 2,000 men, including those already trained and pursuing normal occupations while waiting orders, and 3,000 urban combatants.

According to these observers, 1964 was a year of quiet recuperation of Communist strength in Venezuela, despite reversals suffered in the universities and failure to organize a united front of leftist groups inclined to support anti-Government insurgency.

The Communists' achievements of 1964 consisted mainly in extending the number of guerrilla bands in gestation or in open operation and their success in creating a climate favorable for amnesty for jailed insurrectionists.

President Raul Leoni is being steadily pressured by the two parties which have joined Accion Democratica (the Government party) to form a coalition government into giving favorable consideration to the amnesty appeals.

Another internal Communist document, a report on party organization in eastern Venezuela, laments the decline in party activity in many localities after the election.

But the same report notes considerable strength in the iron and steel producing region of Bolivar state.

In the past the Communists have concentrated their labor effort in penetrating unions in the mining and petroleum industries.

The dominant Communist strategy in Venezuela, over the objection of a dissident minority opposing continued violence, is based upon the concept of "long war" as developed in China, Cuba, Algeria and Vietnam.

A training program advocated in the party strategy memorandum advocated "a prolonged period of specialization for the group that returns to Venezuela by irregular means."

[From the New York Times, Dec. 20, 1964]
GUATEMALA REBELS STEP UP FIGHT AGAINST REGIME

(By Paul P. Kennedy)

GUATEMALA, December 18.—Revolutionary forces fighting as guerrilla units in the Caribbean area of Guatemala are taking advantage of the political indecisiveness here to step up their activities against the military government of Col. Enrique Peralta Azurdia.

The well-equipped, well-trained groups in the mountain and jungle areas in the Department of Izabal are estimated at 150 to 300. They are said to have more than 1,000 adherents in the urban areas, particularly here in the capital.

They regularly produce the newspaper *Revolucionario Socialista* and also distribute pamphlets throughout the Republic. Persons caught distributing the publication face a heavy fine and prison sentence.

The guerrilla forces get ransoms from the families of kidnap victims and more money by holding up travelers on the Puerto Barrios Highway. But it appears evident now that the movement is receiving funds from outside sources as well.

SHIPMENT OF FUNDS

There has been considerable speculation over the reported shipment last month of \$100,000 in quetzals from a bank here to a New York bank.

The Guatemala bank assumed the costs of commission, insurance and the shipping at the going rate of 1 percent for the total transaction. There was no indication here of the identification of the consignee in New York. The Guatemala Government, while it enforces dollar control, does not ask for details of quetzals-for-dollars transactions. The quetzal is on a par with the dollar.

The theory prevalent here is that the underground movement is being supplied by adherents traveling from Mexico. This theory, vaguely defined, holds that in transactions such as the quetzal-dollar exchange the messengers for the guerrilla forces smuggle in the funds from Mexico. The question of finances arises from the certainty that the expenses of the underground movement are mounting and that there is no way to account for its funds except from outside sources.

Marco Antonio Yong Sosa, called "El Chino" because one of his parents was Chinese, admitted in an interview with the leftist Mexican magazine writer Victor Rico Galan that a number of the incursions of the guerrilla forces he leads have brought in about \$100,000. The principal contribution was \$75,000 paid as ransom for Jorge Samayoa, the kidnapped son of a Guatemalan movie chain operator.

REVENUE FROM RAIDS

Additional revenue has come from raids on provincial United Fruit Co. treasuries and small banks.

Mr. Yong Sosa, in the interview published in the leftist Mexican magazine *Siempre* on October 30, 1963, conceded that his forces had assassinated several public figures and a large number of army officers ranging up to colonel in rank. Most of the assassinations, he said, were for political reasons.

The guerrilla forces, even their supporters in the capital concede, are primarily of nuisance value. But they have an unsettling political effect not only in the mountains but also in the urban centers. In the cities, particularly in the capital, they plant small bombs and occasionally kidnap or shoot persons considered to be enemies of the movement. Earlier this week they exploded about a dozen bombs here. These explosions followed a police search that found caches of mortars, machineguns, small arms, and ammunition.

There is some question whether Mr. Yong Sosa, who was trained as a guerrilla fighter by the United States in the Canal Zone, was himself a Communist. He has told at least one Guatemalan politician that he is accepting assistance from Communist sources in Mexico and Cuba.

This politician is Francisco Villagran Kramer, a young lawyer who is head of the leftist Revolutionary Democratic Union Party. At one time Mr. Villagran Kramer and his party contemplated a union with the Yong Sosa organization, the lawyer said. Representatives of the two organizations, according to Mr. Villagran Kramer, held a series of conferences, but these were broken off when the Villagran Kramer party decided to go to the polls on its own last May. This decision, Mr. Villagran Kramer said was made over the heated objections of the Yong Sosa group, which maintained that a revolutionary overthrow of the Peralta government was Guatemala's only political solution.

4. THE ECONOMY, NORTH AND SOUTH

[From the New York Times, Mar. 16, 1964]
VIETNAM SPEEDS GAIN IN INDUSTRY

(By Philip Shabecoff)

Amid the carnage of civil war, industrial birth is continuing in Vietnam.

"You have to see for yourself how deeply the Vietnamese people fear and hate the Vietcong if they think they can oppose them and not have their throats cut. My team is working its heart out. But all this is dependent, of course, on some sort of stable strong governmental direction."

And it is precisely because so many fine people in the countryside are working their hearts out—and giving their lives—that a visit to the front lines renews a sense of fury at the intrigues in the city—intrigues that may mean that all this devotion and dedication here at the front will add up to nothing.

The war will not be won in Saigon. But Saigon can prevent it from being won.

[From the Washington Evening Star,
Dec. 9, 1964]

COURAGE AT VIETNAM OUTPOST (By Marguerite Higgins)

PLEI ME, VIETNAM.—The morning had begun with a mine disaster. Literally. It was a "Jumping Betty" mine—one of those that jumps out of the dirt and explodes in the air. And so it had cruelly mangled the bodies of 16 of the work detail that Capt. Ronnie Mendoza, of Los Angeles, had sent to repair about three and a half miles of the red dirt jungle road the Vietcong had severed by digging great, gaping ditches across it.

Many of the wounded were only 11 to 14 years of age, children or relatives of the Vietnamese and Montagnard (non-Mongol mountain people) soldiers who, along with Captain Mendoza's 12-man team, use this isolated outpost near the Lao border for patrols and ambushes and other counter-guerrilla operations against the Vietcong.

COPTER ARRIVES

Soon the helicopter arrived at Plei Me to lift out the wounded. The two pilots—Capt. John Mustard, of Montebello, Wash., and Capt. Charlie E. Bryant, of Ocala, Ga.—spoke feelingly of the courage with which the big-eyed Vietnamese and Montagnard children tried to suppress their cries of pain.

This is high, spectacular country where the jungle covered mountains rise, steeply, 7,000 feet high and where air currents in the intervening valleys can be tricky. The helicopter bumped and dipped as it fought the turbulent currents.

From the air, Plei Me is an eyesore with its barbed wire outer fences, its trenches, its mortar emplacements and sandbags, its brick and tin barracks building. It seems an improbable and unexpected scar in the green jungle.

In this part of Vietnam the jungle trails are prowled not just by the Communist Vietcong but by mighty tigers that European hunters once traveled far to shoot.

And despite the morning tragedy, Mendoza had not been able to keep his mind off those jungle trails because 100 men of his special forces, including 2 American sergeants, were out there on a week long patrol, 3 days of which had passed. Their mission was to try and spot possible infiltration routes and the supply dumps that the Communists always prepare in advance at points a day's march apart.

Since his men had last checked in by radio, a lot of sniper fire had been heard in the next valley and Mendoza, a cool and controlled sort, nonetheless was eagerly awaiting the next radio report which would come at 4 p.m.

The itinerary of the patrol had been worked out by Mendoza in consultation with his Vietnamese counterpart, Capt. Nguyen Van Thoi who was known all over the valley as one of the few Vietnamese who could command the loyalty of the Montagnards.

I asked him if the morning mine casualties might have any effect on the morale of the soldiers.

"There has never been a desertion from this camp and there will not be," the Vietnamese captain said with pride.

"Were his men happy with the new regime in Saigon?" I asked.

"Madam," said the Vietnamese captain, "I am an officer and not even I know the name of the leader in Saigon. My men do not fight for Saigon. They fight for their village. They fight because the Vietcong takes their rice and steals their children and kills their kinfolk. They fight because the Americans give them rice and the American doctor treats their wife and children. And that is how it is."

Finally, it was 4 o'clock and the air was electric with good news. "Nobody hurt," said Mendoza after his curt quick radio exchange with the patrol.

When night came and it was time for mere reporters to leave, Mendoza saw us off and yelling against the noise of the chopper blades said something that sounded like, "We can take care of things up here if they can just keep those rioters quiet in Saigon."

It was the same high morale everywhere at the front. And it made you so mad at the so-called student and Buddhist rioters who cause chaos back in the soft-living city.

2. NORTH VIETNAMESE INTERVENTION EIGHTY TONS OF VIETCONG ARMS UNCOVERED, BIG SHIP SUNK

(By Peter Arnett)

TUY HOA, VIETNAM.—By far the biggest haul of Communist weapons for the Vietcong was uncovered yesterday, near a remote cove where a large mystery vessel was sighted and sunk earlier in the week. Officials estimated 80 tons of armaments—much of it Russian and Chinese—had fallen into government hands.

The weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies, including whole blood, apparently had been shipped along the coast from Communist North Vietnam to equip Red guerrillas fighting in the South, United States and South Vietnamese officials said.

"We thought the supply routes were through Laos and Cambodia, but look at this lot," said Col. Theodore Mataxis, of Seattle, Wash., a senior adviser. "They could easily be arming a new division to launch against us up here."

CAMOUFLAGED SHIP SUNK

The materiel was found in the hull of the sunken vessel and in caches on the beaches of a cove on Vung Ro Bay here, 240 miles northeast of Saigon and about 50 miles south of Nha Trang, site of a major U.S. military installation.

A routine helicopter patrol uncovered the cache Tuesday. Flying over the bay, the helicopter crew sighted what looked like a drifting island. Then, heavy fire came up from the island. It turned out to be a well-camouflaged ship, about 400-feet long. South Vietnamese fighter-bombers were called in and sank the vessel.

Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khanh personally ordered troops into the area. After heavy fighting, they took over the cove and beach area Friday, when some of the armaments were found.

A captured Communist guerrilla said the ship had made six trips to bays along Vietnam's central coast, dropping off supplies.

Then yesterday the South Vietnamese uncovered more caches. One area, said an official, was "literally covered with weapons, six deep."

The haul included 1,000 Russian-made carbines, several hundred Russian sub-machineguns and light machineguns, and Chinese burp guns. All had been wrapped in waterproof cloth.

Scores of tons of ammunition were found for these weapons, some of it made as recently as last year in Chinese factories, according to ordnance experts at the scene.

There was also a selection of sophisticated mines and grenades, and ammunition for a new type of rocket launcher used against tanks.

The large supplies of captured medicines included many cases of penicillin, anti-malarial drugs, and whole blood produced in Japan late last year.

ONE BIG SUPPLY FACTORY

Four caches had been found up to late yesterday. Troops probing through the hills under the guns of Communist snipers expected to find more.

"These hills are just one big supply factory," said Mataxis.

The extent of the Communist supply depots shocked U.S. advisers.

"This is just massive," one said.

The Vietcong put up a determined fight to keep government troops from the caches. But they had to pull back. Several government soldiers have been killed in isolated mortar and sniping attacks.

Government forces intend to stay in the region as long as it is necessary to clear it of supplies.

The commander of the 23d Division, Gen. Luu Lan, said, "What we have found here is of tremendous importance. The Communist aggressors have been able to confuse people, so that the truth has been hard to discover."

"But here we have discovered one link of the massive chain of weapons introduction into South Vietnam. This is one of the reasons why we and our American allies have had to take the actions we have taken," the General said.

This was a reference to retaliatory air strikes in North Vietnam.

Members of the International Control Commission, the organization created to police the Geneva accords on Indochina, were shown the arms haul by Khanh.

The commission is made up of Indian, Canadian and Polish delegates. Included in the Communist medical supplies were drugs from Poland.

COMMUNIST BUILDUP

U.S. sources said the apparent buildup of Communist arms along the coast may coincide with reports that increased numbers of guerrillas have been infiltrating from North Vietnam in the past 3 days.

The Vietcong have made determined attempts in recent months to take over the central Vietnamese region. They have met with considerable success so far.

Some Americans expressed belief the Communists will use ships more frequently to supply the Vietcong.

U.S. jet planes have been attacking the Communist supply routes through Communist-held territory in Laos.

[From the Baltimore Sun, Feb. 11, 1965]

CONCEPT OF "INTERNAL REVOLT" IN SOUTH VIETNAM PUNCTURED (By Mark S. Watson)

WASHINGTON, February 10.—From the torrent of events in southeast Asia since the weekend one politically useful fact emerges. That is the well-publicized radio order from Communist Vietcong headquarters in the north to all Vietcong agents south of the border to redouble their activities immediately.

The promptness with which the order was obeyed at widely separated points shows how well organized are the Vietcong's controls. But more important in its long-range political effects may be this plain proof of a fact that hitherto the Communist leaders have denied; namely, that the whole internal revolt in South Vietnam is, and always has been, skillfully engineered from Red headquarters far to the north.

WORLD OPINION DISCUSSED

The victim of assassination is not greatly concerned with who kills him. But world

public opinion, which communism has tried for years to delude with this "internal revolt" fiction, now is in better position to know that even while the Communist powers were agreeing to the Geneva neutralization pact the Communist machine in North Vietnam was already beginning its subversion and assassination program in the south.

In this program of deception a large influence was the International Control Commission, set up to assure that the pledges of neutrality were kept. By 1961, reports of 1,200 offensive "incidents" by Communist agents, ranging from one-man assassinations to fairly large scale military actions, had been laid before the commission. None was acted on.

The reason given by an American White Paper was that the Polish Communist member of the commission refused to investigate any charge that might embarrass the Communist Vietcong, and the Indian member refused to start an inquiry that would embarrass his Polish colleague. Opposed by two, the one remaining member, the Canadian, was powerless.

LEADERS KNOWN

For some reason, possibly the difficulty in remembering the oriental names, the Vietcong leaders have, with two exceptions, remained largely unknown to the American public.

There is no mystery about the others, for captured or defecting Vietcong agents and officers have divulged almost all details of the Red machine for which they worked. Full information about that complex and surprisingly efficient mechanism and its operators at all levels now can be reported without endangering security.

Of the two familiar names one is that of Ho Chi Minh, head of the North Vietnam political government and of its Lao Dong (Workers) Party, and tirelessly active in its all-important Central Research (Intelligence and Operations) Agency and other working elements. The other fairly familiar name is that of Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, Defense Minister, one of the world's great guerrilla leaders.

The Lao Dong Party follows the pattern of Russia's Communist Party, and its Secretary General, Ho Chi Minh, that of Russia's usual one-man-in-two-jobs, premier of the nation and secretary general of the party. The military is subordinate to Ho, the political chief, and all the way down the line and into the kindred Lao Dong of South Vietnam at all levels the political leaders uniformly command the military. That is one way of assuring unity.

FRONT CREATED IN 1960

To provide a cloak of respectability and conceal in some measure the responsibility of the Hanoi organizers with murder and insurrection against Saigon, Ho Chi Minh in 1960 created the "Front for Liberation of South Vietnam."

It is still guided wholly by Ho Chi Minh's Central Committee, immediately directing work in the "South Central" zone (just south of the 17th parallel border) and in the "Nambo" region (south and southwest, including Saigon and the Mekong Delta).

For the Central Committee, supervision is exercised in Hanoi by a "Committee for Supervision of the South," made up of Le Duc Tho, of the Politburo, Phon Hung, Vice Premier of North Vietnam, and Brig. Gen. Nguyen Van Vinh, chairman of the board for reunification. Each of the two zones has its own secretary general, a deputy and a dozen members; each its agencies for training, propaganda and action.

To this political leadership the military, as remarked, is subordinate. Its principals are Ga Vinh, who is indeed a member of that Committee of the South but pointedly a "junior member"; Brig. Gen. Nguyen Don, in charge of military work in the South-Central zone but directly responsible to Tran Luong,

of the Lao Dong in Hanoi, and Brig. Gen. Van Muoi, similarly responsible to Muoi Cua, a politician.

The Central Research Agency, a prime "action" unit for subversion, forgery, arming, radio command, intelligence and military command, is actively directed by Ho Chi Minh and Giap. Its prime center for disorder in South Vietnam was at Vinh Linh, the target of Sunday's fierce bombing attack. Other centers handle Cambodian and overseas intelligence, with Gen. Hoang Dao, Col. Le Can and Col. Van Trong as principal agents.

This is regarded as the agency chiefly responsible for conveying Ho Chi Minh's directives straight to the guerrilla pockets in South Vietnam, and seeing that the supply of men and weapons continues pouring over the many branches of the so-called Ho Chi Minh trail into South Vietnam.

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 27, 1965]

AGGRESSION ADMITTED

(By Joseph Alsop)

At last, the administration's policymakers are somewhat reluctantly admitting the importance of the North Vietnamese troop movements into South Vietnam and Laos. Being clandestine, these Communist troop movements were long and obstinately pooh-poohed. Now, however, they are an officially acknowledged fact. While the fact is admitted, its meaning is still being played down. Even the resulting solid proof of North Vietnamese aggression has not been greatly stressed. As for the military implications, they have been hardly mentioned; yet they are potentially very great indeed.

In Laos, to begin with, the whole balance of the war has been upset. It is a tiny war. The non-Communist Laotians, although they have fought very well against Laotian Communist sympathizers, have always fared ill in their rare engagements with North Vietnamese units. Hence the appearance in Laos of several additional North Vietnamese battalions changes the whole local outlook.

Because Laos is both a subsidiary war theater and a corridor to South Vietnam, it is not quite certain how the additional battalions are to be used. Some think they are intended for use in Laos, since they have moved into the heart of Laos to the west of the corridor-region of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. If this is correct, the brilliant Communist commander, Gen. Vi Nguyen Giap, must be planning a semifinal test of strength in Laos.

Because of the generally misty character of every Laotian situation, a prompt American riposte to such a test of strength will be extra difficult. And a major Communist thrust in Laos will have the gravest repercussions in South Vietnam, unless the American riposte is both prompt and massive.

It is equally possible, however, that these new battalions spotted in Laos are eventually destined to be moved into South Vietnam. For a good many months, organized battalions of the North Vietnamese Army have been filtering into the South Vietnamese fighting—moving by truck down the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the Chepone region, crossing the border in small bands, and then reforming and marching to their assigned areas of operations.

There have long been plenty of signs to prove that the North Vietnamese had reached the stage of sending organized battalions into the fighting, instead of mere cadres to lead their guerrillas. As noted, for instance, in this reporter's recent dispatches from Saigon, young North Vietnamese army conscripts are now quite often found among prisoners of war.

The invasion of South Vietnam by two, three, or even four new Communist battalions per month may not sound like much by the standards of modern war. But this war in Vietnam is not very modern. An

entire province may be defended by no more than five government battalions.

If the Communists already have seven battalions, as they do in Quang Nai Province, for instance, the addition of two more battalions may cause the Dien Bien Phu-like disaster that is General Giap's obvious aim in this phase. That is the real meaning of the persistent Communist troop movement into South Vietnam.

For this very reason, Gen. Maxwell Taylor has repeatedly recommended stronger, more direct action against the North Vietnamese. He wanted something much more effective than the brief retaliatory raid after the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. He wanted retaliation after the attack on the U.S. airfield at Bien Hoa. He again asked for retaliation after a U.S. officers barracks in Saigon was destroyed by a Communist-planted bomb.

The recommendations of General Taylor were disapproved by President Johnson in all three instances. As a less dangerous sort of retaliation, the President instead authorized bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, first by the Laotian air force, and then by the U.S. fighter-bombers that recently destroyed a key bridge at Ban Ban.

The degree of power this deployed against the infiltrators may be gaged from the fact that one-half the Laotian air force has just been put out of action by a single accidental bomb explosion in an airplane hangar. In any case, mere air attacks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail are wildly unlikely to produce any solid result, even if made with 10 times the power.

The truth is, the war in southeast Asia is steadily going from bad to worse. The enemy is getting bolder, and he is steadily reinforcing his frontline troops. The reinforcement is not being countered. Hence there is no hope of any counteroffensive, unless President Johnson has important surprises up his sleeve.

Perhaps the President has such surprises in preparation, for he is a man of surprises. But as of now, we are drifting toward final defeat.

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 23, 1965]

RED ASIAN BUILDUP CONFIRMED

(By Murrey Marder)

U.S. officials confirmed yesterday that there has been increased infiltration of Communist North Vietnamese troops into Laos and South Vietnam. But they called it a cause for continuing concern, not sudden alarm.

The Communist buildup of forces in both places during 1964 and continuing into recent weeks is significant in relative terms, but not a dramatic or grave turn, officials said.

In both on-the-record and background comments, administration officials sought to demonstrate an attitude of skeptical calmness about recently published reports that the conflicts on the Indochina peninsula may be approaching a stage of more massive, open warfare.

Few hard facts or figures were disclosed in the process. Officials said more details should be available early next week after consultations with the U.S. mission in Saigon, capital of South Vietnam.

It became increasingly evident yesterday that both in South Vietnam and in Washington there are conflicting interpretations about the facts and the significance of the increased Communist infiltration.

Those officials most eager to strike more directly at Communist bases in North Vietnam appear to interpret the infiltration reports as evidence to justify that. This group believes the Communists are increasingly preparing to shift from guerrilla tactics to direct offensives.

But the less-alarmist school of thought rates such a shift in Communist strategy as unlikely.

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We suggest that all of our military, political, and economic programs in Vietnam be subordinated to a massive southeast Asian development program. A Johnson plan for the full flowering of southeast Asian economic resources and independence will have as much potency and promise for success in that corner of the world as the Marshall plan did in Europe and the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States.

The Mekong Basin is one of the world's richest and least developed areas. In an area of the world already food rich there is an opportunity to harness the tributaries of the Mekong Basin toward an economic flowering offering infinite promise to Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand as well as to South Vietnam, and offering to the people and the Government of North Vietnam economic opportunity which only their blindness or non-cooperation can frustrate. To Burma, Malaysia, and even India, this would present an opportunity in both economic and political terms which, especially at this moment, could not possibly be more desirable. To the Philippines such a program would provide the same magnetic opportunity for participation as led them generously to create and man Operation Brotherhood a decade ago. It would also offer the first possibility of really involving the wealth and energy of the Japanese Government and people. A Johnson development plan for southeast Asia would manifest to the entire world that the welfare of the people of southeast Asia is our only purpose.

The Mekong Basin development program will provide for the first time a future-oriented thrust around which a Vietnamese resurgence program can be made vital and toward which the efforts of Americans, Japanese, Lao, Thai, Cambodians, and Filipinos can hopefully be attracted.

THE MISSING LINK

Within the last 3 years the Communist nations have revealed their inability to meet their own most pressing economic needs. The shortcut to the future has suddenly proved to be a dead end of economic failure, recrimination, and political embarrassment. But this has not frustrated the wars of national liberation nor prevented the Communists from mounting insurrectionary warfare whether in Congo or Vietnam. National governments and native peoples assaulted by such Communist purposes have, at best, sought to sustain their own energy through defensive effort. Virtually unused has been the enormous potential for hope which can be found only in the non-Communist, world, cooperatively employing the resources of the United States and nations friendly to it whether in Asia, the Pacific, or Western Europe.

We have offered to the Vietnamese people our assistance in their struggle for national independence. We have failed, however, to harness that struggle and our assistance to an all but miraculous future, a flowering of man, his capabilities, his resources, his aspirations. Ours indeed is the truly revolutionary opportunity. The Johnson plan offers to southeast Asia a genuine opportunity to harness nature, enlarge justice, extend life, eradicate the scourges of illness and illiteracy and enable long-suffering peoples to reap the fruits of their soil and the permanent benefits of national independence. Behind this large vision, men throughout the world may be led to voluntary association in Lincoln Brigades, Gandhi Brigades, Mag-saysay, and Marti Brigades—an international volunteer corps for peace and freedom.

The Johnson plan for the development of the Mekong Basin has, in our judgment, the following potential, essentially unavailable in the present circumstances:

1. It will inject dramatic, viable, and politically potent new purpose adequate to

sustain popular support of Vietnamese Government leaders.

2. It will infuse new energy into the Vietnamese already risking their lives in daily defense against the Vietcong.

3. The plan offers concrete reasons for the cooperative involvement of neighboring southeast Asian countries as well as a generous commitment able to sustain emotionally an international corps of volunteers.

4. It contains an enormous incentive to North Vietnam to turn away from its present fratricidal course.

5. Finally, the Johnson plan constitutes a pioneering laboratory of hopeful consequence to other less developed areas where Communist insurrectionary warfare presently finds soil in which to sow the seeds of destruction.

VFW ENDORSES PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S NORTH VIETNAM ACTION

WASHINGTON, D.C., February 8, 1965.—The national commander in chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, Mr. John A. Jenkins, of Birmingham, Ala., today informed President Johnson of the "whole-hearted and unreserved support of the VFW" for the President's decision to retaliate against North Vietnamese military installations.

In his telegram to the President the VFW commander pointed out that such military action against North Vietnam was in full accord with the unanimously adopted resolution of the 1964 VFW national convention, supporting whatever action is necessary to win in South Vietnam. The text of Commander Jenkins' telegram to President Johnson follows:

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Veterans of Foreign Wars wholeheartedly and without reservation supports your decision in taking retaliatory armed action against the Communist aggressors in North Vietnam. Your wise and bold decision in this matter will go far toward assuring our allies throughout all Asia that the United States stands by its commitments and will not be intimidated by Communist threats and aggressive action. U.S. action against North Vietnam is entirely consistent with the unanimously passed resolution of our 1964 VFW national convention which called for all action necessary to win in South Vietnam. The VFW, consisting of 1,300,000 overseas combat veterans fully recognizes that communism has launched a deliberate attack against all southeast Asia and, consequently, the interest of U.S. security and the cause of freedom can be protected, in the final analysis, only by the judicious and willing use of military power.

JOHN A. JENKINS,
Commander in Chief, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States.

1. THE CONTINUING RESISTANCE

[From the New York Times, July 31, 1964]

"PLEASANT VALLEY": A VIETNAMESE SUCCESS STORY—SAIGON'S FORCES WREST AREA FROM STRONG RED CONTROL—"SHOW CONFIDENCE IN PEOPLE," MAJOR SAYS OF HIS METHOD (By Jack Raymond)

PHOU CHAI, SOUTH VIETNAM, July 26.—In Vietnamese, Phou Chai means "pretty valley," and that is just what this collection of hamlets is. It represents a success story in South Vietnam's desperate struggle to defeat the Communist insurgency.

Phou Chai is about 45 miles west of Tamky, in the northern part of South Vietnam. For more than 2 years, until 6 months ago, this valley, with its population of about 6,000, was virtually controlled by the Vietcong.

The insurgents grew rice here to feed the

guerrillas. They "taxed" farmers. They maintained rest stations and assembly points for fighters who blew up bridges and terrorized villages.

Two organized Vietcong battalions with a regimental headquarters operated without Government interference. Then a 34-year-old major, Hoang Tho, appeared with his outfit, the 6th Regiment of the 2d Division, Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

TRAINED IN GEORGIA

Major Tho has been an officer since 1951, when he fought for the French against the Communist Vietminh. He received training at the U.S. Army's military-government school at Fort Gordon, Ga., and at the Fort Denning, Ga., infantry training center.

Articulate, English-speaking and self-confident, Major Tho has evidently won the complete confidence of his troops and of American advisers here. He lives in Danang with his wife and five children.

He spoke matter-of-factly about having organized 10 defended hamlets after achieving military victories over the Vietcong.

Last February, the major recalled, he sent patrols into the valley. They located Vietcong units, ambushed some and drew others into stand-up battles of company and battalion size.

REDS FOUGHT HARD

The Vietcong fought hard for the valley; it was important as a source of food as well as a military center for the countrywide guerrilla campaign. Yet in a month the 6th Regiment drove the Vietcong into the jungle.

"It was only phase 1," Major Tho said. "Now came phase 2, the administrative and political phase."

Major Tho stood with a pointer before an operations map as he continued his story.

Before evacuating the valley, the Vietcong ordered the peasants to take 15 days' supplies into the jungle. They assured the peasants that the Government forces would not stay and that the Communists would soon resume control.

But the Government forces stayed. Major Tho and his men seized 40 tons of rice originally planted by the Vietcong. They distributed 20 tons and destroyed the rest because they could not handle it and did not want the Vietcong to try to recapture it.

THE PEASANTS EMERGE

Two weeks went by, and the peasants came out of the jungle to reclaim their homes and farms. "We let the people come back and keep their rice," Major Tho continued. "We said to them, 'You see, the Vietcong took your things, but we do not.'"

The major went on:

"Many of the villagers came to us and denounced their neighbors as Vietcong. Some gave me a list of 40 men to be executed. But I realized that many were not hard-core Vietcong, only forced to do the bidding and pay allegiance to the Communists."

Major Tho weeded out those he thought were incorrigible Vietcong members and sent them to higher headquarters. Others, including some who had held positions under the Vietcong, he gave new assignments.

"I recommended no executions," Major Tho added. "I wanted to win the confidence of the people. I called the chief villager and asked him how he had organized the villages, and with a few changes I let the organization run the same old way for the time being."

"I wanted to show that we would protect the people against the Vietcong, and I provided special guards for those who took tasks as village administrators and hamlet chiefs. Every night I discussed village problems with the chiefs."

WEAPONS ARE REDISTRIBUTED

Then Major Tho collected weapons. He paid for all that were turned in. Most were rifles and carbines of varied origin. Some were American, captured from Government forces, and others were Russian and Chinese brought in from North Vietnam.

After collecting all the weapons, the major added, he redistributed them in the hamlets. "I wanted to show confidence in the people," the major recalled. "I said, 'Here, take the weapons, and use them against the Vietcong if they bother you.'"

Major Tho retained one hamlet chief who had worked for the Vietcong, but he sent him to higher headquarters for questioning. The man died while traveling, and Major Tho ordered the body brought back for burial. He arranged a big funeral.

GESTURE WITH A MORAL

"I make propaganda, too," Major Tho explained with a smile. "I wanted to show that even those who had served with the Vietcong could be forgiven and could take a proper place in our community."

Now 10 Government hamlets flourish in a valley that was once a Vietcong stronghold. As Major Tho accompanied a visitor on a jeep ride to meet the people, they greeted him with apparent pleasure and showed off a new school. Pupils on roughhewn benches in a big shack were writing the alphabet in notebooks.

There have been no incidents in the valley for more than 4 months, and the Vietcong have apparently been unable to reestablish links with villagers who were once more than ready to help them.

Yet all around the valley, the Vietcong are known to patrol in strength.

"They set up ambushes," the major said, "but they do not come within 2 or 3 miles of the valley. We have established good morale here."

[From the Baltimore Sun, Sept. 26, 1964]

VIETNAM HAMLET REPULSES REDS—PENTAGON RELEASES ACCOUNT OF RECENT CLASH

(By Mark S. Watson)

WASHINGTON, September 25.—Messages from the U.S. command in South Vietnam today permitted the Pentagon to supply in almost unprecedented detail an account of a well-conducted defense and counterattack recently, with the South Vietnam Government forces gaining a substantial success over Vietcong guerrillas.

It was at and near Luong Phu, a little hamlet of some 75 men, women, and children in the swampy delta of the Mekong River, southwest of Saigon. This is the region where the Communist Vietcong has long been generally in control, even before 1954 when the beaten and discouraged French withdrew from southeast Asia.

LOYAL TO GOVERNMENT

Luong Phu, largely because it remained loyal to the government has long been subjected to Communist harassment, the dispatch from Saigon mentioning 50 incidents thus far in 1964, including 15 genuine attacks, of which the latest was the most violent.

In the official account of this occasion there were several aspects so important as to attract attention.

1. The 40 men composing the hamlet's own defense, only lightly armed, held off the attack, with temporary loss of only an ammunition bunker.

2. A group of them had the spirit to counterattack and regain the bunker without loss of its contents, but with four of the loyal force killed.

RELIEF FORCES CALLED

3. A relief force, summoned by radio, came within artillery range and provided quick assistance to the defense.

4. The relief force commander, moving in by a U.S. landing craft (one of five in the Mekong Delta's rivers) was warned by one of his agents that a Vietcong force was in ambush near the riverbank, awaiting him, after the familiar guerrilla practice.

He opened fire on the hidden guerrillas and broke up the ambush with large casualties, his own craft taking only one serious shot from the guerrillas' 57-millimeter rifle. The relief of Luong Phu was completed, with 40 enemy dead around it and a larger number in the ambush party carried away by river boats.

It was this combination of stout resistance at the attack point, prompt radio report to the district command, quick advance of relief forces, and alertness to the danger of ambush, with which the Saigon authorities are obviously most pleased.

PATTERN OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

This is the pattern of their counterinsurgency training, but nobody pretends that it is easy to accomplish that operation with all its four phases perfectly executed. With any of the four missing, the whole operation has small chance of success.

The landing craft and patrol boats and motorized junks on the several rivers and canals are—save for the helicopters—the prime means of rapid movement of reinforcing troops and weapons. They make possible a fairly rapid use of guns and heavy mortars.

The other artillery application is by mounts of single guns in an entrenched position (dotted over the countryside) permitting movement of the gun throughout 360° and prompt laying of fire on any target within range.

This method presupposes the existence of excellent maps and prime ability to use them effectively for fire or an unseen target. A most encouraging aspect of the war in South Vietnam is that the maps do exist and that there is interesting skill in their efficient use.

CONTINUING MYSTERY

There is one continuing mystery in Vietnam, namely the reason for the Vietcong guerrillas' strange failure to take wide advantage of the South Vietnam Government's semiparalysis as a result of the most recent coup. It would have seemed the ideal time for massive assaults.

A growing theory is that the guerrilla movement has been hurt more than is generally realized, and compelled to slow down for a time in order to regather strength for another strong assault at widely scattered points.

Such an assault is still thought likely, the surprise being that it was not timed to take advantage of governmental confusion.

[From the Evening Star, Nov. 9, 1964]

VIETNAM VILLAGERS FIGHT ON

(By Marguerite Higgins)

MEKONG DELTA, SOUTH VIETNAM.—From the distance the boom of artillery sounded a steady reminder that the frontlines of the war were at hand.

A few rice paddies away there was the authoritative crackle of small arms fire which was, as to be expected, harassing the helicopter that was whirling down on the dirt road next to the quaint and charming little village of thatched roofs that now gave haven to the broken bodies of two American sergeants killed by an electrically detonated landmine.

It was a road of bitter memories, this muddy, tortured dirt lane surrounded by emerald green rice paddies and a deceptively lyrical and limpid stream in which the big-eyed children played, not even looking up when the angry machinegun bursts got close and mere adults looked for cover.

In the summer of 1963 there had been a nasty fire fight on the road, in which several

American reporters lost face but not much else when they made a run for it. In November 1963 this reporter revisited the road and its villages on the day that it claimed the lives of two United Nations agricultural workers. And now the death of the two sergeants.

FAMILIES FIGHT REDS

Yet, at the end of the road is a small village—Van Thien—whose 150 families have been overrun six times by the Vietcong and who still fight back. And one reason they fight back is because every day American advisers and Vietnamese soldiers, American aid teams and Vietnamese engineers defy the danger and travel back and forth with their guns and supplies and medicines to help Van Thien try to stay free.

And this is the real miracle of South Vietnam—this fact that somehow the war is still fought anywhere at all with devotion and sacrifice and hope despite the selfish joustings of the politicians in Saigon, the power plays of the military, the riots of the draft-dodging students and the political poisons spread by a handful of power-hungry Buddhist leaders whose intrigues are totally disapproved by the genuinely religious Buddhists here in the countryside.

Indeed, here in this section of the delta. I found the progress of the war far less depressing than I had expected. Chaos, lack of direction, arbitrary arrests, and purges have taken their toll, of course. But in giddy, gaudy Saigon the spoiled intellectuals and politicians do not know the Vietcong firsthand and can indulge their political death wishes with a garishly gay ignorance of what would happen to them if the Communists took over.

VIETCONG DEPREDACTIONS

But in Van Thien it is only a short moment in time since the Vietcong disemboweled the wife of the district chief and kidnapped 14 youngsters of the village. So long as there is the slightest hope of real and effective outside help against the Vietcong, the people will fight to keep them out of the Van Thiens of the delta.

Mytho is the headquarters for the 7th Vietnamese Division, which guards four key provinces in the delta. When I first visited Van Thien in the summer of 1963, it had just been liberated for the first time from a long period of Vietcong rule. And elsewhere in the delta, the fight against the Communists, while tough and hard, was beginning to show results. That summer perhaps 64 percent of the population in these key four provinces were under central Vietnamese control.

Then came the coup d'etat of November 1963, the murder of Diem and Nhu, the disintegration of the entire fabric of Vietnamese governmental structure, all of which was taken as a signal by the Vietcong to really go on the warpath. As a consequence, when this reporter revisited the 7th Division provinces in late November 1963, it had been impossible to even go near many areas that had been clean and clear of Vietcong the previous summer. By early 1964, the Vietnamese controlled less than 25 percent of these four provinces.

NEED TO START OVER

"And so," said the American colonel in Mytho, "we had to start over. By April, we got a new and less ambitious pacification program. Somehow despite the tumult in the cities the supplies kept coming. Everytime a new coup d'etat was rumored everything ground to a halt, of course.

"Slowly and painfully we have gone back into village after village. It has been heart-warming to see places where we began with deserted marketplaces and burned school-houses soon make a comeback and become bustling again. I think we can win this war against the Vietcong. I am an optimist.

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east Asia. Such a plan, they point out, would offer incredible promise to Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand as well as to South Vietnam, and it would offer equal promise to the people of North Vietnam, which only the continued belligerence and noncooperation of their Government could frustrate.

This, to me, sounds eminently sensible.

FOR A COMMITMENT TO VICTORY

If we decide to withdraw from Vietnam we can certainly find plenty of excuses to ease our path. We can blame it on the geography; or on the topography; or on local apathy; or on political instability; or on religious strife; or even on anti-Americanism. But that will fool no one but ourselves. These conditions make our success there difficult, but only our own timidity and vacillation can make it impossible.

It has become obvious that we cannot go on fighting this undeclared war under the rules laid down by our enemies. We have reached the point where we shall have to make a great decision, a decision as to whether we are to take the hard steps necessary to turn the tide in Vietnam or whether we are to refrain from doing so and thus lose inevitably by default.

The ultimate outcome of the cold war depends upon an affirmative decision to do whatever is necessary to achieve victory in South Vietnam. The events of recent weeks demonstrate again that the administration is not lacking in resolve and that it is rapidly approaching such a decision.

Whether that means a larger commitment of forces, or continued retaliatory strikes against the North, or carrying guerrilla warfare to the enemy homeland, or completely sealing off South Vietnam from Communist aid—I say to the administration, "Give us the plan that will do the job, and we will support you."

Whether our victory be near or far, can we, dare we, turn away or begin to turn away from the task before us, however frustrating or burdensome it may be?

Here surely is a time for us to heed Santayana's maxim "Those who will not learn from the past are destined to repeat it."

And so I speak today not merely to urge that we stand fast in Vietnam, but also to urge that we meet head on the new isolationism in its incipient stages, before the long months and years of discontent, frustration, and weariness that lie ahead have swelled the chorus urging disengagement and withdrawal to a deafening roar.

Let us expound a foreign policy nurtured in our constantly growing strength, not one fed by fear and disillusionment; a policy which each year is prepared to expend more, not less, in the cause of preserving our country and the decencies of man.

Let us insist upon a defense budget based upon the dangers we face abroad, not upon the benefits we seek at home.

Let us embrace a doctrine that refuses to yield to force, ever; that honors its commitments because we know that our good faith is the cement binding the free world together; a doctrine that recog-

nizes in its foreign aid program not only that the rich are morally obligated to help the poor, but also that prosperity cannot permanently endure surrounded by poverty, and justice cannot conquer until its conquest is universal.

Let us, above all, encourage and inspire a national spirit worthy of our history, worthy of our burgeoning, bursting strength, in our arms, in our agriculture, in industry, in science, in finance, a spirit of confidence, of optimism, of willingness to accept new risks and exploit new opportunities.

And let us remember that providence has showered upon our people greater blessings than on any other, and that, great though our works have been, much greater is expected of us.

In recent days, the free world has paid tribute to its greatest champion of our age, Winston Churchill.

It is a curious thing that though Churchill is acknowledged on all sides as the preeminent figure of our time and as the highest embodiment of Western statesmanship, he was, throughout his life, and remains today, a prophet unheeded, a statesman whom men venerate but will not emulate.

It may well be that Winston Churchill's greatest legacy will prove to be, not the legacy of his immortal deeds, but that of his example and his precepts; and that freemen of the future will pay him the homage denied by his contemporaries, the tribute of imitation and acceptance of his message.

As we ponder the passing of this heroic figure and reflect upon his career and try to draw from it lessons which we might apply to the aggressive onslaught that we face today in a hundred ways on a hundred fronts, we might take to heart this advice which he gave in the dark days of 1941 to the boys of Harrow, his old school:

Never give in. Never, never, never, never. Never yield to force and the apparently overwhelming might of the enemy. Never yield in any way, great or small, large or petty, except to convictions of honor and good sense.

Let us resolve to nail this message to the masthead of our ship of state in this year of decision.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the following documents: First, a summary of Communist violations of the Laotian armistice prepared for me by the Library of Congress; second, a copy of a statement released yesterday by the American Friends of Vietnam, under the caption of "A New Policy for Vietnam"; third, a copy of a telegram to the President from the Veterans of Foreign Wars; fourth, various newspaper clippings bearing on the situation in Vietnam.

There being no objection, the sundry documents were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
Washington, D.C., May 28, 1964.

To: Hon. THOMAS J. DODD.
From: Foreign Affairs Division.
Subject: List of violations by the Communist Pathet Lao of the Geneva armistice of 1961-62.

July 27, 1962: Laotian cease-fire committee of the three factions (neutralists, rightists, and pro-Communist Pathet Lao) reaches an

agreement on principles to implement a truce: forces of each faction will remain in their previous positions; frontline forces and military supplies are not to be increased; and troops of the three factions will not attack each other.

August 22, 1962: Several companies of pro-Communist Pathet Lao troops attack outposts of rightist forces near Sam Neua in northeastern Laos.

November 27, 1962: U.S. C-123 cargo plane, flying rice and other supplies to neutralist forces, is shot down over the Plaine des Jarres. Two American airmen are killed and one wounded. Investigation shows that the plane was shot down by dissident neutralist troops tied up with Pathet Lao.

April 4, 1963: Premier Souvanna Phouma announces that Pathet Lao troops have attacked neutralist troops of Gen. Kong Le in the Plaine des Jarres. On April 8 the U.S. State Department accuses the Pathet Lao of a serious violation of the cease-fire.

April 15, 1963: Following brief cease-fire, fighting breaks out again on the Plaine des Jarres. The neutralist forces of Gen. Kong Le are attacked and suffer new setbacks. On April 16 U.S. Under Secretary of State George Ball says that the United States does not rule out the possibility of sending troops into Laos if the situation should continue to deteriorate. Warnings are also issued by Secretary of State Dean Rusk on April 18 and President Kennedy on April 19.

May 3, 1963: Pathet Lao troops fire on two helicopters of the International Control Commission in the Plaine des Jarres, destroying one and wounding four occupants. On May 10, U.S. Ambassador Leonard Unger accuses the Pathet Lao of disrupting the peace and violating the Geneva accords, and he says that the United States will never leave Laos standing alone "to face its enemies from within and abroad."

May 21, 1963: Premier Souvanna Phouma issues communique stating that severe fighting has been going on for 2 days in the Plaine des Jarres between Pathet Lao troops and neutralist forces. On May 23, the ICC asks Britain and the Soviet Union to issue immediate appeal for a cease-fire on the Plaine des Jarres.

June 1, 1963: Premier Souvanna Phouma charges that Pathet Lao forces are continuing their attacks, resumed on May 30, against neutralist positions near the Plaine des Jarres.

September 7, 1963: U.S. C-47 unarmed cargo plane is shot down by Pathet Lao in central Laos. The government says they carry only rice and other relief supplies.

September 9, 1963: Fighting breaks out in Vientiane between the Pathet Lao and the rightist police force under Deputy Premier Phoumi Nosavan.

November 17, 1963: Cease-fire is broken as fighting resumes in the Plaine des Jarres. Talks between neutralist and Pathet Lao military leaders subsequently break down as the Pathet Lao rejects a proposal for the ICC to police the cease-fire.

January 29, 1964: Neutralist military headquarters reports that six Pathet Lao and four North Vietnamese battalions have launched an attack in southern Laos, have defeated neutralist and rightist forces at Na Kay, and are now heading toward the strategic post of Thakhek.

April 19, 1964: Military coup in Vientiane, organized by rightist army officers, ousts government of Premier Souvanna. Coup leaders give as reason for their action the premier's failure to establish peace in Laos.

May 15, 1964: The Laotian Government reports that Pathet Lao forces have seized Tha Thom, a key town about 90 miles northeast of Vientiane. It also reports that an attack on the defense perimeter of Pakxane is imminent. On May 16, Pathet Lao forces renew attacks on neutralist position on the Plaine des Jarres. A State Department spokesman

calls the new attacks a "flagrant and open violation" of the Geneva accords of 1961-62.

DAVID E. LOCKWOOD,
Analyst in Far Eastern Affairs.

A NEW POLICY FOR VIETNAM

(Statement by the American Friends of Vietnam)

THE DILEMMA

If we are to identify wisely our most effective forward course in Vietnam, it is important first to understand the exact nature of our dilemma there. We know the inherent generosity, both toward free Vietnam and its neighboring countries, which has led us to involve our substance and our blood. We know that but for our commitment, free Vietnam would long since have fallen into the political darkness and physical despair which oppresses Communist North Vietnam. We know that our presence there is in response to the wish of most segments of Vietnamese leadership, however they differ among themselves on other matters. We know that our presence there is earnestly desired by most neighboring countries of southeast Asia. We know that our purpose is to assist responsible and responsive government and to enable Vietnam and its neighbors to maintain national independence against external encroachment. We know that we have neither wished to "establish" nor "dominate" a Vietnamese government nor to seek for ourselves political, military, or economic advantage.

Our dilemma flows in part from the fact that this knowledge is not shared by all of the Vietnamese people, is not accepted by the members of the Vietcong, is not believed in parts of the less developed world still suffering the scars of recent colonial experience. Nor, in fact, is this understanding uniformly shared by our own people.

The dilemma is sharpened further by a spreading doubt among leadership elements in independent southeast Asian countries that the United States has staying power. Thailand's foreign minister, Thanat Khoman, recently warned members of the Overseas Press Club: "The Thai Government knows much better but some people are not sure we can depend on outside help—especially when there is so much talk of quitting and going home. The Communists have never spoken that line of quitting. When they go some place they stay there."

In part, at least, this skepticism is fostered by the doubt among some Americans that any valid purpose led to our presence in Vietnam in the first place.

THE ALTERNATIVES

The lack of public understanding flows in part from inadequate examination of the alternatives confronting the United States now. In our opinion there are six choices:

1. Continue as now. Whether or not the Vietcong are, in fact, increasing their effectiveness there is a growing conviction in Saigon, in the United States, and in much of the rest of the world, that this is so. This alone makes continuation of our present policy undesirable. The overriding hazard of the present policy is the undeniable fact that it has not provided sufficient psychological and political potency to sustain a Vietnamese Government.

2. Withdraw. This would violate our pledge not to abandon the Vietnamese people. It would manifest throughout the world a U.S. inability to long sustain an effort designed to frustrate Communist intentions. The implications would be read as eloquently in Berlin or in Cuba, as they would be in Vietnam, Indonesia, or India. There can be no question that this alternative would require the Governments of the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, India, Japan, to reassess totally present policy and to reorient toward what would be the dominating new facts of Asian life.

("Neutralization" of Vietnam is not suggested here for a simple reason; genuine and reliable neutralization of Vietnam is not possible at the present time. What is most often talked of in this connection is merely a rhetorical euphemism designed to make withdrawal more palatable. On the other hand, the proposals discussed here are valuable to part precisely because they do hold the promise that they may generate sufficient free Vietnamese vitality to make true and assured neutralization possible at some future time.)

3. Military cordon sanitaire across Vietnam and Laos. An estimated military force of up to 100,000 would be involved in making such a cordon truly effective and enemy penetration genuinely hazardous. Its greatest contribution would be in providing hard evidence of new determination to maintain southeast Asian integrity. Although military effect of interdicting the Vietcong's transport and supply may be limited, it is nonetheless one useful alternative, especially when employed with other steps outlined here.

4. Extend military action to the north. Until last week, steps taken in this direction were, in our judgment, not sufficiently explicit, either to rekindle Vietnamese faith in our intentions or to inspire confidence in other Asian countries that we are indeed willing to accept risk as the price of our commitment to freedom. The increased external, Communist intervention in South Vietnam has made it both reasonable and essential that there be a vigorous anti-Communist military response. The limited air strikes in North Vietnam by American and Vietnamese planes constituted such an appropriate response.

There are many other forms of stronger American action and involvement and they are not mutually exclusive. They include:

(a) Formation of an open, well-publicized North Vietnam liberation movement sponsoring major psychological operations programs, including paramilitary action, against the North Vietnamese regime.

(b) Establishment of an International Voluntary Corps dedicated to the maintenance of free nations in the Mekong basin. This corps should consist primarily of volunteers from Asian countries but may also contain a liberal admixture of Americans with military experience. Operating normally in small units with sufficient air support, this force—under the sponsorship of the proposed North Vietnam Liberation Movement—would harass the enemy wherever suitable targets exist, including targets within North Vietnam.

(c) Positioning of U.S. combat forces within South Vietnam to act as a general reserve—a sizable firefighting force. Such a military contingent (perhaps as many as two brigades) should not be used for routine combat or security duties, but as an immediate-reaction fighting force intended to engage Vietcong troops in fixed positions. Desirably, combat elements from other nations will be attached to this force.

(d) Continued bombing of selected military targets in North Vietnam. In contrast to the indiscriminate terrorist activity of the Vietcong in South Vietnam, the free world's concern for the Vietnamese people in both halves of the country make it undesirable for us to conduct warfare upon cities where the innocent will be hurt. However, those military targets in North Vietnam which are vital to their aggressive capability and which can be destroyed with our assistance are, in our view, legitimate targets for stage-by-stage destruction.

What is the risk involved in such action? In our judgment the possibility of Chinese involvement in South Vietnam would be only slightly increased. The possibility of Chinese help thrust upon North Vietnam would be greater. However, this probability may be

precisely what is needed to make clear to even the most Communist leaders of North Vietnam how undesirable such help is to them in the long run. A heightened awareness of this danger might, in fact, force greater restraint upon the Government in Hanoi than our present policy can achieve.

Frankly, however, the direct military damage inflicted on the Communist regime in North Vietnam is the lesser of our reasons for suggesting that these steps be undertaken. In our opinion, it is urgent that the people of free Vietnam be assured that President Johnson means what he says—that we mean to stay and help, no matter what risks we must incur. It is equally urgent that these intentions be understood also in Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, the rest of Asia, and the world. Staunch, long-term American commitment—fully communicated and understood—would provide a lift to morale in free Vietnam, inject new vitality in the Vietnamese Government and require a new assessment of the United States among neighboring countries and among Asian allies elsewhere.

There is one final reason we support this painful course of action. Basic requirements for victory in Vietnam are not primarily military. They are psychological, social, and economic. Below we address ourselves to instruments which can meet the nonmilitary aspects of the undertaking. But neither the economic nor political measures we propose will get off the ground without evidence of the seriousness of our military intention. Nor will our military commitment produce the desired results without the companion economic and psychological supports.

America's experience in relation to the instability in postwar Europe is clearly relevant. The Marshall plan did not begin to come to life until the physical security promised by NATO was added. Nor would NATO by itself have been meaningful without the human vision and economic future presented by the Marshall plan.

5. Forging a more popular or responsive government. It is clear that the difficulties confronting any Vietnamese Government under Communist attack are enormous. We can but sympathize with those who carry the burdens of government in circumstances so frustrating and continuously demanding. It is possible that 20 years of civil war, colonial war, and Communist insurrectionary war, have so debilitated the structure of government as to preclude the immediate possibility, no matter how desirable, of absolutely stable government. There are political personalities with nationalist backgrounds who are deserving of our help and encouragement. We must do what we can to help them and bring them forward. At the same time, we must help to diminish the present conflict of personalities that has proved in past years to be so destructive. In any event, we believe it is futile to concentrate, as we have in the past, on personalities, rather than on purposes, ideas, and institutions.

6. Injection of new purpose. If charismatic leadership is unavailable, charismatic purpose can be found. One aspect of that purpose involves the modest extension of military effort discussed above. It involves the clear demonstration that the United States means to remain committed even at enlarged risk. And such charismatic purpose must, of necessity, accept as workable "the best available choices of Vietnamese Government personnel"—choices made by the Vietnamese not by us. But our object would be to harness our military commitment and the Vietnamese effort to an infinitely larger objective than has previously motivated our participation. It would make crystal clear that the objectives which unite us with the Vietnamese people, as with our other allies on southeast Asia, are constructive and inextricably linked to the welfare of all southeast Asian peoples.

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and how much they have done to undermine the fight against Communists.

No stable government can be created in Vietnam without the participation and support of responsible Buddhist leadership. But this responsible leadership cannot be found among the handful of monks of questionable antecedents who have been misdirecting the militant Buddhist movement in the cities of Vietnam.

It is time to speak bluntly on this issue.

THE FALLACY OF THE FRENCH ANALOGY

Over and over again in recent months I have heard it said that our position in Vietnam is impossible because the French, who knew Vietnam so much better than we do, were compelled to admit defeat after 8 years of war against the Vietminh. A recent half-page advertisement in the New York Times asked: "How can we win in Vietnam with less than 30,000 advisers, when the French could not win with an army of nearly half a million?"

Our own position is entirely different from the French position in Indochina. The French were a colonial power, exploiting and imposing their will on the Indochinese people and stubbornly denying them their freedom. The French military effort in Indochina was doomed because it had against it not only the Communists but the overwhelming majority of the Indochinese people. It was a war fought by Frenchmen against Indochinese.

The United States, however, does not seek to impose its control on Vietnam or exploit Vietnam. We are not a colonial power. We seek only to help the people of South Vietnam defend their freedom against an insurgency that is inspired and directed and aided by the North Vietnamese Communists. This is understood by the Vietnamese people. And that is why hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese who fought with Ho Chi Minh against the French are today fighting for the Saigon government against the Vietcong.

That is why the war against the Vietcong can be won, while the war of French colonialism against the Indochinese independence movement was doomed from the outset. There is no similarity in the two situations that has any meaning or validity.

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

I believe the war in Vietnam can be won without a significant increase in our military effort. There are many things that can be done to improve the performance of our side, and most of them lie essentially in the nonmilitary field.

Let me set forth some of the things that I believe can be done.

THE NEED FOR IMPROVED LIAISON

One of the most obvious and most serious weaknesses of the American position in Vietnam is the lack of adequate liaison with the leaders of the various sectors of the Vietnamese community.

Because of this lack of communication, we have frequently been caught unawares by developments; we have remained without serious ability to influence them; and we have not been able to effectively assist the Vietnamese in com-

municating with each other and in stabilizing the political situation in Saigon.

No one person is to blame for this. It is, rather, the system which rotates military officers and AID officials and other Americans in Vietnam on an annual or 2-year basis.

As one American officer pointed out in a recent interview, "It takes about 8 months before you can really get to know the country and the people. And, just about the time you are beginning to understand something, you are rotated home and that is the end of your utility."

I believe that something can be done to improve this situation.

I have met a number of Americans, former soldiers and former AID officials, who have spent 5 years or more in Vietnam, have built up personal friendships with leaders of every sector of the Vietnamese community, enjoy the confidence of the Vietnamese because of their understanding and dedication, and who would jump at the opportunity to return to Vietnam for the purpose of helping it in this critical hour. I am told that there may be as many as 10 or 12 such people in this country.

I have proposed in a letter to the President that these Americans be constituted into a liaison group and that they be dispatched to Saigon immediately for the purpose of helping the Embassy to establish the broadest and most effective possible liaison with the army leaders, with the Buddhists, with the intellectual community, and with the Vietnamese political leaders.

I know that there is always a tendency on the part of World War II officers to resent World War I officers, and on the part of those who are involved in a situation today to resist the assistance of those who preceded them. There is also sometimes a tendency for those who were there yesterday to believe that they understand things better than those who are there today.

But this is a situation in which I am confident every American, no matter what his rank, will seek to rise above his personal prejudices. It is a situation that demands the utilization of every ounce of experience and dedication available to us.

It is my earnest personal conviction that the dispatch of such a liaison group to Saigon would result in an early improvement in our ability to communicate with the Vietnamese and in our ability to assist them in achieving the political stability which is essential to the successful prosecution of the war.

THE NEED FOR A STEPPED-UP POLITICAL WARFARE EFFORT

From many conversations with Vietnamese and with Americans who have served in various capacities in Vietnam, I am convinced that another one of our major weaknesses lies in the field of political warfare.

We have, by and large, been trying to meet the Communist insurgency by traditional military methods or by traditional methods slightly tailored to meet the special requirements of guerrilla warfare. In the field of political warfare, where the Communists have scored their most spectacular triumphs, our own ef-

fort has been limited, and halting, and amateurish, and, in fact, sadly ineffective.

The prime goal of political warfare, as it must be waged by freemen, is to win men's minds. The prime goal of political warfare, as it is waged by the Communists, is to erode and paralyze the will to resist by means of total error.

An effective political warfare program requires three major ingredients: First, a handful of basic slogans which capsule popular desires and which are capable of striking responsive chords in the hearts of the people; second, a propaganda apparatus capable of conveying this program both to those on the Government side and those on the side of the insurgents; third, specially trained cadres to direct the effort.

But the slogans we have are inadequate. Our propaganda program is dismally weak compared with that of the Communists. And according to my information, we still have not assisted the Vietnamese to set up an intensive training program in Communist cold war methods and how to counter them.

An article in the New York Times on August 3, 1964, pointed out that in every area "the basic cutting tool of the Vietcong is a squad of about 10 armed men and women whose primary function is propaganda." The article also said that "Most of the experts in psychological warfare and propaganda here believe the Vietcong's agitprop teams have done the Saigon government more damage than even the tough Vietcong regular battalions." Finally, the article made the point that according to estimates there were 320 Vietcong "agitprop" teams working in the country, against 20 "information teams" for the government side. This gave the Vietcong an edge of 16 to 1 in the field of propaganda personnel. And the edge was probably even greater in terms of finesse and effectiveness.

Even if we help the South Vietnamese Government intensify its propaganda effort, there would still remain the problem of basic goals and slogans.

I have pointed out that the Vietnamese people have a proud history and a strong sense of national unity. All Vietnamese, whether they live in the north or south, would like to see a unified and peaceful Vietnam. But as matters now stand, only the Communists are able to hold forth the prospect of the reunification of Vietnam. To date we have not given the South Vietnamese Government the green light to set up a "Committee for the Liberation of North Vietnam," as counterpart to the "Liberation Front" which the Communists have set up in the south. This places the South Vietnamese side at a grave disadvantage.

There are any number of patriotic North Vietnamese refugees who have been itching for the opportunity to set up a Liberation Committee for the North. The establishment of such a committee could, in my opinion, have an immediate and profound impact on the conduct of the war.

But above all, the situation in Vietnam underscores the need for an effective training program in political warfare,

for our own foreign service and military personnel so that they can help to communicate this knowledge to nationals of other countries who, like the South Vietnamese, are engaged in a life-and-death struggle for survival against the most cunning and most ruthless practitioners of political warfare history has ever known.

In this connection, I wish to bring to the attention of my colleagues the fact that there has been pending before Congress for some 6 years a bill calling for the establishment of a Freedom Academy. This would be an institution where Americans and citizens of other free countries could receive concentrated training in Communist techniques and operations, and in tactics and methods designed to frustrate the Communists at every operational level, from elections for the control of trade unions and student organizations, to street riots, to attempted insurrections.

The Senate Judiciary Committee in reporting this measure to the floor in May of 1960, described the bill as "one of the most important measures ever introduced in the Congress." But, unfortunately, although the bill was passed by the Senate, the House took no action.

When the bill was reintroduced for the third time in early 1963, it has the sponsorship of the following Senators: MUNDT, DOUGLAS, CASE, DODD, SMATHERS, Goldwater, PROXMIRE, FONG, HICKENLOOPER, MILLER, Keating, LAUSCHE, and SCOTT.

The distinguished senior Senator from South Dakota last Friday reintroduced the measure for the fourth time, and it is now lying on the table, so that those who wish to add their names as cosponsors may do so. It is my earnest hope that the measure will have the sponsorship of an even larger bipartisan group of Senators than it did in 1963. It is my hope too that there will be no further delay, no foot dragging, in enacting this long-overdue measure. It is time, high time, that we recognize the imperative need to equip ourselves and our allies with the knowledge and the trained personnel required to meet the Communist onslaught.

CARRYING THE GUERRILLA WAR TO THE NORTH

First of all, I think there is a growing acceptance of the need for punishing the North with hit-and-run raids. It would be much more effective if these raids could be carried out in the name of a North Vietnamese Liberation Front than in the name of the South Vietnamese Government.

Second, I have reason for believing that increasing consideration is being given to the need for countering the Vietcong insurgency in the South with a guerrilla warfare effort in the North.

In May of 1961, when I returned from Laos and Vietnam, I made a statement, which I should like to repeat today:

The best way for us to stop Communist guerrilla action in Laos and in South Vietnam is to send guerrilla forces into North Vietnam; to equip and supply those patriots already in the field; to make every Communist official fear the just retribution of an outraged humanity; to make every Communist arsenal, government building, commu-

nications center and transportation facility a target for sabotage; to provide a rallying point for the great masses of oppressed people who hate communism because they have known it. Only when we give the Communists more trouble than they can handle at home, will they cease their aggression against the outposts of freedom.

I believe that every word I said in 1961 is doubly valid today. It is not too late to embark upon such a program. And if we do give the South Vietnamese Government the green light to embark upon it on an effective, hard-hitting scale, again I think it would add significantly to the psychological impact of the entire program if all guerrilla activities were carried out in the name of the "Committee for the Liberation of the North."

A FEW MILITARY SUGGESTIONS

I do not pretend to be a military expert. But I have discussed the situation in Vietnam with a number of military men of considerable experience in the area, and I have been encouraged to believe that the several suggestions which I have to make in this field are realistic.

I submit them for the consideration of my colleagues, because I think they make sense.

My first proposition is that we cannot regard the war in Vietnam in isolation from the rest of southeast Asia.

The Communist Party over which Ho Chi Minh presided for many years was the Communist Party of Indochina. Indeed, to this day, there is no such thing as a Communist Party in Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh's thinking and strategy are directed toward the reunification of all the former territories of French Indochina under his personal sway. This makes it imperative for us to develop a coordinated strategy for the entire area if we are to cope effectively with the Communist strategy.

Proposition No. 2 is that there are certain dramatic military actions open to us that do not involve the territory of North Vietnam.

The hub of the Ho Chi Minh trail is the town of Tchepone, inside the Laotian frontier, just south of the 17th parallel, the dividing line between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Through Tchepone pour most of the reinforcements and equipment from North Vietnam. From Tchepone the men and equipment are infiltrated into South Vietnam along hundreds of different jungle trails.

I recall that when I met with President Diem in April of 1961, he urged that the Americans assist him and the Laotian Government in preemptive action to secure three key centers in the Laotian Panhandle—Tchepone, Saravane, and Attopeu—in order to prevent the large-scale infiltration which is today taking place. I still have a copy of the marked map which he gave me in outlining his project. Had Diem's advice been followed there would have been no Ho Chi Minh trail. But this was at the time of the Laotian armistice and we were not disposed to take any actions which might provoke the Laotian Communists. So nothing was done.

The seizure of Tchepone by Laotian and Vietnamese forces, with American

air support would, I have been assured, be a feasible military operation and one that could be carried out with the means available to us on the spot. It would do more to put a crimp in the Ho Chi Minh trail than any amount of bombing we could attempt. And it would have as dramatic an impact on the situation in Laos as on the situation in Vietnam.

Finally, there is the matter of collective action by the SEATO nations.

As late as April of 1961, the SEATO nations in the immediate area of the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and Pakistan—all favored common action against the Communist menace in Laos. But the British and French were opposed to such action, and we ourselves sat on the fence; and the result was that nothing was done.

The charter of SEATO will have to be modified so that one nation cannot veto collective action by all the other nations. Britain, I am inclined to believe, would now be disposed to support collective action by SEATO because of the situation in Malaysia. But, perhaps France should be invited to leave SEATO, on the grounds that she has no vital interests in the area, and her entire attitude toward Red China is one of appeasement. In view of the fact that something has to be done immediately, however, the sensible course is to encourage collective action by the free nations in the area, outside the framework of SEATO, until SEATO can be reorganized in a manner that makes it effective.

In this connection, I am most encouraged by the news that South Korea has decided to send a contingent of several thousand military engineers to South Vietnam, and the Philippines have decided to do likewise. It is infinitely better from every standpoint to have Asian troops supporting the Vietnamese forces against the Vietcong on the ground, than it is to have American troops actively involved.

THE NEED FOR UNDERSCORING OUR LONG-TERM COMMITMENT

The retaliatory strikes ordered by President Johnson against the North have had the effect of reiterating our commitment in a manner that the Communists understand; and this, in the long run, is probably more important than the damage wrought by these strikes.

But if the Communists are to be discouraged from continuing this costly war, we must seek every possible means of underscoring our determination to stand by the people of South Vietnam, to pay whatever cost may be necessary, and to take whatever risk may be necessary to prevent the Communists from subjugating the Vietnamese people and other people in the area.

It is important to reiterate our resolve at every opportunity. And it is even more important to translate this resolve into hard political and military actions.

The American Friends of Vietnam have suggested another dramatic measure. They have suggested a commitment to a massive southeast Asian development program based on the harnessing of the Mekong River—a kind of Tennessee Valley Authority for south-

For some strange reason, the torture of one Vietcong prisoner aroused far more indignation in our country than the assassination of scores of thousands of innocent civilians by the Vietcong Communists, including the bombing of a schoolbus in which a score of children died.

But, if the Vietnamese people are anti-Communist, I have been asked: Why has the Vietnamese Army put up so poor a show?

The Vietnamese Army has been handicapped by political instability by the frequent shifts of officers, by poor staff work, by its inadequate use of scouts and security patrols, and by the many disadvantages under which counter-guerrilla forces must always operate. But, it is simply not true that the Vietnamese Army has shown no willingness to fight.

They have fought bravely in thousands of engagements. They have taken heavy casualties and inflicted much heavier casualties on the enemy.

The belief that the Vietnamese people do not have the will to resist the Communists and that the Vietnamese forces have fought poorly against them, is in large measure due to the unfortunate emphasis which the press always places on disasters and defects.

It probably also springs in part from the traditional attitude of the American newspaperman that it is his duty to mercilessly expose every weakness in his city government, in his State government, in his National Government.

I do not complain about that. I suppose that is the way it has to be.

But whatever the reasons may be, the emphasis in the press has been so misleading that even knowledgeable members of the administration have been confused by it. For example, a member of the administration who very recently visited Vietnam informed me that, contrary to his impressions from reading the press he was amazed to learn that in eight engagements of battalion size and larger which took place during the month of January 1965, the Vietnamese Army got the better of the engagement in every single case.

I have here the comparative figures for Vietnamese and Vietcong casualties for the 3-year period 1962-64, which I have received from an official source. I wish to read them, Mr. President, because they throw an altogether new light on the situation in Vietnam. I do not know why these figures were not released long ago. I hear people complaining that they do not know what is going on in Vietnam. The release of these figures would have helped them to understand.

In 1962 the Vietnamese Army lost 4,400 killed in action against 21,000 Vietcong killed, and 1,300 prisoners against 5,500 captives taken from the Vietcong.

Those are pretty good statistics. They ought to be read and studied by persons who are saying the South Vietnamese have no will to fight.

Listen to these further figures:

In 1963 the figures were 5,700 Vietnamese soldiers killed in action against 21,000 Vietcong, and 3,300 missing or captured against 4,000 Vietcong captured.

And even last year, when the fortunes of war turned against the Vietnamese government, the Vietnamese Army killed 17,000 Vietcong against a loss of 7,000 men, and took 4,200 Communists captive against 5,800 captives lost to them.

To those who say that the Vietnamese Army has not shown the will to resist, I point out that, over the 3-year period for which I have presented figures, this army suffered a total death toll of 17,000 men, which is almost as high as the total American toll in South Korea. The enemy's casualties have been much heavier. But the Communists have continued to attack regardless of losses. And because it has not been possible to reconstitute a stable government since the overthrow of Diem, and because no one knows where guerrillas may strike next, and because unlimited terror is a dreadfully effective instrument, the Vietcong, over the past 15 months, have been able to make most of the Vietnamese countryside insecure.

The fact that the Vietcong seem to be winning and that they have been so effective in resisting government counterattacks, has led some people to believe that the Vietcong soldier is convinced of the justice of his cause and that this is why he fights more grimly.

The Communists are masters of the art of imposing iron discipline by means of unlimited terror.

Senators will recall that during the Korean war we all marveled at the discipline of the Chinese Communist soldiers who kept on marching without breaking step while they were being bombed and strafed by American planes, or who attacked our positions, wave upon wave, apparently oblivious to casualties.

I remember people saying, "See the dedication of these Chinese Communists. See how they bear themselves against bullets and bombs. See how fanatically they believe in their cause." I did not think that was the reason, but I did not have an effective answer until after the war was over.

Senators will recall the terrible riots in the Kojie prisoner-of-war camp, when the prisoners seemed so grimly united against us that for weeks on end American soldiers could not venture into the POW compound. Again, the common assumption was that the prisoners were all fanatical Communists.

But then the end of the war came—and it turned out that 20,000 out of 25,000 of the Communist prisoners in our hands asked for refugee status rather than return to North Korea or China. And these were supposed to be the dedicated Communists who believe so fanatically in communism.

Of the 5,000 who returned home, there is reason to believe that the majority did so with heavy hearts, because of strong family ties and not because of any love for communism.

I remind the Senators—because these things tend to be forgotten—of the evidence which emerged that the Kojie prisoners of war had been terrorized by a tiny minority of Communist militants who ran the camp with an iron hand, torturing political opponents, staging

kanaroo courts, and executing and burying those who were sentenced.

I also remind them of the scenes that took place when the prisoners were brought before the Communist interrogators under the procedures set up by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The prisoners had to be dragged before the interrogators forcibly, their arms pinned behind their backs by Indian soldiers. When the Communist interrogators spoke to them, urging that they return to their homeland, the prisoners spat out their hatred with a vehemence that Western observers found frightening. So embarrassing were the interrogations for the Communists that after a number of sessions they decided to call off the whole show.

In the light of this conclusion, how much significance can one attach to the seemingly fanatical courage displayed by the Chinese and North Korean soldiers in attacking our positions, or to the grim unity of the Kojie prisoners of war in resisting their American captors?

Before we marvel at the apparently high morale of the Vietcong forces in South Vietnam, I suggest that we recall the experience of the Korean war, because the evidence is overwhelming that the Vietcong Communists are using terror on the same scale and in the same manner that it was employed on the Korean battlefield and in the prisoner-of-war camps.

That the morale of the Vietcong forces is not 10 feet tall is demonstrated by the substantial number of Vietcong prisoners taken over the past 3 years. It is demonstrated even more dramatically by the fact that from February 1963 through the end of 1964 there were approximately 17,000 Vietcong defections. The number of defections would be far larger, I am certain, if a stable government could establish itself in Saigon.

It is interesting to note that, while most of the defectors have been young peasants who were conscripted by the Vietcong, their ranks also include North Vietnamese officers who were told that they were going south to fight the Americans and who broke when they discovered that they were fighting their own people.

Impatient constituents have sometimes asked me why the Communists have been able to plan elaborate attacks on our airfields and other installations without advance intelligence reaching us from members of the local population who must have observed the Communists.

The instrument of terror is also applicable to the control of the civilian population. Whenever the Communists take over a village or a town, they systematically massacre all known anti-Communist leaders and those who are suspected of informing. They frequently mutilate their bodies as an example to the people. If we could give the Vietnamese villagers a feeling of greater security, I am sure that more intelligence would be forthcoming. As matters now stand, the average Vietnamese peasant fears that the Communists are going to win the war, and he knows the terrible punishment that awaits those who inform on the Communists. This is why our in-

telligence has admittedly been inadequate—one of the reasons, certainly. But this is a situation that could change dramatically if we succeeded in convincing the Vietnamese people of our determination to help them retain their freedom, and if we succeeded in inflicting a number of significant defeats on the enemy.

THE BUDDHIST FALLACY

I now wish to discuss the Buddhist situation, about which we have heard for several years now.

The myth of Buddhist persecution and the parallel myth that the Buddhists are opposed to the Government, have because of the so-called militant Buddhist movement, become important political factors in Vietnam. It is, therefore, important that we should seek to understand the nature of this movement, the motivation of its leaders, and the real degree of influence it exerts over the Vietnamese people.

It is, indeed, idle to debate the subject of Vietnam and our policy there and not understand the so-called Buddhist problem. There has been much loose talk about it, but there has thus far been little hard, factual information.

The campaign which resulted in the overthrow of President Diem was marked by the charge that he had subjected the Buddhist religion to inhuman persecution; and, in protest against this alleged persecution, a number of Buddhist monks went through the horrifying ritual of self-immolation.

Week after week, month after month, the American people and the people of the world were inundated with stories supporting the charge that Diem was persecuting the Buddhist religion. There were a number of experienced correspondents of national reputation who challenged the authenticity of these stories. But their voices were drowned by the torrent of charges and allegations that appeared in some of our major newspapers, and that were lent further credence because of repetition of our official information agencies.

At the invitation of President Diem, the U.N. General Assembly decided to send a factfinding mission to South Vietnam to look into the situation. I find this rarely referred to in any discussion of the Buddhist question, but it is a fact that the United Nations did send a mission over there.

While the mission was still in the country, President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were overthrown and assassinated.

The mission decided that the overthrow of Diem made it unnecessary to come up with a formal finding. I believe that this was most regrettable. But the summary of the testimony which it had taken in Vietnam pointed strongly to the conclusion that the persecution of the Buddhists was either nonexistent or vastly exaggerated and that the agitation was essentially political. This, in essence, was what I was told in a personal conversation with Ambassador Fernando Volio Jimenez, of Costa Rica, who had introduced the motion calling for the setting up of the U.N. mission and who served as a member of it.

I went to New York and saw Ambassador Volio. I said, "Mr. Ambassador, I understand you were a member of the United Nations commission which went to Vietnam. I should like to ask you what the facts are." Ambassador Volio gave me the facts as I have given them to you here.

Ambassador Pinto, of Dohomey, another member of the U.N. mission, expressed himself in similar terms in public.

The entire tragic story suggests that the free world was made the victim of a gigantic propaganda hoax, as a result of which the legitimate government of President Diem was destroyed and a chaotic situation created which has inevitably played into the hands of the Communists.

If Senators have not yet had time to read the report of the U.N. factfinding mission to Vietnam, I urge them to do so because it throws essential light on the current activities of the militant Buddhists. I am arranging to have copies mailed to every Senator, and I hope that all Senators will read it, because they will learn a great deal about the present Buddhist situation from it.

The first fact which needs to be established in evaluating the militant Buddhist movement is that the Buddhists do not constitute 80 or 85 percent of the population, as was widely reported at the time of the Buddhist crisis. According to Dr. Mai Tho Truyen, one of the greatest authorities on Vietnam Buddhism, the Vietnamese Buddhists number approximately 4 million people, or about 30 percent of the population.

The second point that must be made is that the militant Buddhists constitute only a small fraction of the total Buddhist population. The millions of the Buddhist peasants, in their great majority, do not approve of the militant political actions and the government-toppling intrigues of the Buddhist militants in Saigon. Their activities, indeed, run completely counter to the pacific traditions of the Buddhist religion.

It is questionable whether the Buddhist militants have been able to mobilize as many as 50,000 active supporters in all the demonstrations they have staged in Saigon and Hue and other cities. But because political power resides in the cities, the several tens of thousands of Buddhist militants, by their clamor and their persistent demonstrations and their clever propaganda, have succeeded in creating the impression that they speak for the people of the cities and for the majority of the people of Vietnam.

What do the Buddhist militants want? Before the overthrow of President Diem, Thich Tri Quang told Marguerite Higgins frankly: "We cannot get an arrangement with the north until we get rid of Diem and Nhu."

The evidence is clear that Thich Tri Quang and some of his other militants are still bent on an agreement with the north. Indeed, only last Friday, Quang called for U.S. negotiations with Ho Chi Minh.

If there is reason to believe that Thich Tri Quang is a neutralist, there is even more reason for fearing that some of the

other members of the Buddhist opposition movement are openly pro-Communist or that they have become tools of the rather substantial Communist infiltration which is known to exist in the Buddhist clergy in the various countries of Asia.

That such an infiltration should exist is not surprising because there are no barriers to it.

A man who wants to become a Buddhist monk does not have to prepare himself for his ministry by engaging in studies, nor does he have to be ordained, nor does he take any vow.

He simply shaves his head and dons the saffron robe and enters a monastery—and overnight he becomes one of the religious elite.

When he wishes to leave the monastery, he sheds his robe and leaves it; if he wishes to reenter, he dons his robe again and reenters. That is all there is to it.

I do not criticize this procedure on religious grounds.

Buddhism is one of the great religions of mankind and much can be said for an arrangement that enables every man of religious disposition to spend at least a portion of his life under the voluntary monastic discipline characteristic of Buddhism.

But, regrettably, it is a procedure that leaves the door wide open to Communist infiltration.

I remember that when we were digging into the files of the Nazis at Nuremberg, we found that Hitler had under consideration a program of infiltrating the churches by inducing young people to enter seminaries, so that he could have them at his disposal.

When I first began to hear of the Buddhist situation, it occurred to me that more than likely there was a similar infiltration of religion at work.

The militant Buddhists have used the influence and prestige which accrued to them from the overthrow of Diem for the prime purpose of making stable government impossible: in this sense, whatever the intent of their leaders, they have been serving the desires of the Communist Vietcong.

They have organized demonstrations, provoked riots, inflamed passions with highly publicized fasts and self-immolations, and subjected the government to a ceaseless propaganda barrage. They overthrew the Khanh government. Then they overthrew the Huong government which succeeded it. And they seem to be intent on making things impossible for any government that may come to power.

It is, of course, difficult to deal with a political conspiracy that camouflages itself in religious robes. In any case, this is a matter for the Vietnamese Government and not for our own Government. But it would make matters immeasurably easier for the Vietnamese authorities if the true facts about Buddhism in Vietnam were given to the American people and if they could be helped to understand how little the Buddhist militants really represent, how nefarious their political activities have really been,

Polish Communist member consistently refused to investigate reports of North Vietnamese intervention in South Vietnam. In this way, this entire massive body of evidence of Hanoi's intervention in South Vietnam was muted and rendered ineffective.

In order to understand the war in Vietnam, we have to get away from traditional concepts in which armies with their own insignias cross clearly marked national demarcation lines after their governments have duly declared war.

Communist guerrilla warfare is waged without any declaration of war. In the case of Vietnam, it is waged from external sanctuaries which claim immunity to attack because the state which harbors them has not formally declared war.

It blends military cadres who have infiltrated into the country with native dissidents and conscripts, in a manner which conceals the foreign instigation of the insurgency, and which enables the Communists to pretend that it is merely a civil war.

It is time that we nail the civil war lie for what it is. It is time that we recognized it as a form of aggression as intolerable as open aggression across marked frontiers.

Why did Ho Chi Minh decide to launch the current war for the liberation of South Vietnam? The answer to this question is really very simple.

After the Geneva agreement, it had been the expectation of the Communists that South Vietnam would collapse in administrative and political chaos before many months had passed, and that it would fall into their hands like an overripe plum. Indeed, when Ngo Dinh Diem took office as Premier after the surrender of North Vietnam to the Communists, 99 percent of the Western press viewed the situation in South Vietnam as hopeless and predicted an early takeover by the Communist guerrillas.

Cut off from the mineral and industrial riches of the north; swamped by an influx of 1 million refugees; without an adequate army or administration of its own; with three major sects, each with private armies, openly challenging its authority—confronted with this combination of burdens and handicaps, it seemed that nothing could save the new born South Vietnamese Government.

But then there took place something that has properly come to be called the Diem miracle; this term was used at different times by President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara prior to Diem's overthrow, which most people, I believe, now realize was a tragic mistake.

Diem first of all moved to destroy the power of the infamous Binh Xyuen, a sect of river pirates who, under the French, were given a simultaneous monopoly on the metropolitan police force of Saigon and on the thousands of opium dens and houses of prostitution and gambling that flourished there.

So powerful was the Binh Xyuen and so weak were the Diem forces at the time that even the American Ambassador urged Diem not to attack them.

Diem, however, did attack them and drove them out of Saigon.

Having defeated the military sects and integrated them into the Armed Forces of the republic, Diem within a few years was able to resettle the 1 million refugees and to create a stable unified state where none had previously existed.

I could not help feeling indignant over an article on Vietnam which appeared some time ago in the Washington Star. The author, Prof. Bernard Fall, who wrote the article in ill-concealed admiration of what the Communists had done in their area of Vietnam, mentioned the fact that the Communists had built schools for the people. What he did not mention was that from 1955 to 1963 President Diem has doubled the number of students in elementary schools, while at the secondary school level the increase has been fivefold.

The remarkable progress in the field of education was no exception. The entire South Vietnamese society scored remarkable advances in every field of economic and social endeavor, so that in 1963 South Vietnam for the first time had a sizable rice surplus for export. There were significant increases in all sectors of industry and agriculture, and a 20-percent rise in per capita income.

Meanwhile, in North Vietnam, things were going from bad to worse. As in every other Communist country the collectivization of the peasants resulted in a dramatic reduction of food output and in chronic food shortages throughout the country. The resentment of the peasants was compounded by the brutal and indiscriminate punishment of hundreds of thousands of peasant farmers who were hauled before so-called people's courts and charged with being bourgeois elements or exploiting landlords. During the course of 1955 peasant revolts broke out in several areas. There was even a revolt in Ho Chi Minh's own village. And there was some evidence that the troops sent to suppress these revolts sometimes sympathized with the peasants. Shortages increased year by year. The people became increasingly apathetic.

The contrast between the growing prosperity of the South and the growing misery in the North confronted the Vietnamese Communists with a challenge they could not tolerate. That is why they decided that they had to put an end to freedom in South Vietnam. While they have scored some sensational victories in their war of subversion against the South Vietnamese Government, I think it important to point out that this war has gravely complicated the already serious internal difficulties of the North, so that in 1963, for example, the per capita output of rice in Communist North Vietnam was 20 percent lower than in 1960.

And I also consider it important to understand the significance of the fact that the Vietcong insurgency was directed not against a government that had failed to improve the lot of its people but against a government which, over a short period of time, had scored some of the most dramatic economic and

social advances recorded anywhere in Asia.

ESCALATION: FACT AND FALLACY

There has been a good deal of talk about the United States escalating the war in South Vietnam. Several Senators who spoke last week warned that if we escalate the war by means of air strikes against North Vietnam, the escalation may get out of hand and wind up as a war with Red China or perhaps even a world war.

But it is not we who have escalated the war; it is the Communists. Peiping and Hanoi have been busy escalating the war in South Vietnam for several years now. They have sent in tens of thousands of soldiers of the North Vietnamese Army; they have trained additional tens of thousands of dissident South Vietnamese; they have supplied them with massive quantities of equipment; and they have stepped up the tempo of their attacks against the Vietnamese people.

Now we are told that if we take any action against the territory of North Vietnam, which has mounted and directed the entire attack on South Vietnam, it will entail the risk of world war.

If the Communists are always to be permitted the privilege of escalating their attempts to take over new countries, while we shrink from retaliation for fear of further escalation, we might as well throw in the sponge now and tell the Communists the world is theirs for the taking.

I find it difficult to conceive of Red China sending in her armies in response to air strikes against carefully selected military targets. After all, if they did so, they would be risking retaliation against their highly vulnerable coastal cities, where most of Red China's industry is concentrated. They would be risking setting back their economy 10 or 20 years.

Moreover, both the Chinese Communists and the Hanoi Communists are aware that the massive introduction of Chinese troops would create serious popular resentment because of the traditional Vietnamese suspicion of Chinese imperialism.

That there will be no invasion of the North by Vietnamese and American forces can, I believe, be taken as axiomatic. Nor do I believe there will be any large-scale involvement of American troops on the Korean model. We will have to continue to provide the Vietnamese with logistical support and air support, as we are doing now. But on the ground, the fighting can most effectively be done by the Vietnamese armed forces, supported, I believe, by military contingents from the other free Asian countries.

THE FALLACY THAT THE ASIAN PEOPLES DO NOT KNOW THE MEANING OF FREEDOM

It has been stated by the senior Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] and by other critics of our foreign policy in Vietnam that it is pointless to talk about fighting for freedom in Asia because the Asian people historically do not know the meaning of freedom. It has even been implied that, because of their ignorance

of freedom and their indifference to it, communism exercises a genuine attraction for the peoples of Asia.

I am sure that most Asians would consider this analysis condescending and offensive. I myself would be disposed to agree with them. It is an analysis which, in my opinion, is false on almost every score.

We have grown accustomed to equating freedom with the full range of freedoms that we in the United States today enjoy. But, in the world in which we live, the word "freedom" has at least three separate and perhaps equally important connotations.

First, there is national freedom, or independence from foreign control.

Second, there is freedom of speech and press and the other freedoms inherent in parliamentary democracy, such as we enjoy.

And, third, there is the type of natural freedom that is enjoyed by primitive peasants and tribesmen in many backward countries, even under political autocracies.

It is true that most Asian governments are autocratic; and it is probably true that the Vietnamese people do not understand or appreciate freedom in the sense of parliamentary democracy. But they certainly understand the meaning of "freedom" when the word is used to mean independence from foreign rule. They are, in fact, a people with a long and proud history and a strong sense of national identity. Every Vietnamese schoolboy knows that his people fought and triumphed over the hordes of Genghis Khan in defense of their freedom and he also knows that his country was free for five centuries before the French occupation. Finally, he knows and takes pride in the fact that his people drove out the French colonialists despite their army of 400,000 men. Do not tell me that these people know nothing about freedom.

To the westernized Saigonese intellectuals, freedom of speech and freedom of the press are certainly very real issues; and even though they may have not mastered the processes, they would unquestionably like to see some kind of parliamentary democracy in their country. It is completely understandable that they should have chafed over the political controls that existed under the Diem government, and that have existed, in one degree or another, under succeeding governments.

But in the countryside, where the great mass of the people reside, the political controls that exist in the city are meaningless. The peasant is free to own his own land, to dispose of his produce, to worship according to his beliefs, to guide the upbringing of his children, and to elect his local village officials. To him, these freedoms that touch on his everyday life are the freedoms that really count, not the abstract and remote freedoms of constitutional and federal government.

And, if on top of granting him these natural freedoms, the government assists him by building schools and dispensaries and by providing seed and fertilizer, then, from the standpoint of the

southeast Asian peasant, his life is full and he is prepared to fight to defend it against the Communists.

It is, in short, completely untrue that the Vietnamese people and the other peoples of Asia do not know the meaning of freedom. And it is equally untrue that communism is acceptable to the Asian peasant because of his indifference to freedom.

Communism has never been freely accepted by any people, anywhere, no matter how primitive.

It has never been accepted for the simple reason that even primitive peoples do not enjoy being pushed around and brutalized and terrorized, and told what to do and what not to do, and having their every activity ordered and supervised by political commissars.

This is why communism must govern by means of ruthless dictatorship wherever it takes power.

This is why the primitive mountain peoples of both Laos and Vietnam have, in an overwhelming majority, sided against the Communists.

This is why there are almost 8 million refugees from Communist rule in Asia today—people who have seen the reality of the so-called People's Democracy, and who have given up everything they possessed and frequently risked their lives to escape from it.

That is why there is barbed wire and iron curtains surrounding the Communist countries. The inhabitants of the Communist countries would all leave if they could.

There is one final comment I would like to make while dealing with this subject. Too often I have heard it said that the Vietnamese people are not fighting because there is nothing to choose between communism and the kind of government they now have.

To equate an authoritarian regime like that in South Vietnam, or Taiwan, or Thailand with the totalitarian rule of communism is tantamount to losing all sense of proportion. Not only have these regimes never been guilty of the massive bloodletting and total direction of personal life which has characterized Communist rule in every country, but, carefully examined, it will turn out that these regimes are a mixture of natural democracy at the bottom with political controls of varying rigidity at the top.

Even at their worst, the political autocracies that exist in certain free Asian countries are a thousand times better than communism from the standpoint of how they treat their own people. And at their best, some of these autocracies have combined control of the press and political parties with remarkably progressive social programs.

But perhaps more important from our standpoint is that these free autocracies, for lack of a better term, do not threaten the peace of their neighbors or of the world or threaten our own security, whereas world communism has now become a threat of terrifying dimensions.

THE FALLACY THAT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE HAVE NO WILL TO RESIST COMMUNISM

We have been told that the Vietnamese people are indifferent to communism;

that they resist it only halfheartedly. Some commentators have even sought to create the impression that America is in a position of coercing the South Vietnamese to fight against communism.

This estimate of the attitude of the South Vietnamese people is totally false.

True, South Vietnam is suffering from political instability.

True, the war against the Vietcong is going badly.

But these things by themselves do not constitute proof that the Vietnamese people are indifferent to communism or that they do not have the will to resist.

The people of South Vietnam are, in fact, one of the most anti-Communist peoples in the world. Among them are more than 1 million refugees who sacrificed everything they possessed to flee from North Vietnam to South Vietnam after the country was divided by the Geneva agreement of 1954; and it is estimated that there are another 300,000 internal refugees who have fled from Communist-controlled areas in the south. Among the present population of 14 million, in addition, there are several million peasants and workers and students who have at one time or another borne arms against the Communists, some of them in the Vietnamese Army, the majority in village self-defense units.

The overwhelming majority of the people of South Vietnam know what communism means because they have experienced it on their own backs. There are indeed very few South Vietnamese who do not have friends or relatives who have been the victims of Communist brutality and terror.

Let me tell the story of one such act of Communist terror, because statistics by themselves tend to be meaningless.

In the village of Phu Hoa, there was a teenage girl by the name of Giau, the pride of her parents and a born leader of others. As a member of the Republican Youth Organization, she organized the village youth and gave talks. On the evening of January 15, 1962, she was abducted from her village by Vietcong soldiers. The next morning her mutilated and decapitated body—I have a photograph of it—was discovered in the roadway outside the village with a note on her breast captioned "Death Sentence for Giau," and signed by the "People's Front of Liberation."

For a long period of time, assassinations such as this were going on at the rate of some 500 a month, or 6,000 a year. The victims were most frequently active supporters of government, local administrators, village heads, and schoolteachers. The families of village militiamen were another favorite target. The Vietcong would entice the militia away from the village—and when they returned they would find their wives and children massacred.

While the facts of these mass assassinations are not generally known in our country, they are known in Vietnam. And this is one of the reasons why the Vietnamese people hate the Communists, and why they continue to resist them despite the chronic political instability in Saigon and despite the seeming hopelessness of their situation.

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I suggested to Senators that a train wreck had occurred in which 100 persons had lost their lives, or a shipwreck in which 150 had lost their lives, or some common disaster with hundreds or even thousands of lives lost, we would react, we would feel it. But if I suggested that 1 million murders had taken place, our minds would not be able to grasp the enormity of such a crime.

Perhaps that is just as well. There must be built into our intellectual mechanism some kind of governor. Unfortunately, while it is probably saving us from insanity, the fact that our minds cannot comprehend the murder of 1 million people or 40 million people serves as a protective asset to the perpetrator of such an evil deed. It does not make the crime any less horrible. It simply makes our task that much more difficult.

Even after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin confirmed all the essential charges that had been made against the Soviet regime, men of good will in the Western World refused to believe that the Communist regime could be so evil. They refused to believe, because it is difficult for them to conceive of horror and brutality on such a mass scale.

To those who refuse to believe, I would like to read the eloquent words penned by Dr. Julius Margolin, a prominent Jewish leader in prewar Lithuania, one of the scores of thousands of Lithuanians deported to Soviet slave labor camps after the Soviet occupation of his country. When he was released after 7 years in the camps, Dr. Margolin wrote:

Until the fall of 1939, I had assumed a position of benevolent neutrality toward the U.S.S.R. . . . The last 7 years have made me a convinced and ardent foe of the Soviet system. I hate this system with all the strength of my heart and all the power of my mind. Everything I have seen there has filled me with horror and disgust which will last until the end of my days. I feel that the struggle against this system of slavery, terrorism, and cruelty which prevails there constitutes the primary obligation of every man in this world. Tolerance or support of such an international shame is not permissible for people who are on this side of the Soviet border and who live under normal conditions. . . .

Millions of men are perishing in the camps of the Soviet Union. . . . Since they came into being, the Soviet camps have swallowed more people, have executed more victims, than all the other camps—Hitler's included—together; and this lethal engine continues to operate full blast.

And those who in reply only shrug their shoulders and try to dismiss the issue with vague and meaningless generalities, I consider moral abettors and accomplices of banditry.

Let those who talk of getting out of Vietnam for the ostensible purpose of saving human lives weigh the words of Dr. Julius Margolin—a man who, like themselves, refused to believe that communism could be so inhuman until he saw its punitive machinery at work with his own eyes.

And if the administration should ever succumb to their pressure and negotiate the surrender of Vietnam, and if the Vietnamese Communists then embark on the orgy of bloodletting which has always accompanied the establishment of Communist power, let those who are pressur-

ing for negotiations not be heard to say, "but we didn't intend it this way." Because there is today no excuse for ignorance about communism.

(B) THE FURTHER CHOICE: COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OR MAJOR ESCALATION

Our withdrawal from Vietnam would immediately confront us with an agonizing choice.

If we decide to try to defend what is left of southeast Asia against the advance of communism, it will require far more money, far more men, and far more American blood than we are today investing in the defense of Vietnam. What is more, it would involve a far greater risk of the major escalation which we seek to avoid.

If, on the other hand, we decide to abandon the whole of southeast Asia to communism, as some of the proponents of withdrawal have frankly proposed, it would result in the early disintegration of all our alliances, and in the total eclipse of America as a great nation. Because no nation can remain great when its assurances are considered worthless even by its friends.

(C) MORE VIETNAMS

Whether we decide to abandon southeast Asia or to try to draw another line outside Vietnam, the loss of Vietnam will result in a dozen more Vietnams in different parts of the world. If we cannot cope with this type of warfare in Vietnam, the Chinese Communists will be encouraged in the belief that we cannot cope with it anywhere else.

In the Congo, the Chinese Communists have launched their first attempt at applying the Vietnamese strategy to Africa.

In the Philippines, the Huk guerrillas, after being decisively defeated in the early 1950's, have now staged a dramatic comeback. According to the New York Times, the Huks are now active again in considerable strength, control large areas of central Luzon, and are assassinating scores of village heads and local administrators on the Vietcong pattern.

In Thailand, Red China has already announced the formation of a patriotic front to overthrow the Government and eradicate American influence. This almost certainly presages the early launching of a Thai Communist insurrection, also patterned after the Vietcong.

An article in the Washington Post on January 16, pointed out that the Venezuelan Communists now have 5,000 men under arms in the cities and in the countryside, and that the Venezuelan Communist Party is openly committed to "the strategy of a long war, as developed in China, Cuba, Algeria, and Vietnam."

And there are at least half a dozen other Latin American countries where the Communists are fielding guerrilla forces, which may be small today, but which would be encouraged by a Communist victory in Vietnam to believe that the West has no defense against the long war.

It is interesting to note in this connection that, according to Cuban reports, a Vietcong delegation which came to Havana in 1964 signed a "mutual aid pact" with the Venezuelan guerrilla forces. In addition, Marguerite

Higgins, the distinguished correspondent for the Washington Star and other papers, points out that Vietcong experts have teamed up with experts from Communist China and the Soviet Union in training Latin Americans for guerrilla operations in the several schools maintained by Fidel Castro.

(D) WHAT NEW DEFENSE LINE?

It has been suggested that if we abandon southeast Asia, our seapower would make it possible for us to fall back on Japan and the Philippines and the other Pacific islands, and constitute a more realistic defense line there. This is nonsense. American seapower and American nuclear power have thus far proved impotent to cope with Communist political warfare. Cuba is the best proof of this.

If we abandon southeast Asia, the Philippines may prove impossible to hold against a greatly stepped-up Huk insurgency.

Japan, even if it remains non-Communist, would probably, by force of circumstances, be compelled to come to terms with Red China, adding the enormous strength of its economy to Communist strategic resources.

Okinawa, where our political position is already difficult, would become politically impossible to hold.

If we fail to draw the line in Vietnam, in short, we may find ourselves compelled to draw a defense line as far back as Seattle and Alaska, with Hawaii as a solitary outpost in mid-Pacific.

(E) THE ECLIPSE OF AMERICAN PRESTIGE

To all those who agree that we must carefully weigh the consequences of withdrawal before we commit ourselves to withdrawal, I would refer the recent words of the well-known Filipino political commentator, Vincente Villamin. The abandonment of Vietnam, wrote Mr. Villamin, "would be an indelible blemish on America's honor. It would reduce America in the estimation of mankind to a dismal third-rate power, despite her wealth, her culture and her nuclear arsenal. It would make every American ashamed of his Government and would make every individual American dis-trusted everywhere on earth."

This is strong language. But from conversations with a number of Asians, I know that it is an attitude shared by many of our best friends in Asia.

VIETNAM AND MUNICH

The situation in Vietnam today bears many resemblances to the situation just before Munich.

Chamberlain wanted peace. Churchill wanted peace.

Churchill said that if the free world failed to draw the line against Hitler at an early stage, it would be compelled to draw the line under much more difficult circumstances at a later date.

Chamberlain held that a confrontation with Hitler might result in war, and that the interests of peace demanded some concessions to Hitler. Czechoslovakia, he said, was a faraway land about which we knew very little.

Chamberlain held that a durable agreement could be negotiated with Hit-

ler that would guarantee "peace in our time."

How I remember those words.

Churchill held that the appeasement of a compulsive aggressor simply whetted his appetite for further expansion and made war more likely.

Chamberlain's policy won out, because nobody wanted war. When he came back from Munich, he was hailed not only by the Tories, but by the Liberals, and the Labor Party people, including leftwingers like James Maxton and Fenner Brockway.

Churchill remained a voice crying in the wilderness.

But who was right—Churchill or Chamberlain?

Who was the true man of peace?

In Vietnam today, we are again dealing with a faraway land, about which we know very little.

In Vietnam today, we are again confronted by an incorrigible aggressor, fanatically committed to the destruction of the free world, whose agreements are as worthless as Hitler's. Indeed, even while the Communist propaganda apparatus is pulling out all the stops to pressure us into a diplomatic surrender in Vietnam, the Chinese Communists are openly encouraging a new Huk insurgency in the Philippines and have taken the first step in opening a Vietcong type insurgency in Thailand through the creation of their quisling Thai patriotic front.

In signing the Munich agreement, it was not Chamberlain's intention to surrender the whole of Czechoslovakia to Hitler. The agreement was limited to the transfer of the German-speaking Sudetenland to German sovereignty. And no one was more indignant than Chamberlain when Hitler, having deprived Czechoslovakia of her mountain defenses, proceeded to take over the entire country.

While there are some proponents of a diplomatic solution who are willing to face up to the fact that negotiations at this juncture mean surrender, there are others who apparently quite honestly believe that we can arrive at a settlement that will both end the war and preserve the freedom of the South Vietnamese people. If such negotiations should ever come to pass, I am certain that the story of Czechoslovakia would be repeated. Having deprived South Vietnam of the political and military capability to resist, the North Vietnamese Communists would not tarry long before they completely communized the country.

And, before very long, those who urge a diplomatic solution for the sake of preventing war, may find themselves compelled to fight the very war that they were seeking to avoid, on a bigger and bloodier scale, and from a much more difficult line of defense.

I take it for granted that no one in this Chamber and no loyal American citizen believes that we should stand by indifferently while communism takes over the rest of the world.

I take it for granted that every intelligent person realizes that America could not long survive as a free nation

in a world that was completely Communist.

I take it for granted that everyone agrees that somewhere, somehow, we must draw the line against further Communist expansion.

The question that separates us, therefore, is not whether such a line should be drawn, but where such a line should be drawn.

I believe that we have been right in drawing the line in Vietnam and that President Johnson is right in trying to hold the line in Vietnam, despite the setbacks we have suffered over the past year. Because, if this line falls, let us have no illusions about the difficulty of drawing a realistic line of defense anywhere in the western Pacific.

NEITHER SURRENDER NOR ESCALATION

We have been told in many statements and articles that the only alternative to withdrawal from Vietnam, with or without negotiations, is a dramatic escalation of the war against the North. And we have been warned that such an escalation might bring in both Red China and the Soviet Union and might bring about the thermonuclear holocaust that no one wants.

These are supposed to be the choices before us.

It is my belief, however, that the tide of war in Vietnam can be reversed and that this war can ultimately be won without an invasion of the North and without a significant intensification of our military effort. It is my belief that there are many measures we can take, primarily in the nonmilitary field, to strengthen our posture and the posture of South Vietnamese forces in the fight against the Vietcong insurgency.

Before outlining some of the measures which I believe can and must be taken, I wish to deal with a number of widely accepted fallacies and misconceptions about the situation in Vietnam, because one cannot intelligently approach the problem of what to do about Vietnam without first establishing the essential facts about the present situation in that country.

THE FALLACY THAT THE VIETNAMESE WAR IS A CIVIL WAR

The belief that the Vietnamese war is a civil war is one of the most widespread misconceptions about Vietnam. This is frequently associated with the charge that it is the United States, and not North Vietnam or Red China, which is intervening in South Vietnam.

The war in South Vietnam is not a civil war. It was instigated in the first place by the North Vietnamese Communists, with the material and moral support of both Peking and Moscow. There is overwhelming proof that Hanoi has provided the leadership for the Vietcong insurrection, that it has supplied them massively, and that it has served as the real command headquarters for the Vietcong.

The present insurrection in South Vietnam goes back to the third Communist Party Congress in Hanoi in September of 1960. At this Congress it was decided "to liberate South Vietnam from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in order to achieve

national unity and complete independence." The Congress also called for the creation of a broad national front in South Vietnam directed against the United States-Diem clique. Several months later the formation of the front for the liberation of the south was announced.

I understand that there is an official report, according to which, the U.S. military assistants command in Vietnam is in possession of reliable evidence indicating that probably as many as 34,000 Vietcong infiltrators have entered South Vietnam from the north between January 1959 and August 1964.

The report indicates that the majority of hard-core Vietcong officers and the bulk of specialized personnel such as communications and heavy weapons specialists have been provided through infiltration. Infiltrators, moreover, apparently make up the major part of Vietcong regulars in the northern half of South Vietnam.

The infiltration from the north supplies the Vietcong with much of its leadership, specialist personnel, key supplies such as heavy ordnance and communications equipment, and, in some cases, elite troops.

This information is derived from the interrogation of many thousands of Vietcong captives and defectors and from captured documents.

It is this hard core that has come down from the north that has provided the leadership cadres in all major insurgent actions, including the series of sensational attacks on American installations.

The scale on which Hanoi has been supplying the Vietcong insurgency was dramatically illustrated this weekend when an attack by an American helicopter on a ship off the coast of South Vietnam resulted in the discovery of an enormous arms cache—almost enough, in the words of one American officer, to equip an entire division. The haul included a thousand Russian-made carbines, hundreds of Russian submachine guns, and light machine guns, and Chinese burp guns, and scores of tons of ammunition. There were also a variety of sophisticated land mines and ammunition for a new type of rocket launcher used against tanks. A Communist guerrilla who was captured in the action said that the ship which delivered the weapons had made six trips to bases along the South Vietnam coast, dropping off supplies.

Finally, we would do well to consider the fact that the general offensive launched by the Communist forces in Vietnam 2 weeks ago was preceded by an open call by Hanoi radio for assaults throughout the country on Vietnamese and American positions.

The public confusion on the nature of the Vietnamese war stems in large measure from the sabotage of the Communist member of the three-man International Control Commission set up to supervise the carrying out of the Geneva agreement. By 1961, reports of 1,200 offensive incidents of Communist agents, ranging from one-man assassinations to large-scale military actions, had been presented to the Commission. The Commission, however, took no action because the

A debate has been joined which is worthy of the best traditions of the Senate.

I hope that the remarks I make today will contribute at least in some measure, to the further unfolding of this debate. Out of this debate, let us hope, will ultimately emerge the kind of assistance and guidance that every President must have in dealing with vital issues of our foreign policy.

What we say here may help to guide the President. But in the final analysis the terrible responsibility of decision is his and his alone. He must listen to the exchanges which take place in this Chamber. He must endure a hundred conflicting pressures from public sources, seeking to push him in this direction or that. He must also endure the impatience of those who demand answers to complex questions today, and who accuse him of not having made the American position clear when he has in fact made our position abundantly clear on repeated occasions.

And finally, when all the voices have been heard, when he has examined all the facts, when he has discussed all aspects of the situation with his most trusted advisers, the President must alone decide—for all Americans and for the entire free world—what to do about Vietnam.

No President has ever inherited a more difficult situation on coming to office. No President has ever been called upon to make a decision of greater moment. At stake may be the survival of freedom. At stake may be the peace of the world.

I believe the United States can count itself fortunate that it has found a President of the stature of Lyndon B. Johnson to meet this crisis in its history. I also believe that, whatever differences we in this Chamber may have on the question of Vietnam, our feelings to a man are with the President in the ordeal of decision through which he is now passing.

I have said that I have been dismayed by the rising clamor for a negotiated settlement. In the type of war which the Communists are now waging against us, I fear that, although those who urge negotiation would be among the first to oppose an outright capitulation, their attitude may not be construed in this way by the Communists.

The Vietnamese war, in the Communist lexicon, is described as a "war of national liberation." Its strategy is based on the concept of what the Communists call "the long war." This strategy is premised upon the belief that the free world lacks the patience, the stamina, the fanatical determination to persist, which inspires the adherents of communism. It is based on the conviction that if the Communists keep on attacking and attacking in any given situation, they will ultimately be able to destroy the morale and the will to resist of those who oppose them in the name of freedom.

China affords the classic example of the long war. It took 20 years for Mao Tse-tung to prevail. There were several times during this period when his entire movement seemed on the verge of collapse. But, even in his blackest days,

Mao Tse-tung remained confident that, if he persevered, ultimately his enemies would crack and he would emerge as China's undisputed ruler.

There is no more cruel test of courage and staying power than "the long war" as it is waged by the Communists. Five years, 10 years, 20 years, means nothing to them. And if they detect any sign that those opposed to them are flagging, that their patience is growing thin or that their will to resist has weakened, the Communists can be relied upon to redouble their efforts, in the belief that victory is within their grasp.

I disagree strongly with my colleagues who have spoken up to urge negotiations.

But if there is any way in which my voice could reach to Peking and to Moscow, I would warn the Communist leaders that they should not construe the debate that is now taking place in this Chamber as a sign of weakness; it is, on the contrary, a testimony to our strength.

Nor should they believe that those who speak up in favor of negotiations are the forerunners of a larger host of Americans who are prepared to accept surrender. Because there is no one here who believes in surrender or believes in capitulation. I believe the senior Senator from Idaho made this abundantly clear in his own presentation, in which he underscored his complete support for the retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam.

WHY ARE WE IN VIETNAM?

I have been amazed by a number of letters I have received asking the question, "Why are we in Vietnam?" or "What is our policy in Vietnam?" I have been even more amazed to have the same questions put to me by sophisticated members of the press.

To me the reasons for our presence in Vietnam are so crystal clear that I find it difficult to comprehend the confusion which now appears to exist on this subject.

We are in Vietnam because our own security and the security of the entire free world demands that a firm line be drawn against the further advance of Communist imperialism—in Asia, in Africa, in Latin America, and in Europe.

We are in Vietnam because it is our national interest to assist every nation, large and small, which is seeking to defend itself against Communist subversion, infiltration, and aggression. There is nothing new about this policy; it is a policy, in fact, to which every administration has adhered since the proclamation of the Truman doctrine.

We are in Vietnam because our assistance was invited by the legitimate government of that country.

We are in Vietnam because, as the distinguished majority leader, the Senator from Montana [Mr. Mansfield], pointed out in his 1963 report, Chinese Communist hostility to the United States threatens "the whole structure of our own security in the Pacific."

We are in Vietnam not merely to help the 14 million South Vietnamese defend themselves against communism, but because what is at stake is the independ-

ence and freedom of 240 million people in southeast Asia and the future of freedom throughout the western Pacific.

These are the reasons why we are in Vietnam. There is nothing new about them and nothing very complex. They have never been obscure. They have never been concealed. I cannot, for the life of me, see why people fail to understand them.

IS THERE A POSSIBILITY OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT?

The senior Senator from Idaho, and several other Senators who spoke last Wednesday, repeated the proposal that we should seek negotiations for the purpose of terminating the bloodshed in Vietnam and of avoiding an enlargement of the war. We are told by some people that negotiations are the way of diplomacy and that if we reject negotiations now, we are in effect rejecting diplomacy.

The proposal that we negotiate now overlooks the fact that there does exist a negotiated agreement on Vietnam, approved by the participants of the Geneva Conference of 1964. The final declaration of this agreement read, and I think it is worth while reading it for the Record and for our own recollection:

Each member * * * undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity, and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned states and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

Since there is no point to negotiating if it simply means reiterating the Geneva agreement, I cannot help wondering whether those who urge negotiations envisage rewriting the agreement so that it does not "guarantee the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned states."

The history of negotiated agreements with the Communists underscores the fact that their promises are worthless and that only those agreements have validity which are self-enforcing or which we have the power to enforce. A report issued by the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security—on which I have the honor to serve—establishes that the Soviet Union has since its inception violated more than 1,000 treaties and agreements. The Communists have repeatedly violated the terms of the Korean armistice, of the Geneva agreement on Vietnam, and of the Laotian armistice.

Incidentally, I had hoped the Senator from Idaho [Mr. Church] would be present. He had hoped to be here. He is tied up on another matter, but hopes to get here later.

The Senator from Idaho has held up the Laotian armistice as an example of a rational agreement with the Communists that has served our interests. He could not possibly have picked a worse illustration for his argument.

I can think of no more dramatic proof than the Laotian armistice that agreements with the Communists are worthless, and that every time we try to escape from today's unpleasantness by entering into a new covenant with an implacable aggressor, we are always confronted on the morrow by unpleasantness compounded 10 times over.

I traveled through southeast Asia just before the conclusion of the Laotian armistice.

I talked to many people at that time. It is true that the armistice was favored by our Ambassador in Laos, and it obviously must have had the support of important members of the State Department hierarchy. But the personnel of our Embassies in Saigon and in Bangkok did not conceal from me their grave apprehensions over the consequences of such an armistice for Vietnam and southeast Asia.

All of this I reported on confidentially upon my return.

At that time, the Saigon government still controlled the situation throughout most of the countryside, although the 15,000 Vietcong guerrillas were giving it increasing difficulty. Our Embassy personnel in Saigon expressed the fear that the conclusion of the Laotian armistice would enable the Communists to infiltrate men and material on a much larger scale and would result at an early date in a marked intensification of the Vietcong insurgency. Needless to say, the apprehensions which they expressed to me have been completely borne out by subsequent developments.

The Laotian armistice has served Laos itself as poorly as it has served the cause of freedom in Vietnam. The Communists have continued to nibble away at what is left of free Laos, in one aggressive act after another, so that by now they firmly control more than half the country, while their infiltrators and guerrillas are gnawing relentlessly at government authority in the rest of the country.

In mid-1964, I asked the Library of Congress to prepare for me a study of Communist violations of the Laotian armistice agreement. The study which they submitted to me listed 14 specific violations up until that time.

That was last year. There have been many more since then.

Mr. President, I plan to insert into the Record at the conclusion of my remarks a copy of the survey of Communist violations of the Laotian armistice prepared for me by the Library of Congress. I earnestly hope the Senator from Idaho will take the time to study this before he once again holds up the Laotian armistice as a model for Vietnam.

I should also like to quote from a statement made on March 30, 1963, by Gen. Kong Le, the neutralist military commander who, as is common knowledge, had favored the conclusion of the Laotian armistice. Kong Le's statement is significant because it illustrates how Communists will deal tomorrow with non-Communist elements that they are prepared to accept into coalition governments today.

Referring to certain Communist stooges, Gen. Kong Le said:

Despite their continual defeats, however, these people learned their lessons from their Communist bosses. . . . When the Prime Minister went abroad, they moved rapidly to destroy the neutralist forces. They used tricks to provoke the soldiers and people to overthrow Colonel Ketsana. When these did not succeed, on February 12 they used an assassin to murder Ketsana. They also savage-

ly killed or arrested all neutralist party members, and their bloody hands caused the death of many people.

This was the statement of Gen. Kong Le, one of those who had pressed the hardest for the Laotian armistice when he saw what the armistice did to his country.

Finally, I do not believe that the Laotian armistice has served the interests of the other peoples of southeast Asia. I have in my possession a map of northern Laos showing areas where the Chinese Communists have been building roads that would give China direct access to the borders of Burma and Thailand. The construction of these roads bodes ill for the future peace of southeast Asia. That they are intended for future military use is taken for granted by everyone in the area.

So much for the example of the Laotian armistice.

All this does not mean to say that we must not under any circumstances enter into negotiations with the Communists. I do not suggest that at all. It simply means that when we do so, we must do so with our eyes open and with a clear understanding of the ingredients required to enforce compliance with the agreement about to be entered into. That is all I have ever urged.

Moreover, there is a time to negotiate and a time not to negotiate.

The demand that we negotiate now over Vietnam is akin to asking Churchill to negotiate with the Germans at the time of Dunkirk, or asking Truman to negotiate with the Communists when we stood with our backs to the sea in the Pusan perimeter in Korea. In either case, the free world could have negotiated nothing but total capitulation.

The situation in Vietnam is probably not as desperate and certainly no more desperate, than Britain's plight at the time of Dunkirk or our own plight at the time of Pusan. If we are of good heart, if we refuse to listen to the counsels of despair, if we again resolve that "we will never give in"—as Churchill put it—there is every reason to be confident that a time will arrive when we can negotiate with honor and for a more acceptable objective than a diplomatic surrender.

There are those who say that the whole of southeast Asia will, whether we like it or not, go Communist. These people are at least consistent in urging negotiations now. But anyone who believes that we can negotiate now and not lose Vietnam to communism is deluding himself in the worst possible way.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEFEAT IN VIETNAM

It is human to oppose the cost of staying on in Vietnam when American boys are dying in a faraway land about which we understand very little. I am conscious of this. I am sensitive to it. I share the troubled minds of all Senators. But I am convinced that the great majority of those who advocate that we abandon Vietnam to communism, either by pulling out or by "negotiating" a settlement, have not taken the time to weigh the consequences of defeat.

In my opinion, the consequences of an American defeat in Vietnam would be

so catastrophic that we simply cannot permit ourselves to think of it. This is truly an "unthinkable thought," to use an expression coined by the Senator from Arkansas. He was not applying it to this problem, I point out, but I find the words particularly apt in reference to Vietnam.

GENOCIDE

For the Vietnamese people, the first consequence would be a bloodletting on a genocidal scale.

In the Soviet Union and in Red China, tens of millions of "class enemies" were eliminated by the victorious Communists. While it is true that there are some slightly more moderate Communist regimes in certain countries, Vietnamese communism is characterized by utter disregard for human life of Stalinism and Maoism. What will happen to the more than 1 million refugees from North Vietnam? What will happen to the millions of peasants who resisted or bore arms against the Vietcong. I shudder to think of it. The massacre of innocents in Vietnam will be repeated in every southeast Asian country that falls to communism in its wake, in a gigantic bloodletting that will dwarf the agony and suffering of the war in Vietnam.

Those who urge our withdrawal from Vietnam in the name of saving human lives have the duty to consider the record of Communist terror in every country that has fallen under the sway of this merciless ideology, with its total disregard for human life.

The total number of victims of communism will probably never be known. Students who have followed the Chinese Communist press closely claim that it can be demonstrated that Chinese communism has cost the lives of at least 25 million and more, probably 50 million people, while students of Soviet communism put the overall figure for the Soviet Union at approximately the same level. They point out that, entirely apart from the purges and mass killings at periodic intervals and the forced starvation of 5 million Ukrainian farmers, the reported death rate in the Soviet forced labor camps ran approximately 25 percent per annum in bad years, and 15 to 20 percent in good years. If one accepts the average population of the slave labor camps as 10 million over the 20 odd years of Stalin's undisputed rule, this would mean that approximately 2 million slave laborers died annually in Stalin's camps, or 40 million for the 20-year period.

According to the Polish Government in exile, in London, the Soviets deported 1½ million Poles to Siberia after they had occupied eastern Poland in the wake of the Hitler-Stalin pact. Approximately 150,000 were returned through Teheran after the Nazi invasion of Russia. Another 300,000 drifted back after the war. More than 1 million never came back. Such was the mortality in the Soviet slave labor camps.

All of this seems incredible to the Western mind.

I remember, when I was in Nuremberg, that when I first read the terrible statistics about the mass killings by the Nazis, I could not comprehend them. If

The greatest problem, as I have indicated before, of morale, is lack of mail, or letters that come, reading of depression, despondency, of problems or difficulties in the home that tend to lower morale more than any other factor. Then, too, especially I would say a word as chaplain here: I have seen many men—friends of mine that I closely felt a deep affection for—I have seen them go down; I have conducted memorial services for them. Many times a question comes, "Is this vain or is this waste?" I have over and over evidence that relatives often write and wonder if this isn't a ridiculous world we're in.

And I would say to you at home, as I have said to our men here, and as I believe they feel deeply, the men who have given their lives here have not given their lives in vain. The real price of life is always the price death to fine dedication.

Our nation was built by men who loved their principles—the truth for which they lived by much more than they loved life itself. Our nation was built and shall only exist by our standing for the truth that we hold dear, and as we are here in this land, we are not only working and laboring and dying here for Vietnam but for America, for the world.

Our world is a very small tiny village today, and we cannot have our neighborhood wars. We can only have a peace that can be a peace for all of us. I would say, let us dedicate ourselves, and you, to the task of liberty, and freedom, and human dignity for all people, and let us be proud of the men here, whether they are special forces out in the field; whether they be pilots-navigators in the sky; whoever, they might be.

Most will come home—some will not—but let us be proud of them and let us remember them and dedicate ourselves to this task of bringing freedom and peace to our world.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

INCREASE OF FUND FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which is S. 805.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 805) to amend the Inter-American Development Bank Act to authorize the United States to participate in an increase in the resources of the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank.

VIETNAM AND THE NEW ISOLATIONISM

THE NEW ISOLATIONISM

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, there has been developing in this country in recent years a brand of thinking about foreign affairs which, I believe, can aptly be described as "the new isolationism." This internal phenomenon is, in my opinion, potentially more disastrous in terms of its consequence than the major external problems that confront us.

Its background is a growing national weariness with cold war burdens we have been so long carrying, a rising frustration with situations that are going against us in many places, a long-simmering indignation over the fact that our generosity and sacrifice have too often

been met abroad, not just with indifference and ingratitude, but even with hostility and contempt.

Its political base seems to be to the left of center, although it forms as yet a distinct minority there.

Its scareword is "escalation"; its cure-all is "neutralization."

Its prophets include some of my colleagues in the Congress, influential spokesmen in the press, and leading figures in the academic world. Some are new volunteers in this cause of retrenchment; they regard themselves as pragmatists. Others are old hands at Pollyanna-ism, those unshakable romantics who were disillusioned by Moscow at the time of the Hitler-Stalin pact, disillusioned by Mao when they discovered that he was not really an agrarian reformer, disillusioned by Castro when they learned that he was not a cross between Thomas Jefferson and Robin Hood—and who, having again dusted themselves off, now look for new vistas of adventure.

If I may digress, let me say that I have always admired their durability. The manner in which they have survived, unchastened, a whole series of intellectual Dunkirks is, if nothing else, a tribute to man's invincible confidence in himself; and their adeptness in avoiding discredit, in the face of repeated catastrophes and evacuations, must be acknowledged as one of the marvels of modern history—a triumph of self-rectitude over reason.

The basic premise of the new isolationism is that the United States is overextended in its attempt to resist Communist aggression around the world, overcommitted to the defense of distant outposts, and overinvolved in the murky and unintelligible affairs of remote areas.

The corollaries of the new isolationism are many. It is contended that we should deemphasize the cold war and reverse our national priorities in favor of domestic improvements; that we should withdraw from South Vietnam; that we should cease involvement in the Congo; that we should relax the so-called rigidity of our Berlin policy; that foreign aid has outlived its usefulness and should be severely cut back; that our Military Establishment and our CIA, organizations that seem particularly suspect because they are symbols of worldwide involvement, should be humbled and "cut down to size" and stripped of their influence in foreign policy questions.

In my judgment all of these propositions have one thing in common. Each of them would strike at the heart of our national effort to preserve our freedom and our security; and collectively they add up to a policy which I can describe by no other name than "appeasement," subtle appeasement, unintentional appeasement, to be sure, but appeasement nonetheless.

My purpose, this afternoon then, is to oppose these propositions and to enlist Senators' opposition against them—for the new isolationism is as bankrupt as the old.

First of all—to tackle the main premise—I reject the assumption that the

United States is overextended, or overcommitted, or overinvolved.

We are enjoying a spectacular growth in every index of national strength. Our population, our wealth, our industrial capacity, our scientific potential, our agricultural output, all are enjoying great upward surges. We were informed that our gross national product was again up in January, and the trend seems ever upward.

Far from overextending ourselves in the cold war, we are actually in a period of declining defense budgets, of steadily lowered draft calls, of sharply reduced foreign aid, of one tax cut after another.

Let me emphasize this: In every basic resource, we have greater capacity today than during the past 5 years; by every military or economic standard, we are stronger; and by every physical measurement, the percentage of our resources going into the cold war is lower. Why then should we talk of weariness or overcommitment?

We are not even straining ourselves. We are actually pursuing today a policy not only of both guns and butter, but of less guns and more butter.

So far as our resources go, we are capable of indefinite continuation and even intensification of our present efforts, if need be. It is only our mental, and perhaps our moral, resources which seem to be feeling the strain.

We would, of course, prefer to live in a world in which it were possible for us to have no commitments, a world in which we could devote all of our energies to the task of perfecting our society at home and enriching the lives of our people.

But we must face the world as it is. And the basic fact of our world is that Western civilization, itself terribly rent and divided, both politically and philosophically, has been forced into a twilight war of survival by a relentless and remorseless enemy.

It is incontestable, in terms of peoples enslaved and nations gobbled up over the past 20 years, that we have not been holding our own. And each year, the world Communist movement is committing more and more of its resources to the task of subjugating our allies, all around the perimeter of freedom.

Against this background it is preposterous to maintain that we should reduce our effort and lessen our commitment to the great struggle of our century.

Yet, according to Time magazine, it is the widespread sentiment of the academic world that we have overreached ourselves and ought to pull back. Walter Lippmann, the well-known columnist, for whom I have great respect, says that "the American tide will have to recede."

It has been argued that we would be in a "precarious situation" if we were attacked on several fronts. Of course we would, but does anyone believe that we can solve the problem by abandoning our commitments and defensive alliances? Would the loss of these countries be any the less disastrous because they were given up undefended?

On the contrary, if we are not strong enough to honor our commitments today, then we should solve the problem,

not be reducing our commitments, but by becoming stronger, and by aiding our allies to become stronger.

The defense of the free world rests on a very delicate balance. The key elements in that balance are American power and American determination. If we lack the power to maintain that balance then certainly all is lost. If we reveal that we lack the determination, if we, for instance, allow ourselves to be pushed out of Vietnam, such a humiliation may indeed be the second shot heard around the world; and a dozen nations might soon throw in the sponge and make whatever accommodation they could with an enemy that would then seem assured of victory.

Fortunately, at the present time we do not lack the power to carry on the defense of freedom. Our power is at its peak and we have the capacity to increase it vastly if necessary. It is our spirit, apparently, that needs shoring up.

Four years ago, after a visit to southeast Asia, I said on the floor of the Senate:

If the United States, with its unrivaled might, with its unparalleled wealth, with its dominion over sea and air, with its heritage as the champion of freedom—if this United States and its free-world allies have so diminished in spirit that they can be laid in the dust by a few thousand primitive guerrillas, then we are far down the road from which there is no return.

In right and in might, we are able to work our will on this question. Southeast Asia cannot be lost unless we will it to be lost; it cannot be saved unless we will it to be saved.

This problem, seemingly so remote and distant, will in fact be resolved here in the United States, in the Congress, in the administration, and in the minds and hearts of the American people.

The passage of 4 years has not diminished my belief in this course.

If the main premise of the new isolationism is erroneous, then surely the lesser premises are fraught with terrible danger.

It is argued that we should de-emphasize the cold war and turn more of our resources to domestic welfare.

The annual congressional revolt against the foreign aid bill grows more violent and successful each year, and the administration, forced to yield, now sends foreign aid requests 40 percent below what it solemnly declared 2 years ago to be the minimum figure tolerable for free world survival.

And a small but growing band of Senators have begun offering each year amendments making across-the-board percentage cuts in our defense budget, cuts not directed to any specific economy, but rather to a principle—the principle that we should be spending less on defense and more on welfare.

Here, in my judgment, are sure-fire formulas for defeat.

Where are the victories in the cold war that would justify such a reversal of priorities? In what global trouble spots are there lessened tensions or improved postures that would make this plausible? I can see a lot of cold war areas where things are looking worse—but very few where things are getting better.

More effort, more sacrifice—not less—is the need of our time. And I speak as one who does not disparage the need or the importance of domestic improvements. As a credential of this I recommend to Senators my scorecard, compiled last year by the ultraconservative Americans for Constitutional Action, which asserts that I voted right only 13 percent of the time—one of the worst records, alas, in the Congress.

But I say to you that if our foreign affairs are going badly, no aspect of internal welfare is secure or stable. And if we cope successfully with the great problem, the cold war, no internal problem can long defy solution.

Our first national priority is and must ever be the survival of our country and our freedom—and if the 20th century has taught men anything, it is that survival and freedom cannot be purchased on the cheap, in a discount store or a bargain basement.

But our situation is such that we can meet our needs both at home and abroad—not as handsomely as we would prefer, but well enough. This I take to be the objective of the Johnson administration. The war on poverty and the struggle against tyranny can go hand in hand, if our vision be broad.

Twenty-five years ago, our country, comparatively new and untried among the great nations of the earth, through passage of the Lend-Lease Act, described by Winston Churchill as “the most unsordid act of recorded history,” embarked irrevocably upon the path that has brought us to our present posture in history. Through that act, we affirmed the preservation and expansion of liberty as our highest goal; we acknowledged that freedom was insecure everywhere so long as tyranny existed anywhere; and we assumed the burden, and the glory, of being the champion and defender of man's highest aspirations.

Since that embattled hour, when the light of freedom was but a flicker in the dark, our journey across the pages of history has been fantastic and unprecedented: tragic, to be sure, in its mistakes and naiveties, but heroic in its innovations and commitments, prodigious in its energy and power, gigantic in its generosity and good will, noble in its restraint and patience, and sublime in its purpose and in its historic role.

We have not realized the high goals we set for ourselves in World War II.

But we have preserved freedom and national independence in more than half the earth; we have prevented the nuclear holocaust; we have restored Western Europe; we have helped friend and foe to achieve prosperity, freedom and stability; we have launched a world peace organization and have kept it alive; we have offered the hand of friendship and help to the impoverished and backward peoples of the world if they will but take it.

It may be said of our country today, as of no other in history, that wherever people are willing to stand up in defense of their liberty. Americans stand with them.

We cannot know at this hour whether our journey has just begun or is nearing

its climax; whether the task ahead is the work of a generation, or of a century. President Kennedy said, in his Inaugural Address, that the conflict would not be resolved in our lifetime.

The Chief of Staff of the Army recently told the Congress that it might well take 10 years to decide the issue in Vietnam alone. And Vietnam is only one symptom of the disease, the epidemic, we are resisting.

Against this somber background, how foolish it is to talk of deemphasizing the cold war, of pulling out of Vietnam, of abandoning the Congo to Communist intrigue, of slashing the defense budget by 10 percent, or of any of the other irresponsibilities of the new isolationism.

Vietnam

It is against this background that I take up today the question of Vietnam, which has been the favorite target of those who urge withdrawal and retrenchment.

Over the past several months, a number of my most respected colleagues have taken the floor to urge that we get out of Vietnam or that we enter into negotiations over Vietnam.

The propriety of our presence in Vietnam and the validity of our position has been challenged. It has even been suggested that we are the real aggressors in Vietnam. The war has been called “McNamara's War.” It has been suggested that we more or less ignore Asia and Africa and concentrate on Europe and the Americas.

I have listened with growing dismay to these presentations—and with all the more dismay because of the respect and affection I have for the Senators who made them.

If I have not risen to reply to my colleagues before now, it was not because Vietnam was a new subject to me, but because I felt that their arguments required the most carefully considered and most painstakingly prepared reply.

I had visited most of the countries of southeast Asia in early 1961, and I have spoken a number of times on the floor of the Senate on the subject of Vietnam and Laos and Indonesia since my return. I have endeavored to keep up with the situation in that part of the world as best one can do by reading the press and official publications. But I realized that there were important gaps in my information because the press coverage of Vietnam was, with a few outstanding exceptions, weak and in some cases completely misleading. I have, therefore, sought to fill these gaps by correspondence with friends in Vietnam, both Vietnamese and American, and by conversations with Americans who have served in Vietnam in various capacities—some of them for long periods of time.

The senior Senator from Wyoming [Mr. McGEE] and the senior Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONROE] on the one side, and the distinguished minority leader, the junior Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN] and the senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] have already spoken eloquently on the need for standing fast in Vietnam.

improvement of classroom instruction. These devices and materials have been shown to our subcommittee in its hearings on the Elementary and Secondary Education Improvement Act.

Of particular interest, I believe, will be the 45-minute presentation by a master teacher working for the first time with a fifth-grade class from the District of Columbia school system using a variety of the new materials and equipment to strengthen the effectiveness of his own teaching.

Cordially,

WAYNE MORSE,
Chairman, Education Subcommittee.

CONSERVATION RESOLUTIONS

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, on February 18 I called the attention of my colleagues to the fact that a conservation battle is underway in our land. The soil and water conservation districts of America have organized a nationwide effort through their national association to counteract the administration's proposal that Congress enact legislation to authorize a revolving fund through which soil conservation districts, farmers, ranchers, and other landowners would pay the Federal Government \$20 million in 1966 to help finance a part of the cost of technical assistance from the Soil Conservation Service.

I announced then that I have joined the soil conservation districts in opposition to the proposed revolving fund, because it would not be in the public interest. Some of my colleagues have asked me for more details regarding this proposition.

Such details were set forth in resolutions adopted by the National Association of Soil and Water Conservation Districts at their annual convention in Portland, Oreg., on February 9. I think my colleagues will find them of great interest. I ask for unanimous consent to have the NACD resolutions printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolutions were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RESOLUTION 1

PROPOSED REVOLVING FUND

The Bureau of the Budget has proposed that Congress enact legislation to authorize a revolving fund through which soil conservation districts, farmers, ranchers, and other landowners would pay the Federal Government a part of the cost of technical assistance from the Soil Conservation Service of the Department of Agriculture used in planning and applying soil and water conservation practices on the land.

If adopted, this proposal would seriously slow down the soil and water conservation effort on the privately owned lands of the Nation. We believe it would result in an estimated decrease of 40 to 50 percent in the annual application of conservation practices and would reduce the quality of the practices applied.

This proposal, if adopted, would reverse a policy of 30 years standing. In 1935, Congress began a policy of providing technical assistance from the Soil Conservation Service without charge to farmers, ranchers, and other private landowners willing to cooperate in scientific, farmwide conservation programs on their properties.

We believe adoption of this proposal would serve to undermine landowners' confidence in the Federal Government's conservation purpose and its desire for an effective conservation partnership with landowners.

We believe it would weaken the exercise of local leadership and the functioning of self-government in resource conservation and development. Further, the proposal creates the prospect that soil and water conservation district governing bodies may be asked to function as collection agents for the Federal Government.

If adopted, this proposal would, in our judgment, break faith with State and local governments. State legislatures and county governments over a quarter of a century have been steadily building up their financial contributions to the total soil and water conservation effort on privately owned lands, with the understanding that the local-State-Federal team effort would be maintained as a team effort for the universal good of the Nation and all its people.

Adoption of the revolving fund proposal would treat American landowners unfairly. It would charge American landowners for technical assistance which the Federal Government now provides free of charge to the people of many foreign nations.

Under this proposal, farmers would assume still more of the town and city responsibility for soil and water conservation. Soil conservation, flood control, and water development contribute to the well-being of all the people because they depend on our limited supplies of soil and water for their daily requirements of food, water, and a productive countryside.

We believe adoption of this proposal would severely retard water conservation and development work in America. Problems of water shortage, floods, pollution, and sedimentation must be met first within the confines of each local watershed. Water comes from rain and snow which falls primarily on land surfaces. The farmers and ranchers who control our farms, range, and woodlands also are in a position to control the movement and protect the quality of the water falling on their lands.

If adopted, the revolving fund proposal would slow down the effort to reduce water pollution. The conservation needs inventory of the Department of Agriculture showed that erosion is still the dominant soil problem on two-thirds of the Nation's land area. Soil eroded from watershed areas pollutes rivers and streams, and clogs harbors and bay areas with sediment.

Moreover, adoption of this proposal would slow down work that is contributing to the good appearance and beauty of the American countryside. Green valleys, clear waters, contoured fields, well-managed forest, lush pastures, and developed watersheds are basic to the beauty of the countryside. Gullied fields and muddy streams detract from the beauty of America as much as auto graveyards.

If this proposal were to be adopted, we believe it would act as a major drag on the development of recreational facilities on private lands. The Soil Conservation Service type of technical assistance for recreational development on rural lands is not available anywhere else, even for hire.

Without question, establishment of the revolving fund would slow down needed adjustments in land use. In 1964, technical assistance guided more than 1 million soil and water conservation district cooperators in converting 2,500,000 acres from crop use to less intensive uses such as grass and tree production.

In addition, we should recognize clearly that adoption of this proposal would hit hardest in economically depressed areas. Much of what can be done to alleviate poverty in rural areas is bound up in the improved use of soil and water resources. Soil and water conservation is basic to economic development and family farm stability in rural areas.

We believe adoption of this proposal would penalize most the small farmer and the poor farmer who can least afford to pay. Family-

owned farms are the very backbone of rural America. They operate most of the land and are the first custodians of most of our water.

The proposal also invites serious questions about certain commitments of the Secretary of Agriculture. In long-term contracts with farmers and ranchers in special programs, such as the Great Plains conservation program the pilot cropland conversion program, the Secretary has contract commitments under long-term agreements to furnish technical assistance for applying conservation practices set forth in the agreed plan of operations.

Adoption of the Budget Bureau proposal would jeopardize the morale of Soil Conservation Service employees. It would constitute a vote of diminishing belief in the importance and purpose of the agency. The Soil Conservation Service today is recognized as the finest scientific agency of its kind in the world for supplying technical assistance for complete natural resource planning and development, acre by acre, farm by farm, property by property on individual landholdings, watersheds, and whole communities. This standard of excellence could be lost.

A revolving fund would increase total conservation costs. A collection system outside the accepted tax collection structure would have to be devised. Thousands of farmers would need more financial assistance to pay for technical aid—or else give up the opportunity of taking part in soundly developed conservation programs.

We believe future generations would suffer most if the soil and water conservation effort of the Nation is slowed down and dissipated. To recover from a slowdown begun in our time, another generation would be forced to take 11th-hour extreme actions which would be costly in terms of money, damaging in terms of our basic institutions, and unsatisfactory in terms of the resources themselves.

Further, we resist the prospect that the leadership of the Nation in the 1960's should be marked as the one which turned its back on the national soil conservation program so constructively undertaken by Franklin D. Roosevelt and the leaders of the 1930's.

For these several preceding reasons, the National Association of Soil and Water Conservation Districts will:

1. Lead a nationwide effort, and assist the Nation's 3,000 local soil and water conservation districts, to defeat the proposed revolving fund; and
2. Request the Administrator of the Soil Conservation Service to undertake promptly a nationwide study—district-by-district and State-by-State—to evaluate the impact of the Budget Bureau proposal on the conservation and resource development work on the privately owned lands of the Nation, and the ensuing effect on the well-being of the American people.

RESOLUTION 2

SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE APPROPRIATIONS

The workload in soil and water conservation districts involving the planning and applying of soil and water conservation practices continues to increase each year. Districts are being requested to supply increased soil survey information to farmers, agricultural workers, land appraisers, planning commissions, credit agencies, educators, economists, and other public officials. Districts are also assuming new responsibilities in programs for conservation, resource development, land-use adjustments, and economic development in rural America.

These new district responsibilities are based to a very large extent on farm conservation plans which farmers develop in cooperation with local soil and water conservation districts, or on plans developed by organized groups of landowners.

Meanwhile, the cost of technical assistance has continued to increase as the national

economy has grown. Federal funds appropriated to the Soil Conservation Service have been inadequate to furnish sufficient technical assistance to meet the growing obligations in districts.

The National Association of Soil and Water Conservation Districts therefore requests the Congress to appropriate additional funds to the Soil Conservation Service to provide needed technical assistance, watershed planning, watershed protection, and service to the Great Plains conservation program during fiscal year 1966.

More specifically, we ask the Congress of the United States to appropriate \$115,040,000 for the conservation operations in fiscal year 1966.

We urge the Congress to kill the proposed revolving fund through which soil conservation districts and farmers and ranchers would make \$20 million of payments to the Soil Conservation Service for technical assistance.

We ask that \$750,000 of new funds be appropriated to provide technical assistance staff to 25 new soil and water conservation districts expected to be organized during fiscal year 1966.

We further ask that an additional \$10,187,000 of conservation operations funds be appropriated to meet the current backlog in staffing needs of 1,518 man-years of technical assistance in soil conservation districts.

Watershed planning:

We ask the Congress of the United States to appropriate \$10 million for watershed planning in fiscal year 1966.

This \$4½ million increase over the budget estimate is needed to permit a step-up in the rate of watershed planning because nearly 1,200 communities are on the waiting list for planning assistance.

Watershed protection:

We ask the Congress of the United States to appropriate \$85 million for watershed protection in fiscal year 1966.

This would permit beginning construction on approximately 100 new watershed project starts instead of only 70 new starts as proposed in the budget estimates.

Flood prevention:

We ask the Congress to appropriate at the budget estimate level of \$25,417,000 for flood prevention in fiscal year 1966.

This has been a current and adequate level of flood prevention operations for several years.

Great Plains conservation program:

We ask the Congress of the United States to appropriate \$20 million for the Great Plains conservation program in fiscal year 1966.

The increase over the budget estimate is needed to help meet the backlog of nearly 5,000 farmers who have made application for help but are still waiting for assistance.

Resource conservation and development:

We ask the Congress of the United States to appropriate at the budget estimate level of \$4,303,000 for resource conservation and development in fiscal year 1966.

This would permit the continuation of operations in the 10 pilot R.C. & D. projects now underway and would permit the authorization of planning on 10 more pilot R.C. & D. projects in 1966.

We urge soil and water conservation district supervisors and watershed directors to inform their Senators and Representatives of these needs and request support for such appropriations.

RESOLUTION 3

AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION PROGRAM FUNDS

All citizens of the Nation benefit from actions taken to conserve and develop natural resources, including the basic resources of soil and water.

We recognize that the economy of agriculture is such that farmers cannot finance, wholly, all the costs of planning and apply-

ing the conservation practices that are needed.

The agricultural conservation program of the USDA encourages, assists, and gives individual farmers an incentive, through sharing the cost of applying conservation measures, to proceed with the work of conserving natural resources.

The NACD, therefore, opposes the proposed \$100 million budget reduction in the advance authorization for the agricultural conservation program in 1966. We ask the Congress to maintain the authorization at the 1965 level in order to maintain progress toward the conservation of natural resources.

RESOLUTION 4

CONTRACT ARRANGEMENTS IN WATERSHED PROJECTS

Under provisions of the Great Plains conservation program, landowners may enter into long-term contracts with USDA whereby they adopt a conservation plan for their entire unit and agree to make land-use changes, apply conservation practices, and establish desirable cropping and use systems, all according to an agreed upon time schedule. The USDA, for its part, agrees to provide technical assistance and cost-sharing to further adoption of this farmwide conservation plan according to the time schedule.

We urge an amendment to the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act authorizing the use of similar contract arrangements within approved watersheds. We recommend a time schedule of from 3 to 10 years for completion of essential conservation measures on whole farms covered by such watershed contracts.

PETITIONS BY CORNELL UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ON U.S. POLICY ON VIETNAM

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, last night I lectured at Cornell University. At the conclusion of the lecture, a group of students handed me some petitions in opposition to U.S. policy in South Vietnam.

I ask unanimous consent to have them printed in the RECORD at this point with the names.

There being no objection, the petition and names were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

We, the undersigned members of the Cornell University community, strongly protest the bombing and strafing attacks on North Vietnam by the U.S. Government on February 7 and 8, 1965. In spite of official statements to the contrary, we believe that such actions can lead only to the escalation of a war that the United States should not be fighting in the first place; especially since we are supporting regimes disliked by and detrimental to the Vietnamese people.

We hereby join with the growing number of citizens who have voiced their opposition to the United States presence in Vietnam.

We demand that the U.S. Government withdraw from Vietnam now.

Larry Faulkner, Fred Rosen, Mark Sommer, Douglas Hainline, Lincoln Bergman, Daniel Morrison, Charles F. Nagel, Janet A. Schleicher, Stephen R. Kellert, Bruce Bridgman, Martha Grinnell, Mr. and Mrs. Christopher S. Kinder, William E. Schleicher, Joyce Stark, Jill Ann Borkey, Michael Asker, Mark Leider, Carol Newman, Tim Hall, Dan Segrim, Steve Fankuchen, George M. Alexis, Richard Englesten, Thomas D. Hill, Ralph Schwartz, Abby Canfield, Ronald A. Schneider, James P.

Snyder, Bruce E. Kaplan, Sue J. Estey, Murray Cohen, Les Jacobs, Serina Weaver, Fred Weaver, Brenda Milder, Eugene C. Holman III, Mary Dolores Nichols, John Canfield, George R. Price, Sander Hellshby, David Kirkwood, Stanley Perlo.

Gary H. Deissman, Helen Chuckrow, Michael Dossily, Ruth Goldwarren, R. Stewart Jonas, Kenneth G. Rhuess, H. Carol Woodcock, Philip L. Gilman, Martha E. Trae, Nancy Sorkin, Adam J. Sorkin, Richard Peiser, Richard Brenblatt, Hal S. Kibley, Joe H. Griffith, Nypar Feldner, Peter Long, Stephen LeRoy Doreen Brenner, Robert Gschfeld, Eric Lee Geytman, Katherine Porter, David Leecholier, William Schecter, Dainoz Fineman, Lawrence Jones, Jonothan Sabin, Robye Cooper, Henry Balsen, Judith S. Kessel, Richard Unger, James W. Boghosian.

Ann Suitow, Richard Epond, Helene Brosuls, Natalie Kent, Steven Gelber, Marie Gould, Peter Salwan, Steven Faigelman, Walter J. Willie, James R. Wilcox, Mike Smith, Susan Higgins, Jo Hailperin, N. E. Dukin, G. Epoty, Claire Eisenhandler, Gail Boesel, Thomas C. Barnt, Tatman Walter, Jerry Sobel, Paul Epstein, William Duell, Bruce Bennett.

Michael Rudetsky, Peter L. Gale, Nathaniel W. Pierce, Mark L. Klein, Paul Seidel, David Rader, Steve M. Handschu, Christy Reppert, Helen Jones, Peter Dormont, Malcolm Campbell, Judy Russell, Martha N. Simon, Joe H. Griffith, John N. Vournakis, Karen Vournakis, Jeanne Duell, Carol V. Kaske, and Henry Daniel.

PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY'S STATEMENTS FOR GI BILLS

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, this year the cold war GI bill, S. 9, is receiving the greatest support that it has ever had from the Members of this body. In addition to having 40 cosponsors, the high caliber and earnestness of testimony by several Senators before the Subcommittee on Veterans' Affairs demonstrates that opposing forces will have a harder time blocking the consideration of this bill than they have ever had before.

I would like to remind my colleagues that the late President John F. Kennedy was an earnest supporter of readjustment assistance for our veterans. In Senate Document No. 79 of the 88th Congress, a compendium of speeches and statements made by John F. Kennedy during his service in Congress, there are two statements concerning readjustment assistance. The first of these is in support of the Korean GI bill, and the second recommends raising the allowances paid under the then existing GI bill. I ask unanimous consent that these two statements be inserted at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statements were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE KOREAN GI BILL, H.R. 7656, JUNE 5, 1952

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Speaker, I want to take this opportunity to be recorded as supporting fully and vigorously the Korean GI bill, H.R. 7656, now under consideration.

Close to a million Americans have participated in the Korean struggle. They are justly deserving of the same consideration that the veterans of World War II were accorded.

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wedge in the establishment of compulsory Government medicine for all, with its attendant bureaucracy, redtape, and tendency to promote mass-production, assembly-line procedures in which quantity takes precedence over quality and both suffer.

The State chamber believes in a realistic, practical social security system, enlarged and strengthened as the Nation can afford it. There should be continuing study of the many still-unsolved problems involved so that any further legislation in this field may be based upon careful appraisal of experience with the actual operation of the program.

Prominent among these unsolved problems are that (1) no consistent relationship exists between amounts of tax contributions of individuals and the amounts of benefits they ultimately may receive; (2) the program is one of sharply rising costs for the next several decades and a major portion of costs of pension rights being earned now is being postponed for future generations to bear, and (3) the cost-deferment characteristic hides from public consciousness the future cost impact of obligations being incurred currently.

There is need for basic decisions correcting OASI financing weaknesses. In any event, future law changes increasing OASI costs should be accompanied by commensurate tax increases in order to create a clear public understanding of the cost impact.

Every effort needs to be made to find and put into effect the best possible solutions of these problems.

VIETNAM

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I have recently had the pleasure of reading the February 22 issue of the Washington Report issued by the American Security Council, containing an article entitled "Why We Can't Negotiate Now."

This article deals very clearly with the situation facing us in South Vietnam, and refutes one argument after another suggesting negotiation in Vietnam. It points out very logically and clearly the reason why we must stand firm in that area. The article is of real value because it answers some points which have been made. One of the cries we hear constantly, in Congress and outside, is that we cannot win militarily.

One of the points made in the article is that every guerrilla war engaged in between World War II and now has been either lost or won, not just stalemated. Dependent on the issue of whether it has been won or lost has been the whole course of freedom in those areas.

The writers of the article come to the conclusion that this war can be won, that the President's policy should be firmly supported, and they go further with respect to possible support from Red China and the Vietcong.

I do not want to indicate that I am necessarily in favor of or in opposition to the last paragraph of the report, but the entire article points out so many factors with which we have been dealing that I ask unanimous consent that the entire report—which is only four pages—be included at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

WHY WE CAN'T NEGOTIATE NOW

A great swirl of climactic events has followed President Johnson's order to give con-

crete effect to his repeated warnings to the Communists to cease their aggression against South Vietnam. The difficult but extremely necessary decisions have at last been taken. Inevitably in such cases, an atmosphere of crisis is created by the outraged cries and threats of international communism. Just as inevitably, the calls for a negotiated settlement are redoubled on the free world side of the line. Many well meaning people find it difficult to understand why President Johnson does not at least accompany his military action by an offer to enter into immediate negotiations to end the Vietnam war.

Undoubtedly, the President would like nothing better—nor would any other person of good will—if negotiation presently offered a reasonable prospect of fulfilling our pledge to defend the people of Vietnam; it is this pledge which we must honor if there is ever to be any hope of lasting peace in the world. But in considering negotiation the Administration is faced with a series of very unpleasant facts, which are either unknown or forgotten by the general public.

One set of facts concerns the inherent nature of guerrilla wars. The military tactics and political purposes of such wars are not subject to stalemate or compromise. For example, much of the current argument for negotiation rests on the hypothesis that a military victory for either side is impossible. This is begging the question. Since World War II, when the guerrilla war came into vogue, they have invariably been won or lost. Either the guerrillas win in the sense of achieving a take-over of the country or government in question, or else they are militarily defeated, at least to the point where they are reduced to a harmless remnant. There have been no exceptions to this rule.

The guerrillas triumphed completely against the Dutch in Indonesia, against the French in Algeria and Indochina (except here they settled for North Vietnam in 1954 rather than risk U.S. intervention), against the British in Palestine and Cyprus, and against Batista in Cuba. They were decisively defeated in Greece, the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, and—apparently—Venezuela. Whenever negotiations were held it was only for the purpose of ratifying the guerrilla victory. In the majority of cases this was not of a decisive military nature. The French were never beaten in Algeria and even after Dien Bien Phu they could have held on at least in Hanoi and Saigon. The Dutch could have held Indonesia for some time as could the British in Palestine and Cyprus. But either the will to resist was broken or else a reevaluation of national interests caused them to consider the area no longer vital.

CEASE FIRE MEANINGLESS

On the basis of all past experience, therefore, a negotiated settlement in Vietnam can only have the purpose either of confirming a Communist decision to abandon the drive for control of Vietnam, or else an American decision to admit defeat and withdraw. A cease fire would be meaningless. It would only leave the guerrillas in place and free to use the interval to run in more reinforcements and arms until they were ready for the next push. Withdrawal of all Communist guerrillas behind the 17th parallel, as is sometimes suggested, would be fine, but would of course be tantamount to a total Communist defeat in Vietnam. President Johnson has no intelligence as yet to lead him to suppose that the Communists are ready for anything of the sort.

On the contrary—and this is the second set of facts prevailing in the Vietnam situation—the Communist world remains unanimous in its declarations that the only basis for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam is the complete withdrawal of American forces,

which is tantamount to a complete American defeat.

These statements might be written off as mere propaganda bargaining were they not backed up by a great deal of background information coming out of Communist China, which indicate that she believes time and events are very much on her side. Since the second hypothesis for negotiations is that they must include Communist China, her attitude is obviously decisive to the outcome. Here are some of the more public facts which the President must consider:

1. Between December 21, 1964, and January 4, 1965, the first session of the Third National People's Congress was convened in Peiping. Nearly 3,000 deputies met behind closed doors to hear speeches by the leaders of Communist China. In addition to statements by Marshal Ho Lung boasting that the Chinese people's army has been considerably enlarged, supplied with up-to-date equipment, and is now supported by powerful naval and air force units, the Chinese published on December 30 an abbreviated version of Premier Chou En-lai's report on Chinese domestic and foreign policy.

The speech reflected great pride and self-confidence resulting from the explosion of the atomic bomb, the surmounting of the very serious difficulties between 1959 and 1961, resulting from the failure of the great leap forward, and the intention of transforming China into a world power with the most modern industry, agriculture, technology, and defense within the shortest possible time. Reviewing foreign policy, Chou pledged support to all—and he listed each one—revolutionary movements and centers of unrest. He declared that Peiping would consider negotiation with the United States only after it had given up Taiwan and would deal with the United Nations only when it had thrown out Nationalist China.

Chou further asserted that the east wind would prevail over the west wind, and that favorable conditions for such an outcome are the storm centers of world revolution in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The speech forces the conclusion that the Chinese Communists are not only conscious of their power, but are also prepared to use it to support wars of liberation wherever possible in a continuing struggle against imperialism.

2. As a concrete example that Chou meant what he said and that the "falling domino" theory in southeast Asia was not a figment of John Foster Dulles' overstimulated imagination, Peiping formally announced on February 5, 1965, the formation of a patriotic front to overthrow the pro-Western Government of Thailand and eradicate American influence there. For some time now, Communist agents have been infiltrating into Thailand in order to form the nucleus for subverting that country. The Thais have instituted energetic countermeasures which have so far kept them under control, but it is foolish to believe that Thailand would or could resist a Communist takeover backed by China if South Vietnam is lost. The Chinese do not even wait until one victim is gobbled up before proclaiming their plans to take over the next one.

3. Mao Tse-tung stated in a January interview with American journalist Edgar Snow that the crisis in Vietnam will not lead to war between China and the United States so long as China is not invaded. He also said that the war in Vietnam would last only another year or two because the South Vietnamese are deserting in large numbers and the Americans will lose interest. While this statement greatly reduces the likelihood of any Chinese retaliation against our raids on North Vietnam. It gives no comfort to those urging negotiation. If Mao really believes that the war will be won by the Communists in another year or two, then it is

obvious that he looks on negotiation only to confirm this fact, which is another point he actually made in the interview. Unless he can be shaken in this conviction there is no possible basis for negotiation with China.

MUST STOP REDS

It is easy for those without responsibility to call for negotiation, as though this were the automatic panacea for all the world's ills. But the U.S. Government is faced with the kinds of facts mentioned above, as well as much more grim data of a secret nature, which cannot be shrugged off. This is why it has consistently rejected calls for a new Geneva Conference and why even the British have supported this stand. It is accepted as axiomatic by most policymakers that under present circumstances negotiation could lead only to an American defeat.

Such a defeat cannot be accepted, not simply for reasons of foolish national pride, but because the Chinese have made it so very plain that Vietnam is only part of a much wider plan for aggrandizement and trouble making. We are helping Vietnam because it is in the interest of freemen everywhere that the Communist challenge be halted at this point.

The President is trying to create a new psychological situation in Asia. His decision to retaliate against North Vietnam is the only one which offers any hope of success. It has been long overdue and is all the more difficult for that reason, but it is still not too late. Mr. Johnson should be warmly congratulated for his action. If we carry through our policy with resolution there is still an excellent chance that we can win the Vietnam war at least in the sense that the Communists are induced to call off the war as a bad business and either withdraw the guerrillas into North Vietnam or else cease outside aid completely and leave them to their fate. Only then can there be a genuine basis for a negotiation which will ratify this decision.

The Communists will not come willingly or easily to such a disagreeable choice. Previous U.S. vacillation has led them to count the Vietnam war as already won. It will probably take time and a great deal of punishment before they call off the war. But they are practical men and eventually bow to reality. What is essential now is that the President be given the time to make the full effect of his new policy felt in Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow without being continually badgered to negotiate. The calls for negotiation only make the task harder and bloodier because it encourages the Communists to think that we may still falter in our purpose. It is still a Chinese article of faith that world and domestic pressures can be mobilized to thwart any resolute action by the U.S. Government. Many past follies have confirmed them in this viewpoint.

TURNING POINT IN HISTORY

A great experiment is underway—the experiment to see whether we can successfully contain Communist China on the mainland of Asia. If we cannot, the consequences to our children are hideous to contemplate. The Chinese have the numbers, the drive, the ambition, and the eventual potential to rule the world. The days through which we are now passing will mark one of the great turning points of world history.

The United States has very strong trumps to play in this contest. If North Vietnam is willing, or is forced by China to sacrifice herself in a continuing effort to win South Vietnam, there is yet one final arrow in our quiver. We can threaten China with the one punishment she would most fear: The destruction of her nuclear plants by aerial bombardment. If forced to carry out this threat, we would at least prevent or delay the looming menace of a nuclear-armed China.

FRANK J. JOHNSON,
Foreign Editor.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MONTOYA in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION DOMICILIARY AT THOMASVILLE, GA.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, there was published in the February 7 edition of the Jacksonville, Fla., Times-Union an excellent article concerning the operation of the Veterans' Administration domiciliary at Thomasville, Ga., one of the facilities which it was announced is scheduled to be closed.

This article clearly shows the domiciliary's value, both to the veterans it serves and to the community in which it is located. It is my hope that the operation of this facility will not be discontinued, and that the Veterans' Administration will reconsider its plans.

It is indeed regrettable to me that our veterans should suffer because of a purported economy move by the administration, although it must be kept in mind that our disabled veterans must be domiciled and provided home and medical care, and that if this facility is closed, they will have to be moved and cared for at some other location. I fail to see any economy in such a move.

As pointed out in the article, there are both human and economic factors to be considered, and I hope they will not be disregarded by the Veterans' Administration.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have this article printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HUMAN, ECONOMIC ELEMENTS HINGE ON VETERANS' UNIT

(By Carey Cameron)

THOMASVILLE, GA., February 6.—Both the human and the economic elements are of concern to those who will be affected if the Veterans' Administration domiciliary here is closed.

Thomasville and Thomas County residents and businessmen are concerned about the economic element. Counting payroll, other expenditures and non-VA jobs affected by the VA payroll, the area may lose about \$6 million annually, says chamber of commerce Executive Vice President Lloyd Eckberg.

The members who live at domiciliary (they are called members, not patients, stresses J. W. Legg, assistant domiciliary director), their few relatives and the American Legion are concerned with the human element—the displacement of 765 residents of the home, 25 percent of which are indigent.

It is possible that everything will turn up roses on both accounts. Lockheed of Georgia, a corporation that does 98 percent of its business with the Government, will submit a bid February 15 for the right to operate an Urban Job Corps Training Center under the Office of Economic Opportunity programs.

W. A. Pulver, president of the corporation, has told the Thomasville-Thomas Chamber

of Commerce that the school will be located at the domiciliary site if Lockheed gets the contract. Revenue here from the school could reach \$7 million annually, Lockheed estimates.

Plans are being worked out to transfer domiciliary members to various combination hospital-domiciliary centers in other locations. But Lockheed may not get the training center contract and Donald E. Johnson, national American Legion commander, has charged that there is no assurance new homes will be found for the veterans.

On January 12 the VA announced plans to close 11 hospitals, 16 regional offices, and 4 domiciliaries. This plan would eliminate 3,201 domiciliary beds. Although medical care is offered in clinic and infirmary-type departments, domiciliaries are not hospitals.

"They are domiciles (homes) for veterans who have disabilities preventing them from earning a livelihood," Legg explained. When a domiciliary member needs hospital care he is taken to a veterans hospital. Veterans at the Thomasville facility are usually sent to Lake City, Fla.

In return, patients recovered enough to no longer need hospital care are sent back to domiciliaries to make way for new patients. The other three domiciliaries to be closed are at Clinton, Iowa, in Commander Johnson's home State; White City, Oreg., and Bath, N.Y. The Bath home is a VA center, offering both hospital and domiciliary care, Legg explained.

At Thomasville, the domiciliary has an annual budget of \$1,800,000. Members' income from social security, pensions and other compensation totals \$1.5 million. The capital assets are about \$3.5 million, Legg said.

An evacuation plan, subject to approval by the central VA office in Washington, calls for all members to be moved out by March 31. The staff of 161 employees would be gone and the operation closed by June 30.

Members not discharged or transferred to hospitals by March 31 would be moved to centers at Biloxi, Miss., Bay Pines, Fla., Dublin, Ga., and Mountain Home, Tenn.

On January 13 admissions to all receiving domiciliaries were frozen. The Thomasville facility has 800 beds but operates on a planned average member load of 750, leaving a margin of up to 50 beds. On January 14 it had 765 members of which 193 were Florida residents and 263 were Georgia residents.

World War II veterans, a group whose need for domiciliary care is growing now that their average age has reached 45, comprised 56.84 percent of the residents while World War I veterans made up 33.28 percent. There were lesser numbers of Korean and peacetime veterans. Six residents are Spanish-American War veterans.

Other facilities also have a margin between total beds and caseload and it is figured that this margin plus natural turnover will make room for those being moved from the closing facilities, Legg explained.

The Thomasville domiciliary was built during World War II as Finney General Hospital. Like most military facilities of that day its exterior appearance is crude but interiors are comfortable.

About 50 percent of the rooms are private or semiprivate and a main dining room accommodates 408 men who are fed in 2 shifts. Light recreation, such as shuffleboard, is available for those able to take part. Some can play the game but others are in wheelchairs.

After the war, the old general hospital was used for 1 year as a VA hospital before the domiciliary was opened officially December 1, 1948. Legg, who works under Administrator E. C. McDaniel, has been here since 1948.

When news of the closing was announced, Thomasville Mayor Roy Lilly and Frank Neel, immediate past chamber president, went to Washington to see what could be done but were given assurance the order would not be revoked.

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of which is owned by Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. and 20 percent by British Titan Products Co., Ltd.

To be located near the site of the world's largest proven reserve of rutile, the new refinery will be in full operation and is expected to end a worldwide shortage of the important mineral by late next year.

From the refined rutile, other firms will produce titanium oxides, widely used to impart whiteness and opacity to paints and also used in the manufacture of paper, rubber, and floor coverings.

Titanium metal, whose strength-to-weight ratio is nearly twice that of alloy steels, is also highly temperature resistant and is an important construction material in aircraft and space vehicles.

Current world production of rutile is only some 170,000 to 180,000 tons per year. The new refinery will have initial production of 100,000 tons per year.

Materials and equipment for the plant will come from various areas of the United States, with the bulk coming to Modern Storage, Inc., which operates a 120,000-square-foot warehouse at Dundalk Marine Terminal under lease from the Maryland Port Authority.

Among the Baltimore share of the movement will be five 50-ton diesel engines, including three to generate electricity at the plant and two to operate pumps on a hydraulic dredge used to mine the mineral.

A dry mill will be shipped from Jacksonville materials for a 40-home village to be erected at the plant site are moving through Port Everglades and the dredge and other marine equipment will be floated down the Mississippi River and towed to Africa.

W. Waggonner
(Mr. WAGGONNER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Speaker, I am not prone always to agree with the Washington Post, but I found a very provocative editorial in this morning's Washington Post with regard to the situation in Vietnam.

I have from the outset backed the efforts of the President of the United States in stepping up the activity which is required of us in Vietnam, and I see no reason to withdraw that support from him at the present time.

Some controversy has existed between Members of this body and Members of the other body, as well as among Members of this body, as to who supports the President in his action in Vietnam and who does not. I wish to make it clear once again that I support the action of the President in Vietnam; and he is deserving of the unanimous support of the Congress in this matter.

AUTHORIZING THE DISPOSAL OF ZINC FROM THE NATIONAL STOCKPILE

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the bill (H.R. 1496) to authorize the sale, without regard to the 6-month waiting period prescribed, of zinc proposed to be disposed of pursuant to the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

Mr. ASPINALL. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object—and I shall not object—I think I speak for all of us who are interested in the welfare of the lead-zinc industry when I say that we appreciate and commend the distinguished chairman of the full committee, the gentleman from South Carolina, the Honorable L. MENDEL RIVERS, and the able gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. PHILBIN], who is now handling the legislation on the floor, for their action in scheduling prompt hearings on legislation designed to make limited amounts of lead and zinc available from the stockpile in order to fill our current domestic requirements for these vital materials, and bringing the bills before this body so expeditiously.

As you know Mr. Speaker, I have a dual interest in the welfare of the lead-zinc industry: Lead and zinc are produced in various areas of Colorado including the district which I represent; in addition, the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, of which I have the honor to be chairman, has jurisdiction over mining interests generally. We, therefore, are deeply concerned to assure a continuing supply of all minerals and metals while, at the same time, providing for maximum development of domestic sources.

In the circumstances existing today, we support such releases of lead and zinc from the stockpile as are necessary to meet urgent consumer requirements, provided that, in doing so, there is no disruption or adverse effect on the domestic mining industry. My colleagues know the difficulties involved in seeking to ascertain the quantity of a material that is required at a particular moment and the quantity that can be brought into the market artificially and still not have an adverse effect on our own market sources. Let us be frank in recognizing that the stockpile was not created for the purpose of providing reserves for normal domestic consumption and that, accordingly, any release from the stockpile becomes an artificial means of supplying market demand as contrasted with the normal channels, which consist of a combination of domestic production and imports from foreign sources.

Parenthetically, let me call to the attention of my colleagues the fact that 32 Members of the House have joined me in sponsoring legislation that is now before the Ways and Means Committee for the purpose of establishing flexible quotas for lead and zinc, which we believe is the means to solve the long-range needs for lead and zinc in this country and at the same time assure a continuing domestic supply of these metals during periods of industrial expansion as well as for our national security in times of emergency.

Releases from the stockpile are, therefore, temporary measures and should not be treated as affording any long-range solutions or stability. Those of us in Congress who have responsibilities for mining industries have viewed the legislation before you today in this context. The producing industries have likewise studied the legislation in this context.

Despite the fact that many people in the respective industries were wary of

authorizing 150,000 tons of lead and 150,000 tons of zinc to be fed into the market at this time—just when they are beginning to feel the benefits of the improved market position that lead and zinc have enjoyed recently—the industry leaders have, in my opinion, taken a very constructive approach and, in the overall national interest, agreed, and persuaded others to agree, to the release of the 150,000 tons each of lead and zinc that is provided for in H.R. 1496 and H.R. 1658.

In the circumstances, we should be hesitant to cloud the issue at this time by giving consideration to the release of any additional amounts of lead and zinc. In this connection, let me point out that it makes no difference, in my opinion, whether the additional amounts that might be authorized for release would be authorized for sale or for use by Federal agencies, because the use of stockpiled material by a Federal agency displaces a like amount of material that would otherwise come through normal market channels and therefore constitutes an inroad on the normal sources of supply. At the same time, I do not think that it makes any particular difference whether the material to be released comes from one inventory or the other and if, as some of the consuming industries have indicated, there is a possibility that material more suitable for some of the necessary immediate uses can be found in the supplemental stockpile, rather than in the national stockpile, it seems only appropriate to provide for the release of materials from both stockpiles to assure that these consumer needs are met satisfactorily.

Mr. Speaker, I understand that the General Services Administration, under the leadership of Mr. Maurice J. Connell, has, in coordination with the various segments of the lead-zinc industry, developed disposal plans that are acceptable to the industries. These plans provide for initial offerings of a portion of the lead and zinc tonnages that would be released under the legislation before you, to be followed by further consultation by General Services Administration with other affected Federal agencies as well as with segments of the industries before disposing of the balance of the tonnages that are made available for disposal.

Not only do I want to compliment Mr. Connell for his performance in the development of these particular disposal plans, but I would like to take this opportunity to commend him for the cooperation he has exhibited with our committee and with industry in general in connection with the various disposals of metals and minerals that have been accomplished by the GSA.

The Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs has, as I indicated a moment ago, been concerned with these matters over a long period of time. We have been continually following the specific questions involved in connection with lead and zinc, including mine production as well as the level of producers and consumers stocks.

In view of the present market conditions, I urge favorable considera-

pital attendants had arrived with an emergency ambulance.

Despite her objections (she asked to go to Roosevelt Hospital, a private hospital she had stayed at 4 years before when she underwent minor stomach surgery), she was taken to Knickerbocker Hospital, a private hospital in Harlem.

After a preliminary examination, doctors learned that she had suffered a stroke and severe dehydration brought on by diabetes. They then told her relatives—a grandson and two cousins—that Knickerbocker, the hospital she had been brought to, did not have any ward space to accommodate her.

At this point, her grandson telephoned Roosevelt Hospital and was told by someone in emergency admissions that there was room there and an ambulance would be sent to Knickerbocker to pick her up.

After a second ambulance ride and a second examination at Roosevelt (which produced the same details as the earlier one), she was told that her grandson had been misinformed—and that Roosevelt also did not have any ward space available.

While she waited alone and unattended in a small room off the emergency entrance for nearly 2 hours, one doctor finally got around to trying to find a bed for her somewhere. Because there is no daily master list of available bed space in New York's hospitals, the doctor had to call each hospital individually.

Though city records later showed that there were more than 3,000 unused beds in New York hospitals that day, the doctor was unable to find a bed for the aged woman until his seventh call—to Metropolitan Hospital.

It was not until nearly 7 p.m., more than 8 hours since she had been picked up by the first emergency ambulance, that the 84-year-old woman was finally settled in a hospital bed and received treatment.

In just 1 day, 84-year-old Anna Gross (an alias) had become a victim of the city—and what makes it so much worse is that it could have happened to any old and disabled New Yorker with limited resources. In fact, it had already happened to thousands of aging New Yorkers before her.

It is rarely easy to be old and it is never easy to be poor in any city. But, for those both old and poor, life in New York City today has become a nightmare—where, forgotten by their families, the aged find themselves increasingly ignored by the city.

TOO LITTLE FOR TOO FEW, TOO LATE

In the last census, 813,827 New Yorkers—more than the total population of San Francisco or Washington, D.C.—reported they were 65 or older, with 229,663 above 75.

This represents an increase of 749 percent since the turn of the century compared to a 126-percent increase for the city's total population. Today, 1 in every 10 New Yorkers is 65 or older and, by 1970, more than 1.5 million residents are expected to fall into this age group.

What makes the aged problem so critical is that this group's income and opportunities have not kept pace with its increased longevity. Of New York's aged families, 102,712 had incomes of less than \$3,000 in 1960. And, of the 144,127 living alone or with nonrelatives, 70 percent earned less than \$2,000 a year.

Despite an annual city outlay of more than \$300 million for institutional care for the aged, the Citizens Committee on Aging, a branch of the Community Council of Greater New York, believes that "unfortunately for both the taxpayer and the elderly, this amounts to 'too little for too few, too late.'"

"We all know that there are many aged and aging persons who need some kind of care including preventive care, who are not now getting it," said Mayor Robert Wagner. "There are many who could remain or be re-

turned as active and productive members of our society if they could be given proper rehabilitation, and the social guidance that is part of scientific rehabilitation work. The costs involved are immense but what we could save, both socially and economically, by doing what we should for our senior citizens, is also immense."

Mayor Wagner made this statement in October of 1962. Yet today, more than 2 years later, the problems of New York's aged and aging remain critical and no closer to solution.

Medical care is perhaps the greatest problem for the aged of New York City but housing is not far behind. Despite the construction of 2,866 apartments designed and priced for the elderly (another 6,897 are either under construction or in planning), more than 50,000 elderly single New Yorkers still live in substandard dwellings with no place to go, no one to turn to, and little hope for the future.

What is it like to be old, poor, and disabled in New York City?

WHERE TO GO—NURSING HOMES INADEQUATE

Let's take a closer look at Anna Gross, a New Yorker for all but the first 10 of her 84 years. Since the death of her son in 1951, the widow had lived off his insurance and savings in a small apartment on West 82d Street, between Columbus and Amsterdam Avenues.

Unable to collect social security because of a technicality (unaware that the law had been amended in 1959, making her eligible, she had failed to file in time), she had relied on a series of elderly boarders.

Despite her increasing age, she had remained in good health, physically sound and mentally alert. And, despite one grandson and several cousins who lived outside the city, she had remained totally self-sufficient and self-sustaining, spending her leisure hours socializing with her aging neighbors and watching television.

This was her life until last July. It will never be the same again.

Within 6 weeks after her admission to Metropolitan Hospital, her diabetes was fully under control and, despite paralysis of one arm and leg due to the stroke, she was considered mentally alert enough and physically able enough for discharge.

The problem, however, was where could she go. She could not return to her apartment because she no longer could take care of herself. She could not afford a nurse because her savings had dwindled to nearly \$1,000. And she could not move in with her relatives because they did not have sufficient room for her.

Obviously, she needed to be discharged into a nursing home, but in New York City, when a patient's savings are limited and she is unable to care for herself, this is no longer an easy matter.

Oddly enough, the majority of nursing homes in this city, both public and private, are not equipped to take care of patients who need 24-hour medical attention or who are unable to take care of themselves. And some of the others—particularly the private homes supported by charitable organizations—lose interest when they learn a patient or his relatives are unable to make a contribution at the time of admission.

It is not at all unusual for a patient to be accepted (which means he is acceptable but then must wait on a waiting list of indefinite length) while, at the same time, a relative is told by an official of the charity home that, because of his income, he should contribute a specified amount to the home.

What happens if he doesn't is always left unsaid.

Two months after she was ready for discharge and nearly 5 weeks after a hospital social caseworker had filed for welfare, Mrs.

Gross had still not heard from the Amsterdam Welfare Center.

This did not happen last week or the week before—when the department of welfare was terribly undermanned because of its strike of 7,000 workers.

This happened last fall—when the department was supposed to be operating at full strength.

Telephone calls by the hospital worker and by her relatives invariably found the Welfare Center's phones busy. And, finally, when a call did manage to go through, it was, at first impossible to locate the application or the worker assigned to handle it.

While she waited, Mrs. Gross was moved half a dozen times from one room in a ward to another, at one point spending several nights in the hallways.

The longer she stayed—and the longer she waited—the more she felt she was being ignored by the hospital's doctors and nurses. Whether right or wrong, she was convinced that, as one of the few white, English-speaking patients in the ward, she was being discriminated against.

Yet, to an outsider, a visitor to the wards of Metropolitan Hospital, discrimination, even if it does exist, is only a minor problem facing the hospital's patients. For many of the patients—white, Negro, or Puerto Rican—the attitude and caliber of the staff creates a far more considerable hardship.

SICK PATIENTS—IGNORED BY NURSES

Typical was one afternoon last fall.

Despite six buzzer calls from six different patients all seeking assistance in the same ward, two registered nurses and five lesser female employees continued talking in their room at the entrance to the ward. When a visitor told them that one patient had vomited all over herself and needed assistance, the head nurse said it would be taken care of.

Fifteen minutes later, though five of the women including the nurse in charge remained in the room talking, not one of the six patients had been attended to. Reminded by the visitor, the head nurse snapped, "We heard you the first time, Mister. We'll take care of it when we have time."

It was another 10 minutes before the six patients were attended to.

"I don't mind dying of old age but I don't want to be killed," Mrs. Gross told her relatives. "Please get me out of here."

Her fears and her complaints are by no means unique. Other patients at Metropolitan and the other city hospitals have suffered for years because of the city's failure to attract and satisfy top personnel.

This does not mean, however, that all city hospitals and all city hospital employees are inferior. That is clearly untrue. It does mean, however, that many patients and the city, which is paying for most of them, frequently are not getting their money's worth.

Though a welfare investigator finally did get around to checking out Mrs. Gross' case, she was able to leave Metropolitan Hospital only when a relative found a vacancy for her in the Kingsbridge Heights Nursing Home in the upper Bronx. Yet—even in her transfer—the aged woman was to receive a further example of a city hospital in action.

One morning, a few days before she left the hospital, someone (no one seems to remember exactly who it was) moved her from one room to another. During the moving, the woman's dentures, which had been in a glass next to her bed, disappeared. Though she repeatedly asked for them during the next few days, she received neither the teeth, nor an explanation.

A STATISTIC—CITY WOULD LIKE TO FORGET

Finally, after a relative wrote the hospital supervisor demanding an explanation, the hospital replied in a letter several weeks later that the dentures apparently had been lost.

The hospital was extremely sorry for the inconvenience and added that, if the patient wanted to file a claim, she should do it with the department of hospitals.

The letter did not bother to say what the woman was supposed to do until she received funds from the city (which could drag out endlessly) to replace the dentures.

Mrs. Gross remained at the home in the upper Bronx for 5 weeks sharing a small room in a private home with four other aged women. For \$95 a week, which she paid out of her remaining savings, she received her room and her board (because she had no teeth she could eat only a bland diet). The weekly doctor's visits and medication were extra.

She liked the home but, when an opening came up in a larger home with medical treatment included, she decided to move.

Now, in another home in the Bronx, she has turned over all but \$120 of her savings (which the city welfare people have permitted her to keep for burial expenses). She had been assured by administrators of the home that she now has nothing to worry about. They have told her that when her funds run out the department of welfare will continue to pay for her upkeep at the home.

Her relatives have told her that they will not contribute to her upkeep and now, because of the welfare strike and the announcement that only emergency new cases will be accepted until it is settled, she doesn't know what will happen to her.

Like a great many other older New Yorkers, Anna Gross has given up. In just 7 months, she has learned that the city and the people who work for it have little time and less interest in her problems and what becomes of her.

To her relatives, who cannot afford to support her and don't have room enough to take her in, she has become something of a burden.

To the people who run the home she now lives in, she has become little more than a means of obtaining welfare funds from the city.

And to the city itself, she has become a statistic, a number the administration would like to forget.

To New York, a city which has failed to provide adequate services and a good life for its young and middle-aged citizens, the problems of the aged may seem secondary. But to a city in which the aged population has increased sharply and will continue to increase in the next decade, it is a problem that no longer can be ignored.

NEW YORK CITY IN CRISIS—CITY HOSPITALS: A PRODUCT OF BUREAUCRACY

(By Claude Lewis and Barry Gottehrer)

Isalah Lee is a 30-year-old Formosan who can speak and understand Chinese, Japanese, French and English. He cannot, however, speak or understand Spanish.

For most New Yorkers, this linguistic limitation would present no special problem. But Isalah Lee is an exception. He is a social caseworker, employed by the department of hospitals, at Manhattan's Metropolitan Hospital where the majority of the patients are Puerto Ricans who speak and understand only Spanish.

It is his job to obtain detailed biographical and financial information from each of 150 patients assigned to him, make applications for welfare and then help the patients prepare for care after discharge.

EXPEDIENCY

The fact that he is bright (he holds a master's degree from the University of Nebraska) and dedicated hasn't made it any easier for him or his patients in the 7 months he has worked at the hospital.

Because of his heavy accent, most of his patients (even English-speaking ones) have difficulty understanding his questions. And,

because of his inability to speak or understand Spanish, he has even greater difficulty in understanding their answers. Yet even when he has been able to communicate with his patients, he has learned that it is almost impossible to help them.

Unfortunately, this tragic lack of understanding and communication is not limited to Isalah Lee and his patients at Metropolitan Hospital. Today, it permeates almost every level of life in New York City where the government has consistently failed its workers and has increasingly forgotten about its citizens.

Metropolitan Hospital, located on the outskirts of Spanish Harlem at 97th Street and First Avenue, is certainly not the worst of the 21 city hospitals. It is not the best either.

Yet 1 month there—as a worker or as a patient—is enough to convince anyone that the city, despite a talented and diligent commissioner of hospitals, is clearly not keeping pace with its problems.

According to the department of hospitals' personnel section, the only requirement for Mr. Lee's position as social caseworker is a master's degree in social casework from an accredited college.

NO TEST REQUIRED

No test, no language proficiency and no depth interview are required, according to a department spokesman. Since the job pays \$6,290 a year to start and reaches a maximum of only \$7,490 after approximately 6 years, the city cannot afford to be particularly selective in its hiring. Top personnel, if they accept a lower-rung city job, rarely stay long before moving elsewhere, generally into private industry.

Seated in a narrow fifth-floor office within walking distance of the four wards he must cover daily, Isalah Lee is surrounded by paperwork and buried by bureaucracy.

Dozens of applications for welfare are piled neatly in one corner of the desk, many of them still unanswered though he had forwarded them to one of the city's welfare centers weeks and even months before.

Mr. Lee no longer is surprised by the waiting. Since there is no master list showing exactly which nursing home might have a vacancy, Mr. Lee is faced with three choices:

He can telephone each of the city's more than 50 public and private nursing homes each day (which he simply doesn't have time to do).

He can rely on relatives and friends (if they are willing) to find a home for the patient.

Or, overwhelmed by the workload, frustrated by the redtape, and distressed by the lack of progress, he can simply give up. Like a great many other people working for the city, secure in their jobs regardless of their performance, he can become immune to anyone's problems but his own.

Isalah Lee has not yet given up but it is not because he did not have considerable reason.

"We have many people here who are too old and senile to do much for," he said. "It's the others who are still alert, who don't belong in a hospital any more but have no place to go. You want to help them and you try to help them. But things move very slowly, very very slowly. You want to do more but you can't."

It is not that the supervisors at Metropolitan Hospital are unaware of these problems. They are. But, for them, the problems and frustrations are so far ranging that they stagger the imagination.

Once located on Welfare Island, Metropolitan Hospital moved to its present location in 1957 and today, with 1,000 beds (the same number it had in 1957), it serves all of the people living and working in an area that stretches from river to river and from 42d to 116th Streets.

"Our No. 1 problem is overcrowding," says Dr. Ferdinand Piazza, administrator of the hospital. "On occasion, we have to treat patients in an outpatient clinic when they should be in the hospital. It's what we call a calculated risk. There just isn't any place to put all of the people who should be in bed in a hospital with proper nursing, quiet, facilities required to bring them back to a healthy state. We could use another 1,000 beds here in order to function at a good and proper level to meet the needs of our community."

NURSE SHORTAGE

In 1964, Metropolitan Hospital treated 505,995 people, an average of nearly 1,400 a day, in its outpatient clinic with a staff of only 68, including only 36 nurses.

To take care of more than 24,000 inpatients each year (only Bellevue and Kings County have more), Mrs. Ruth Rose, senior supervisor of nursing at the hospital, says she needs 297 registered nurses. Right now, Metropolitan has only 74 registered nurses on its staff.

"I would rather have 297 registered nurses than \$1 million," says Mrs. Rose, who has been forced to hire 219 practical nurses (less educated, less experienced, and not permitted to perform many duties a registered nurse can) to try and make up for the shortage. "It's hard to get people to work nights, because of attacks by men in this area. It's not safe to walk the streets here at night. We complain and get some relief, but we need more police in the area."

Because of the limited pay scale, the overcrowded, understaffed conditions, the difficulty in accomplishing anything, and the locations (many are in or nearby slum areas), the city hospitals have been forced to settle for second best in personnel. Yet the problems at Metropolitan and other city hospitals are by no means limited to the quantity and quality of its personnel.

Typical is Metropolitan's request for a generator. Several years ago, when the city suffered a massive power failure, the city government decided that each of its hospitals must have generators just in case the city's power should ever fail again. Today, nearly 4 years since the major city power failure, Metropolitan still is without its generators. The reason for the delay? Redtape.

A HOPE

"We expect them soon," said Dr. Piazza, and smiled.

Despite its \$15 million budget (only Bellevue and Kings County are larger), there is still a daily shortage of towels, sheets, and more vital equipment.

"Sometimes it takes a full year to get a piece of equipment you really need," says Dr. Piazza.

Though the hospital personnel and administrators are frustrated and disillusioned by the city's inability and indifference to their problems, it is the patient who inevitably must pay, with his health and occasionally with his life.

(Mr. MULTER (at the request of Mr. Dow) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. MULTER'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

OPEN LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

(Mr. BINGHAM (at the request of Mr. Dow) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, all of us today are concerned about the situation in Vietnam. The President is being criticized from all sides. I believe, however, that there is far more widespread support for the President's approach to the problem than appears from the public media.

I have developed this thought in an open letter to the President, which I am sending him today. It reads as follows:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: If one were to judge from the public media, one might suppose that the general line you have been following in Vietnam has little support in this country. Most speeches, articles or ads attack you for being either too hard or too soft. On the one hand, we have the Goldwaters, the Nixons, and the Joe Alsops, calling for full-scale war against North Vietnam and maybe Communist China. On the other hand, we have all kinds of people, including especially many liberals, who are either urging a pullout from Vietnam or who keep telling you to negotiate, negotiate, negotiate.

While they may not be so outspoken, the majority of the American people refuse as you do to accept an oversimplified either/or position. While they are miserably unhappy about the situation (as I am sure you are) and while they may wish that a cease-fire were in effect and negotiations for a viable settlement were going on (as I am sure you do also), they do not want you to let the Communists have their way in Vietnam and they do not want you to widen the war.

Hanson Baldwin's article in time magazine for February 21, which I take to be a statement of the views of many Pentagon military men, is a brilliant exposition of a policy the American people in my view simply will not support. Mr. Baldwin calls for a Korean-type war in Vietnam, fully recognizing the likelihood that Red China would probably be drawn in. Pointing to the Cuban precedent, he predicts that the Soviet Union would not respond with nuclear attacks, and he may be right, but to bomb North Vietnam's vitals, would the American people be prepared to accept the risks they were prepared to accept to get Soviet missiles, aimed at our vitals, out of Cuba? I doubt it. The threat in Vietnam to our security is too indirect, too remote, and the benefits to be reaped are too tenuous and uncertain.

Stand fast against the "hawks," Mr. President. The American people are with you.

At the same time, as the polls show, majority sentiment in this country is not for a pullout from Vietnam. There is wide recognition of what such a decision would do to the morale of our friends around the world who are resisting communism—in Thailand, in the Philippines, in West Berlin, in Venezuela—and to their confidence in us. (I found last summer, even in countries such as Burma and India, people hoping that the United States will not withdraw and leave southeast Asia completely unprotected against the Chinese Communists.)

But what about these more and more frequent appeals to you to negotiate? Do these perhaps reflect American public opinion? After all, Americans are great believers in the conference table.

Here again, I suspect that your position is more widely understood than the flood of published comment might indicate. The question surely is not as simple as many of the appeals imply. It is not whether to negotiate, but under what circumstances, with whom, with what end in view, and with what prospects of success.

As traders, Americans can understand that. They might understand it better if you could spell it out for them, but they know you can't lay all your cards on the table. It may well be, for example, that you have concluded that any settlement in Vietnam,

in order to be viable, must be part of a package involving the settlement of many broader issues affecting the future of the Far East, but that you do not feel in a position today to indicate your thinking as to the outlines of such a broader settlement.

To those of my fellow liberals who keep urging a cease-fire and negotiations, I should like to suggest a few questions worth pondering:

Why should Peiping be interested in serious negotiations over Vietnam now (except for our virtual surrender)? If North Vietnam might have greater reason to call off the fighting, what can we do to widen this potential area of disagreement between Hanoi and Peiping? Can we work with the Soviet Union in this area? What steps can we take to strengthen the position of the South Vietnamese Government among the people of South Vietnam? If a neutralization of all Vietnam could be achieved, as suggested by De Gaulle, what guarantees could be provided against a Laos-type erosion of the agreement? In light of the absence from the U.N. of both Vietnams and mainland China, and in light of the permanent members' veto power in the Security Council, what else can the U.N. realistically do beyond providing a peacekeepers presence if an agreement is reached? What is the necessary relationship, if any, between a cease-fire and negotiations (remembering that in Korea we negotiated for many months while the fighting continued)?

You, Mr. President, are well aware of these questions. They represent just a few of the complexities involved, complexities which too often seem ignored by the simple pleas to negotiate. Last fall Senator Goldwater was rightly accused of oversimplifying international problems. Some of your liberal friends who today are criticizing you, Mr. President, might do well to consider whether they are not oversimplifying from the other end of the political spectrum.

I hope and believe, Mr. President, that you agree with the view that in the long run military measures alone cannot solve the problems of Vietnam and that a new political settlement must be our objective. I hope and believe that you and your advisers are giving great thought to the possible nature of such a settlement and to the possible means for achieving it. What you can tell us about all this would be welcome and, I am sure, reassuring. But, whether you can tell us or not, the world knows that you are no jingoist and that you desperately want to preserve the peace. (The general reaction overseas to our recent retaliatory bombings confirms the widespread trust of the United States and its motives.) The world also knows that, remembering Munich and the Sudetenland, you realize that appeasement is not the way to preserve the peace.

There is nothing easier in this complex world of ours than to frame false either/or imperatives. More often than not, such expressions represent a kind of immature impatience. A measure of our maturity, as we perform carry the responsibilities of the most powerful nation on earth, may well be the degree to which we are willing to accept the burdens of long-term sacrifices and resist the false appeal of quick solutions that may well represent disaster. That you, Mr. President, will meet this test is the conviction of this Congressman and, I believe, of the majority of the Congress and the American people.

Respectfully yours,

JONATHAN B. BINGHAM,
Member of Congress.

APPORTIONMENT OF STATE LEGISLATURES

(Mr. ICHORD (at the request of Mr. Dow) was granted permission to extend

his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Speaker, article V of the U.S. Constitution reads in part as follows:

The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress.

Last December I met in Chicago with leaders of the Council of State Governments and it was later decided that the council would urge the legislatures of the various States to petition the Congress to either call a convention or submit an amendment to the Constitution for ratification. Last week the Missouri Legislature finally passed the resolution proposed by the council and is one of the 16 States to have done so. It should be noted that the wording of the resolution is identical to House Joint Resolution 64 which I have introduced. Those of us who have introduced resolutions on this very important constitutional issue are determined that the Congress should have the opportunity to vote on a constitutional amendment in the very near future. To this end we have formed a steering committee to press for immediate consideration. As a member of the steering committee I intend to take all action available to us under the rules to reach a vote as early as possible.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks in the body of the RECORD and include a copy of House Concurrent Resolution No. 2, as passed by the Missouri General Assembly by a vote of 109 to 45 in the House of Representatives and 21 to 11 in the Missouri Senate:

HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 2

Be it resolved by the house of representatives (the senate concurring), That this legislature respectfully applies to the Congress of the United States to call a convention for the purpose of proposing the following article as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States:

"ARTICLE —

"SECTION 1. Nothing in this Constitution shall prohibit any State which shall have a bicameral legislature from apportioning the membership of one house of such legislature on factors other than population, provided that the plan if such apportionment shall have been submitted to and approved by a vote of the electorate of that State;

"Sec. 2. Nothing in this Constitution shall restrict or limit a State in its determination of how membership governing bodies of its subordinate units shall be apportioned.

"Sec. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress; be it further

"Resolved, That if Congress shall have proposed an amendment to the Constitution identical with that contained in this resolution prior to June 1, 1965, this application for a convention shall no longer be of any force or effect; be it further

"Resolved, That a duly attested copy of this resolution be immediately transmitted to the Secretary of the Senate of the United States, the Clerk of the House of Representatives of the United States, and to each Member of the Congress from this State."

THE ROLE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

(Mr. GONZALEZ (at the request of Mr. Dow) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, the charter that emerged from the meeting of the American Republics at Punta del Este, Uruguay, from August 5 to 17, 1961, is destined to be remembered as one of the most comprehensive and significant documents of the 20th century. This charter, which established the Alliance for Progress, is only 3½ years old. It is widely known but not widely understood. For I believe that in the years to come, when the Charter of Punta del Este, has had the chance to be sufficiently used and tested to achieve the purposes for which it was designed, it will earn its place alongside the Magna Carta, our own Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, the Constitution of Mexico, and the other great instruments of freedom and social justice.

One of the noteworthy achievements of the charter is its recognition of the role that organized labor must play in any national program of social and economic development. The preamble to the charter states:

We, the American Republics, hereby proclaim our decision to unite in a common effort to bring our people accelerated economic progress and broader social justice within the framework of personal dignity and political liberty.

The charter itself expands upon this lofty goal and sets out the basic requirements for economic and social development. According to chapter II of title II:

1. Participating Latin American countries agree to introduce or strengthen systems for the preparation, execution, and periodic revision of national programs for economic and social development consistent with the principles, objectives, and requirements contained in this document. Participating Latin American countries should formulate long-term development programs.

Such national development programs are supposed to incorporate self-help efforts directed toward "improvement of human resources and widening of opportunities by providing adequate remuneration for work performed, encouraging the talents of managers, entrepreneurs, and wage earners; providing more productive employment for underemployed manpower; establishing effective systems of labor relations, and procedures for consultation and collaboration among public authorities, employer associations, and labor organizations."

Labor participates in the Alliance primarily through the American Institute for Free Labor Development—AIFLD—a nonprofit organization supported jointly by unions, employers, and government. It has operated as a school to

train Latin American labor leaders and as an arm for the planning and construction of social projects in Latin America. The fact that the Alliance has helped build 200,000 new houses is a partial tribute to the success of this phase of the program.

In the February 1965 issue of the *Boilermakers-Blacksmiths Record*, the publication of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, is an article entitled "The Alliance for Progress." This well written and illuminating article, by Lester L. Zosel, tells the story of labor's role in the Alliance. It is succinct and well worth reading for the understanding of our international partnership with the countries of Latin America which it furthers. With unanimous consent I am inserting the article by Lester L. Zosel in the Record:

THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS—SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN THE AMERICAS OR POVERTY, CHAOS, AND CONTINUED OPPRESSION?

(By Lester L. Zosel)

On March 13, 1961, the late President Kennedy announced that he was calling upon all of the people of this hemisphere to join in an "Alliance for Progress . . . a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land, health and schools."

He unveiled this sweeping new program to a group of Latin American leaders attending a White House reception. The next day, March 14, he sent his program to Congress with a request for the necessary funds to give it life. In August 1961 the charter for the Alliance was signed by representatives of 20 nations at a conference in Punta del Este, Uruguay.

The signers were: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Naturally, the newspapers and other communications media gave publicity to the Alliance when it was announced, as is the case with Presidential proclamations. There also was reporting on the Punta del Este conference. But what have you read or heard about it since? Chances are, the answer is "very little."

The chances are greater still that you have read nothing in the daily press regarding the role being played by United States and Latin American labor in this worthy project. Such participation by labor is designed to insure that assistance reaches those for whom it is intended.

For the most part the continuing story of the Alliance has been shamefully ignored by most of our Nation's newspapers, magazines, radio, and television—this despite the fact that the Alliance is a program involving money, plans, and far-reaching objectives to dwarf anything of its kind in past history.

Unfortunately, this article, limited as it must be, cannot begin to fill the news gap on the Alliance. Instead, my modest design is to bring you an appreciation of the program's importance and its staggering dimension, and to describe labor's role in helping to advance its nobility of purpose.

The sweep of the Alliance is best illustrated by its charter, wherein signatories are pledged to achieving a long list of imposing objectives—economic and social development, land and tax reforms, improved wages and working conditions, better housing, a greatly reduced rate of illiteracy, stabilized

prices, improved health and sanitation, stimulated private enterprise, and stronger democratic institutions.

Notable advancement toward these goals is expected to require at least \$100 billion over the next 10 years. Latin American nations will provide some \$80 billion of that amount. The United States has pledged a major share of the remaining \$20 billion. However, some funds also are coming from other nations, international organizations, and private enterprise.

The task of implementing U.S. participation in the Alliance falls to the Agency for International Development, a State Department Agency which administers foreign aid programs. U.S. funds for the Alliance come out of the annual foreign aid authorizations by Congress. AID's Administrator has the authority and responsibility for carrying out Alliance projects.

The Alliance, unlike too many foreign aid programs in the past, has prerequisites for those who are to receive its assistance—individuals, communities, or governments. Recipients must prove they also are trying to help themselves, plans are required to have some long-range characteristics and Latin American governments are committed to make long-overdue reforms.

While these prerequisites still are not being met as rapidly as hoped for, the Alliance has brought reforms, to varying degrees, in Latin America.

Sixteen countries have improved their tax programs within the past year. A number of these have tightened up collections on previously wealthy families. Tax revenues in some countries are up as much as 30 percent. Land reform has been undertaken in 12 countries since 1960.

What are Alliance's accomplishments in 3 years of existence? That's a big question—far too big to be fully answered here. How will anyone be able to tabulate, at any given time, the results of a "peaceful revolution" that is to stretch through a 7,000-mile-long continent inhabited by more than 200 million people living in jungles, mountains and massive cities?

Even so, AID Administrator David E. Bell has assembled some impressive statistics. He reported that by the end of June the Alliance will have helped to build 220,000 new houses, constructed more than 23,000 classrooms, trained 20,000 new teachers and printed 6 million books. Over 550 mobile health units, hospitals and health centers will have been established.

More than 200,000 agricultural loans have been made. Nearly 15 million people in more than 1,000 towns and villages now get clean water from Alliance-built supply systems. Millions of dollars in loans are supporting industrial development; electric powerlines are going up; roads are being built; community development programs are clearing slums, fighting disease, and improving diets. Credit unions and cooperatives have blossomed forth in more than a dozen countries.

Not only does the Alliance charter call for labor's participation in its great endeavor, but it also lists establishing of effective labor relations as an important "self help" to be initiated in developing a project. This firm recognition of labor's importance has brought strong support for the Alliance from free unions throughout the Western Hemisphere.

The American Institute for Free Labor Development is the key instrument for labor's participation. Begun in 1960, it is a nonprofit organization supported jointly by unions, employers, and government. AFL-CIO President George Meany is its president. Its executive director is Serafino Romualdi, a man of wide experience in labor's inter-American affairs. The Brotherhood of Railway Clerks chief executive officer, George M.